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Abstract 
I 
Abstract 
Granted stock option compensation, executives can purchase a certain number of 
stocks of the company at pre-determined price and conditions within a designated 
period of time in the future. Given the strike price is fixed, the higher the stock price is 
when executives exercise their rights, the more profits they will make from their stock 
option compensation. Thus when executives are reaping the highest yields from the 
stock option compensation, shareholders can also receive the highest benefits. Therefore, 
stock option compensation can align the interests of executives with those of 
shareholders, thus encouraging executives to maximize shareholders’ value of their own 
volition. To a great extent, executive stock option compensation can efficiently address 
the agency problems resulting from the separation of ownership and management in 
listed companies. 
But executive stock option compensation also has its own shortcomings or agency 
problems:  
A. Executives may be granted excessive stock option compensation because the 
compensation committee and its independent directors fail to perform their duties 
efficiently. Under the influence of executives, it is difficult for them to make objective, 
independent and fair compensation decisions.  
B. Stock option compensation may induce executives to violate securities law and 
regulations to satisfy the conditions for gaining their stock options, for exercising their 
rights, or for artificially raising the stock price when they exercise their rights so as to 
make excessive and unjust profits from their options.  
C. Stock option compensation may provide executives with the unethical incentives 
to time information disclosures by the means of causing their company’s stock price to 
drop shortly before the date of issuance or boosting the stock price shortly before the 
date of exercise so as to maximize the value of their options, which I call timing 
problem in this dissertation.  
D. Stock option compensation may wrongly encourage executives to pursue 
short-term profits through making excessive risk-taking investments, cutting R&D 
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budgets or laying off masses of workers at the costs of the long-term interests of 
shareholders, which I call short-termism problem in this dissertation. 
E. Due to executives’ huge influence, they may be granted windfalls by the board or 
the compensation committee (e.g. the strike price will not be raised even if the good 
performance of the company is due to the good market development), which cannot 
coexist with the objective of this kind of compensation from the perspective of 
shareholders, which I call windfalls problem in this dissertation.   
This dissertation intends to make some suggestions to address the aforementioned 
five agency problems of executive stock option compensation through three different 
legal approaches: first, enhancing supervision inside the company; second, enhancing 
supervision by compensation consultants; and third, enhancing supervision by public 
authorities. Furthermore, each approach is divided into two strategies: ex ante strategy 
and ex post strategy. Frankly speaking, I have no expectation that my suggestions will 
completely address these agency problems. I only hope that my suggestions can do 
better than current laws and regulations, thus improving the development of executive 
stock option compensation in China. 
The core suggestions of this dissertation are: 
A. The role of the compensation committee shall be expanded. 1. It shall be granted 
the sole power to make executive stock option compensation; and 2. It shall be granted 
the exclusive power to hire, compensate, supervise and fire its own compensation 
consultant. 
B. The role of the independent directors in the compensation committee shall be 
expanded. 1. They shall be granted stock compensation to align their interests with 
those of shareholders; 2. More efficient shame sanctions shall be imposed on them 
through well-defined power and the improved disclosure of executive stock option 
compensation; 3. Independent, objective and professional advice shall be provided to 
them; and 4. More efficient threat of civil liabilities shall be imposed on them through 
easier shareholders’ derivative suits and clear and stricter standard of judicial review.  
C. The CSRC shall play a critical role in addressing the aforementioned agency 
problems in China, where the powers of the courts and the capital market are not strong. 
1. It shall update and improve its disclosure rules to make the disclosure of executive 
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stock option compensation more understandable, transparent and comprehensive to 
minority shareholders and the media; 2. It also shall establish the non-independence 
standard of a compensation consultant and ban it from providing professional opinions 
on the stock option plans; and 3. It shall make “comply or explain” rules to address 
three specific agency problems (timing problem, short-termism problem and windfalls 
problem) of executive stock option compensation. 
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Introduction 
 
1 
Introduction 
I. Executive Stock Option Compensation and Its Functions 
A. Approaches to address the agency problems in listed companies 
For a listed company, the purpose of corporate governance
1
 is to efficiently resolve 
the agency problems
2
 caused by the separation of ownership and management. These 
agency problems include: executives
3
 stealing their company’s business opportunities, 
executives trading with their company, executives making reckless decisions and so 
on.  
Generally speaking, these agency problems can be addressed in two legal 
approaches:
4
 one is strengthening supervision (the stick); another is providing 
incentive (the carrot). The supervision approach includes: 1. empowering 
shareholders (e.g. accumulating voting and shareholders’ derivate suits); 2. expanding 
the role of independent directors; 3. enhancing directors and executives’ fiduciary 
duties (duty of care and duty of loyalty) to their company; and 4. other methods 
outside a company: (1) enhancing gatekeepers’ supervision, for instance, lawyers 
checking the reliability of disclosed information; (2) enhancing supervision by 
regulators, for example enhancing supervision by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC); and (3) enhancing the supervision (judicial review) by courts. 
                                                          
1 Corporate governance has different meanings, see Jean Jacques du Plessis et al, Principles of Contemporary 
Corporate Governance (London: Cambridge University Press, 2005), at 1 (“One thing that is clear about the 
concept of corporate governance is that there is not set definition as to what it means.”). In this dissertation, 
corporate governance means to design a proper legal mechanism (both inside and outside a listed company) to 
deter controlling shareholders or executives from pursuing their own interests at the costs of the minority 
shareholders or the shareholders as a whole. 
2 There are three kinds of agency problems in a listed company: 1. the conflicts of interest between shareholders 
and executives; 2. the conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders; and 3. 
the conflicts of interest between a company itself and other parties with whom it contracts, such as creditors, 
employees and customers. See Reinier H. Kraakman et al, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and 
Functional Approach (Second Edition) (London: Oxford University Press, 2009), at 36. In this dissertation, I 
will try to argue how executive stock option compensation can efficiently resolve the 1 and 2 agency problems. 
In economics, the losses caused by these agency problems, especially the conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and executives, are called agency costs, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporation Law and 
Economics (New York: Foundation Press, 2002), at 35-38. 
3 In this dissertation, “executives” refers to “the manager, vice managers, chief financial officers, the secretary of 
the board of directors of a listed company, or any other persons provided in the bylaw” (Article 217 (1) of the 
Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2005 Revision) (promulgated by the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress, effective Jan. 1, 2006, hereinafter Company Law) and includes the executives 
also act as non-independent directors, who are called “executive directors”. 
4 Surely, these agency problems may also be addressed in a market approach, such as the market for executives, 
the products market and the market for corporate control. However, this dissertation only discusses the legal 
approaches. 
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The incentive approach includes: 1. promoting executives’ positions in the company; 
and 2. awarding executives attractive compensation. Awarding attractive 
compensation is a very important method for addressing these agency problems in 
China, because the bankruptcy system and the M&A market are inefficient in the 
country; meanwhile the minority shareholders cannot easily supervise the directors 
and executives, thus executives’ compensation becomes more important. 5  Stock 
option compensation--the focus of this dissertation--has several key functions, which 
make it the most important element of the executives’ whole compensation package.6 
B. The functions of executive stock option compensation 
In general, as they are granted stock option compensation, executives have the 
rights, but not the obligations, to purchase certain amounts of the company’s stocks at 
pre-determined price (strike price) and conditions within a designated period of time 
in the future determined ex ante.
7
 In essence, stock option compensation refers to the 
contracts between a company and its executives, which are usually called stock option 
plans in practice. Suppose the timing is right and the stock price is higher than the 
strike price (in-the-money), executives will exercise their rights; but if the stock price 
is equal to (at-the-money) or lower than (out-of-the-money) the strike price, 
executives will not exercise their rights. Hence, given the strike price is fixed, the 
higher the stock price is when executives exercise their rights, the greater the profits 
executives will make from their stock option compensation. In theory, stock option 
compensation can yield unlimited profits with only the options themselves being at 
risk for loss. Stock option compensation for executives can serve four key functions in 
efficiently addressing agency problems in listed companies. 
1. Stock option compensation can align the interests of executives with those of the 
                                                          
5 See Yu Guang Hua, Regulation of the Remuneration of Executives: Through the Perspective of the Theory of 
Agency Device, Vol.27, No.2 Modern Law Science 181, 181 (2005).  
6 See Andrew C.W. Lund, Compensation As Signaling, 64 Florida L. R., 591, 600 (2012) (“Incentive pay was 
thought to work its magic where it was relatively difficult to observe managers’ behavior, where shareholders 
did not have the skill or motivation necessary to determine the proper business decision ex ante, and where 
executive decisions affected firm percentage returns rather than dollar returns. In those cases, market and legal 
discipline seemed to fail, and appropriately structured pay was thought to be a helpful device for preventing 
mass defection by managers away from share value maximization.”). 
7 Article 19 of the Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentive Plans of Listed Companies (For Trial 
Implementation) (promulgated by the CSRC, effective Jan. 1, 2006, hereinafter Measures for Equity Incentive 
Plans) provides, “the stock options as mentioned in the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans shall refer to the 
right of the eligible participants granted by a listed company to purchase a certain number of shares of the 
company within a certain period in the future at the pre-determined price and conditions. The eligible 
participants may purchase a certain number of shares of a listed company through the stock options granted to it 
at the pre-determined price and conditions within a prescribed time limit, or may waive such right.” Here, the 
“eligible participants” refers to those who are granted with stock options according to the stock option plan. 
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shareholders,
8
 thus encouraging executives to maximize the shareholders’ value9 of 
their own volition, which is the most efficient way to resolve agency problems. When 
the strike price is fixed, the higher the stock price is when executives exercise their 
rights, the more profits they will make from their options. As a result, when 
executives are reaping the highest yields from stock option compensation, the 
shareholders are also able to receive the highest benefits. He Qing Ming generalizes 
this process as “the executives’ hard-working determines the performance of a 
company, the performance of a company determines the stock price, and the stock 
price determines the executives’ compensation”. 10  Furthermore, as a group, 
executives are granted huge amounts of stock options at the same time, so this form of 
compensation encourages mutual supervision. For example, if some executives are 
able to make money from a decision that lowers the stock price while others cannot, 
the decision will likely be rejected by other executives.
11
 
2. Since executives invest most of their human capital into their companies, they 
                                                          
8 See Brian J. Hall, Six Challenges in Designing Equity-Based Pay, Vol.15 No.3 Journal of Corporate Finance 21, 
21 (2003) (“well-designed stock and stock option packages can increase corporate productivity and value by 
better aligning top managers’ interests with those of the shareholders”). Also see Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta 
Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 Yale J. on Reg. 
359, 363 (2009) (“incentive compensation in the form of stock and stock options is, in general, a highly 
effective mechanism for aligning manager and shareholder interests.”). 
9 In other words, stock option compensation encourages executives to maximize the stock price. To some extent, 
the stock price is the most objective and direct method of evaluating a company. “Although not a perfect 
measure of wealth creation, stock prices reflect the market’s estimate of the company’s current and future cash 
flows, which in turn reflect the market’s beliefs regarding the company’s investment or disinvestment 
opportunities and the managers’ response to those opportunities.” See Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, 
And Executive Compensation, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 713, 722 (1995). Since the Chinese capital market is a 
“weak-form efficiency” market, it could reflect the basic value of a company and allocate money relatively 
efficiently. See Zhang Bing & Li Xiao Ming, An Evolving Market Efficiency Test On Chinese Stock Market , 
No.1 Economic Research Journal 54, 61 (2003). However, because of the information asymmetry between 
investors, different expectations between a company’s future and irrational investment behaviors, some scholars 
believe that the stock price is a poor criterion for a company’s value, see Lynn A. Stout, Share Price As A Poor 
Criterion For Good Corporate Law, 3 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 43 (2005) (The author argues that because of the 
problem of private information; obstacles to effective arbitrage; investors’ cognitive defects and biases; options 
theory and the problem of multiple residual claimants; and the problem of corporate spillover effects that erode 
diversified shareholders returns, a tight connection between stock prices and underlying corporate wealth 
generation cannot be assumed any more.). This dissertation agrees that the stock price cannot perfectly reflect a 
company’s intrinsic value, but is the second best method. We have no other better method, or theory, at hand to 
evaluate a company. Another controversial question is whether the maximization of shareholders’ value is a 
desired goal of company law. It is a big question which is not suitable to be discussed in detail here. The short 
answer to this dissertation is yes, because shareholders are the residual claimers of a company, only the rights of 
other parties are satisfied, and the shareholders can earn profits. Only shareholders have the incentive to 
maximize the value of the company. Surely, under some situations, the maximization of shareholders’ value 
may harm the interests of creditors (e.g. when the company is on the verge of bankruptcy) or employees (e.g. 
firing employees to save costs), but these problems in maximizing the shareholders’ value can be resolved in  
bankruptcy law or labor law. So, at least, for the purpose of company law, maximization of the shareholders’ 
value is desirable. For more detailed discussion, see Seiichi Ochiai, The Elements of Corporate Law (Beijing: 
Law Press, Chinese translation edition, translated by Wu Ting et al., 2011), at 49-63. 
10  He Qing Ming, How the Equity Incentives Will Impact the Listed Companies and Investment 
Opportunities,Vol.6 Securities Market Herald 43, 44 (2007).  
11 Sharon Hannes, Reverse Monitoring: On the Hidden Role of Employee Stock Ownership Plans (August 23, 
2006), available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1608/ (The author argues that the recipient employee 
can be viewed as the potential monitor of other employees and that stock options motivate her to fulfill this 
task.). 
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cannot diversify their investments. If a company awards only fixed compensation to 
its executives, the risk-averse executives will not make optimal business decisions 
from the perspective of shareholders. This is because if these decisions are successful, 
they will not make extra money; but if the decisions fail, they could lose their jobs or 
suffer reputational sanctions. “A system of exclusively cash compensation creates its 
own perverse incentives, motivating managers to avoid risk and bankruptcy and to 
pursue inefficient growth maximization, because a larger firm size generally implied 
higher cash compensation for its senior managers.”12 On the contrary, if executives 
are granted stock option compensation, “they will undertake more risky but positive 
net present value and hence firm value-increasing projects.” 13  Considering 
shareholders’ limited liability and diversification-oriented investment strategies, risky 
decisions by executives are worth making.
14
 
3. For start-up companies, “offering employee stock options in lieu of cash 
compensation allows companies to attract highly motivated and entrepreneurial 
employees and also lets companies obtain employment services without (directly) 
expending cash.” 15  The best example of this function is the “Silicon Valley” 
phenomenon,
16
 where “the companies in the Silicon Valley grant those technology 
elites huge amounts of stock options, which creates a totally new culture ... If the 
Silicon Valley is said to be the engine of the world economy, stock option 
compensation is the fuel.”17 
4. In a company with concentrated ownership, in theory, controlling shareholders
18
 
are able to efficiently supervise executives, so stock option compensation seems 
                                                          
12 John C. Coffee JR., Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance (London: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), at 85. 
13 Shivaram Rajgopal & Terry Shevlin, Empirical Evidence on the Relation Between Stock Option Compensation 
and Risk Taking, 33 Journal of Accounting and Economics 145, 146 (2002). Also see Hall, supra note 8, at 29 
(“Options promote more risk-taking because increases in the volatility of a company’s stock price actually 
increase the value of its options (while leaving stock prices unaffected). Options can thus add value by 
encouraging managers to move the firm closer to its optimal level of risk.”). 
14 In order to offset the risks faced by executives (non-transferability and illiquidity (“put all the eggs in one 
blanket”)), a company shall grant its executives more compensation, which is called “risk premium”. See 
Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock 
Options, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 847, 859 (2002). Generally, the value of the stock options granted to executives is 
30% to 40% less than the market value of these options. See Hall, supra note 8, at 26. 
15 Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, Vol. 17, No. 3 The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 49, 49 (2003). 
16 Richard A. Booth, Give Me Equity or Give Me Death-The Role of Competition and Compensation in Silicon 
Valley, 1 Entrepreneurial Bus. L.J. 265 (2006). 
17 Liu Chong Yi, Stock Option Plan and Corporate Governance in the US, Vol. 1 World Economic 49, 54 
(2003).  
18 Here, “a controlling shareholder” refers to “a shareholder whose stocks occupies more than 50% of the total 
equity stocks of a joint stock limited company or a shareholder whose proportion of stock is less than 50% but 
who enjoys a voting right according to the stocks it holds is large enough to impose an big impact upon the 
resolution of the shareholders’ meeting.” (Article 217 (2) of Company Law). 
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unnecessary. However, in this scenario, some diverging interests still exist between 
controlling shareholders and executives. For example, executives may make 
sub-optimal or reckless decisions which are difficult to trace by controlling 
shareholders. As a result, from the perspective of controlling shareholders, stock 
option compensation can motivate executives to work harder and make better 
decisions. For instance, stock option compensation encourages executives to take 
more active roles in asset reconstruction, to sell or spin-off “cash trap” businesses and 
buy ones with increasing value.
19
 From the perspective of minority shareholders, 
stock option compensation can play a very important role in preventing controlling 
shareholders from placing their benefits in jeopardy, and at the same time, can address 
agency problems resulting from the separation of ownership and management. This is 
because stock option compensation encourages executives to resist “tunneling” 
behaviors by controlling shareholders. Tunneling behaviors keep stock prices down, 
thus reducing the profits that executives can make from their options.
20
 This is the 
very reason that despite the prevalence of companies with concentrated ownership in 
China,
21
 scholars, the media and regulators are still passionately encouraging listed 
companies to use stock option compensation.
22
 
                                                          
19 He, supra note 10, at 45.  
20 See Kun Wang & Xing Xiao, Controlling Shareholders’ Tunneling and Executive Compensation: Evidence 
From China, 30 J. Account. Public Policy 89, 90 (2011) (“A strong association between executive 
compensation and firm performance would strengthen executives’ incentives to increase firm performance and 
reduce their willingness to collude with controlling shareholders.”); also see Lei Gao & Gerhard Kling, 
Corporate Governance and Tunneling: Empirical Evidence From China, 16 Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 591 
(2008) (The authors argue that the stock ownership of senior managers is a guarantee for preventing tunneling).  
21 “The ownership of China’s publicly traded firms is highly concentrated. In most firms there is a single 
dominant shareholder whose large share ownership gives considerable power and influence over the way the 
firm is run. This is especially the case regarding the appointment and compensation of the CEO or the board. 
Typically, the largest shareholder owns about 43% of the firm’s shares, the second largest about 9%, and the 
third largest about 4% . ... China’s ownership pattern stands in stark contrast to the US, where 
low-concentration and ownership diffusion is the norm. It is rare for investors to own more than 10% of 
common equity in Anglo-Saxon firms.” See Martin J. Conyon & Lerong He, Executive Compensation and 
Corporate Governance in China, 17 Journal of Corporate Finance 1158, 1160 (2011). “The largest shareholder 
is usually the State or a legal entity, although there are a growing number of cases where the dominant 
shareholder is a private business or non-state institution.” See Michael Firth et al., Corporate Performance and 
CEO Compensation in China, 12 Journal of Corporate Finance 693,697 (2006). 
22 “Share ownership by CEOs and executive directors is very low and their main source of income is from cash 
compensation...The lack of executive stock options is one reason why share ownership by CEOs and top 
managers is so low. The absence of executive stock options removes one method of aligning the interests of 
managers and the shareholders.” see Michael Firth et al., How Ownership and Corporate Governance 
Influence Chief Executive Pay in China's Listed Firms,60 Journal of Business Research 776, 776 (2007). 
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C. The empirical research of executive stock option compensation in Chinese 
listed companies 
The Measures for Equity Incentive Plans as well as three memos on the matter of 
equity incentives
23
 promulgated by the CSRC have established solid legal 
foundations for the development and flourishing of executive stock option 
compensation in Chinese listed companies. By the end of May, 2012, a total of 284 
listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges had already 
implemented equity incentive plans,
24
 accounting for 12% of all the listed companies. 
About 20% of all companies in the ChiNext Market
25
 and 30% of all information 
technology companies have already implemented equity incentive plans.
26
 After 
analyzing companies listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2007, Xia Li Na found 
that the 06’EPS and net asset margin for companies that had implemented equity 
incentives was far above normal. In addition, profit forecasting was much easier for 
companies with stock options than those with restrictive stock incentives.
27
 In the 
same year, He Qing Ming compared the performances of companies that had 
implemented equity incentive plans with the indices of the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges, finding that the former was much better than later. He concluded 
that equity incentive could raise stock prices and bring investment opportunities to 
investors.
28
 Sun Tang Gang studied 63 companies that had implemented equity 
incentive plans in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges by the end of Sept. 30, 
2008, concluding that equity incentives had a significantly positive impact on the 
performances of these companies.
29
 After studying 89 companies that had 
implemented equity incentive plans from Jan.1, 2006 to Dec.31, 2009, besides 
                                                          
23 Respectively, Memo No. 1 on the Matters of Equity Incentive (promulgated by the CSRC, effective Mar. 17, 
2008, hereinafter Memo No.1); Memo No. 2 on the Matters of Equity Incentive (promulgated by the CSRC, 
effective Mar. 17, 2008, hereinafter Memo No.2); and Memo No. 3 on the Matters of Equity Incentive 
(promulgated by the CSRC, effective Sept. 18, 2008, hereinafter Memo No.3). 
24 These equity incentive plans include restricted stock plans and stock option plans, but more than 80% of these 
plans are stock option plans.  
25 ChiNext market, which was inaugurated in Shenzhen Stock Exchange on Oct. 23, 2009, provides “an 
important platform for implementing the national strategy of independent innovation. It helps accelerate the 
transformation of economic development mode and galvanizes growth in emerging industries of strategic 
importance.” “As of Dec. 30, 2011, there were 281 companies listed on the ChiNext, of which 93% are hi-tech 
firms. The total market capitalization of ChiNext listed companies reached RMB 743.4 billion (USD 118 
billion). IPO proceeds hit RMB 196.1 billion (USD 31.1 billion). Total trading value of ChiNext was RMB 1.9 
trillion (USD 301.6 billion) in 2011.” Information is disclosed by Shenzhen Stock Exchange, available at 
http://www.szse.cn/main/en/ChiNext/.  
26 See Yan Xue Feng, CEOs’ Compensation in Listed Companies Is Becoming Rational, No. 11 Directors & 
Boards 73, 74 (2011).  
27 See Xia Li Na, Analyses on the Equity Incentives and the Disclosure of Executives’ Compensation , Vol. 7 
Securities Market Herald 60, 64 (2007). 
28 See He, supra note 10, at 46-47.   
29 See Sun Tang Gang, Empirical Study of Equity Incentive and Performance of Listed Companies, Vol.3 
Industrial Economics Research 44, 49-50 (2009). 
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confirming the aforementioned results, He Fan found that the effect of stock option 
plans was better than that of restricted stock plans. He Fan also recommended that 
high growth companies make better use of stock option plans.
30
 
 In short, stock option compensation gives executives a better incentive to behave 
in the interests of shareholders by the means of providing a direct link between 
realized compensation and company stock price performance, thus realizing a 
win-win situation for both shareholders and executives. 
II. The Agency Problems of Executive Stock Option Compensation 
and the Purpose of This Dissertation 
A. The agency problems of executive stock option compensation 
Though executive stock option compensation has several advantages, it cannot be 
regarded as a panacea to address every agency problem in listed companies, as it also 
has its own shortcomings or agency problems.
31
 The deep root of these agency 
problems lies in the “enormous discretion managers have over most aspects of 
corporate business, coupled with traditional deference from boards”32 or according to 
Bebchuk and Fried’s famous remark, the “managers’ power”,33 which gives managers 
huge influence on the board and independent directors in the compensation committee. 
Executives can help controlling shareholders to tunnel the companies for personal 
benefits, thus hurting the interests of minority shareholders; they can decide when and 
what to disclose; they can also determine whether to invest in risky ventures or reduce 
R&D investments and so on. The executives’ huge influence (either power or 
discretion) will definitely hurt the interests of shareholders, especially the minority 
shareholders in Chinese context, where the ownership of publicly traded companies is 
highly concentrated. Specifically, this dissertation will discuss the following five 
common agency problems of executive stock option compensation: 
1. The compensation committee and its independent directors are not able to 
perform their duties efficiently to supervise executive stock option compensation, 
which makes it possible for executives to be granted excessive stock option 
                                                          
30 See He Fan, supra note 24, at 61. 
31 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17Journal of 
Economic Perspective 71, 72 (2003) (“Executive compensation is viewed not only as a potential instrument for 
addressing the agency problem but also as part of the agency problem itself.”).  
32  Charles M. Yablon & Jennifer Hill, Timing Corporate Disclosures to Maximize Performance-Based 
Remuneration, a Case of Misaligned Incentives? 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 83, 117 (2000). 
33  Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive 
Compensation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
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compensation which they normally would not be able to obtain while “dealing at 
arm’s length”. Excessive stock option compensation has a variety of forms: 
executives may be granted more stock option compensation for a given incentive 
purpose; the conditions for executives to exercise their rights are easy to satisfy; or 
executives gain windfalls from their stock option compensation, which means the 
strike price will not be raised in the event of favorable developments in the market or 
industry and so on.  
Because of “collective action problems” and “rational apathy” , shareholders have 
neither the ability nor the willingness to supervise executives. The independent 
directors elected by shareholders are presumed to act in the interests of shareholders, 
but unfortunately, there are several reasons why a board would, when granting 
compensation, often “puts the interests of the CEO as the primary concern and 
relegate(s) shareholder interests to a secondary consideration.” 34  First of all, 
independent directors have incentives to keep their jobs. Opposing executives 
substantially increase the likelihood that an independent director will not be 
nominated again and will lose their benefits along with the positions. Secondly, 
executives can exercise influence over companies on whose boards they serve to help 
the board of directors acquire additional lucrative directorships.
35
 Finally, social 
relationships, group thinking and structural bias
36
 may also lead independent 
directors to consider the interests of executives rather than those of shareholders’.37 
“Personal and psychic ties to the individuals who are responsible for one’s 
appointment to a board make it difficult to engage in necessary confrontation.” 38 
With regard to the situation in China, besides the aforementioned problems, stock 
option compensation may become a tool for controlling shareholders to pursue their 
own interests. For example, a controlling shareholder may exchange their vote on a 
stock option plan for the agreement of executives to support tunneling behaviors.
39
 
                                                          
34 James McConvill, Commentary: Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance: Rising Above the 
“Pay-for-Performance” Principle, 43 Am. Bus. L.J. 413, 414 (2006). 
35 See Michael S. Weisbach, Optimal Executive Compensation vs. Managerial Power: A Review of Lucian 
Bebchuk and Jesse Fried’s “Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation”, 
at 5-6 (NBER Working Paper No. w12798, December 2006 ), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=955231.  
36 Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 821, 853-870 (2004). 
37 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 33, at 4 (“directors have various economic incentives to support, or at least go 
along with, arrangements favorable to the company’s top executives. Various social and psychological 
factors-collegiality, team spirit, a natural desire to avoid conflict within the board team, and sometimes friends 
and loyalty-have also pull board member in that direction.”). 
38 Charles M. Elson, The Duty Of Care, Compensation, And Stock Ownership, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 649 , 665 
(1995).  
39 Kun Wang & Xing Xiao, Controlling Shareholders’ Tunneling and Executive Compensation: Evidence From 
China, 30 J. Account. Public Policy 89, 89-91 (2011). 
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Besides, the compensation committee having limited power as well as the faults 
plaguing independent directors in China may also contribute to awarding excessive 
stock option compensation to executives. 
2. Stock option compensation may induce executives to break securities laws and 
regulations, for example, by manipulating earnings or other accounting figures, so as 
to satisfy the conditions under which they can be granted stock option compensation 
(or they can exercise their rights) or/and artificially raise the stock price when they 
exercise their rights to make unjust money.
40
 
3. Stock option compensation may provide executives with unethical incentives to 
time corporate information disclosures to maximize their profits, which has been 
called a “case of misaligned incentives”.41 “The executives who know when their 
options will be issued and become exercisable have incentives to disclose negative 
corporate news shortly before the issuance of such options and to disclose positive 
news shortly before their exercise date while delaying disclosure of negative news.” 42 
Thus, stock option compensation creates “a new potential conflict between the 
interests of the corporation and its shareholders in credible, timely, and accurate 
disclosure and the CEO’s newly created interest in disclosure timed to maximize the 
value of his pay package.”43 In short, there is a “dark side” to executive stock option 
compensation: “absent special controls, more options means more fraud.”44 
4. Stock option compensation may wrongly encourage executives to pursue 
short-term profits by means of making excessive risk-taking investments, cutting 
research and development budgets, laying off masses of workers and so on, which 
hurts the long-term interests of shareholders. The reasons why executives do so are: (1) 
They can exercise their rights and sell their stocks in a short period of time; (2) Since 
“the holder of an option participates in the gains in value, but not the losses”, 45 
executives will be “indifferent to losses, an option holder in the pursuit of gains will 
rationally expose the company to potential suicidal risks.”46 So, “perhaps the leading 
                                                          
40  For example, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation at Fannie Mae: A Case 
Study of Perverse Incentives, Nonperformance Pay, and Camouflage, 30 J. Corp. L 807 (2005) (They identify 
and analyze one problem of Fannie Mae’s executive compensation arrangements during the period 2000-2004 
that “by richly rewarding executives for reporting higher earnings, without requiring return of the 
compensation if earnings turned out to be misstated, Fannie Mae’s arrangements provided perverse incentives 
to inflate earnings.”). 
41 Yablon & Hill, supra note 32. 
42 Id. at 87. 
43 Id. at 89. 
44 Coffee, supra note12, at 64. 
45 Calvin H. Johnson, Stock Compensation: The Most Expensive Way to Pay Future Cash, 52 S.M.U. L. Rev. 423, 
442 (1999). 
46 Calvin H. Johnson, Stock and Stock Option Compensation: A Bad Idea, Vol. 51, No. 3 Canadian Tax Journal 
1259, 1260 (2003). 
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corporate governance concern of legislators and commentators at present is the 
reckless pursuit of short-term profits by corporate executives who will have cashed 
out before the long term repercussions are felt”.47 Short-term orientation is said to be 
one of the causes of the 2008 financial crisis.
48
 
5. Stock option compensation may award windfalls to executives, which cannot 
coexist with the objective of the compensation mode from the perspective of 
shareholders, namely, “profiting together, losing together”. In practice, if the stock 
price goes up quickly because of favorable developments within the economy or 
industry, companies will not raise their strike price accordingly, which gives 
executives “the benefit of all the appreciation of the company’s underlying stock 
rather than limiting the benefit to merely the stock price appreciation that is directly 
related to the option holder's performance at the company.”49 In contrast, if the stock 
price goes down quickly because of non-favorable developments in the economy or 
industry, or even due to incompetence by executives, companies will always grant 
new stock options to executives to replace the old ones. This “windfalls” problem 
provides a poor incentive structure to executives: “heads I win, tails we start over”.50 
Some other agency problems brought on by executive stock option compensation, 
such as executives buying financial derivatives to hedge the risks of stock options,
51
 
the board backdating the day the compensations are granted,
52
 and the dilution effect 
of executive stock option compensation
53
 have all caught the attention of many 
                                                          
47 David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 435, 
439 (2010). 
48 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1915, 1917 
(2010) (“The crisis of 2008–2009 has led to widespread recognition that pay arrangements that reward 
executives for short-term results can produce incentives to take excessive risks.”). 
49 Mark A. Clawson and Thomas C. Klein, Indexed Stock Options: A Proposal for Compensation Commensurate 
with Performance, 3 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 31, 32 (1997). 
50 Bebchuk& Fried, supra note 33, at 145. 
51 See Steven A. Bank, Devaluing Reform: The Derivatives Market and Executive Compensation, 7 DePaul Bus. 
L.J. 301, 318 (1995) (“One common way that executives use the derivatives market is by employing an ‘equity 
swap.’ An equity swap is a type of derivative contract in which the holder of the stock pays a second party the 
stock’s dividends for a certain period of time and also pays the second party the net gain in the stock’s value at 
the end of that period. In return, the second party agrees to pay the owner of the stock the income from a 
diversified investment based upon the value of the stock and will also pay for any loss in value to the stock at 
the end of the specified period. Unexercised stock options can also be sold in the derivatives market.”). But 
such hedging is quite rare in practice, see Hall & Murphy, supra note 15, at 55. 
52 See William Hughes, Stock Option “Springloading”: An Examination of Loaded Justifications and New SEC 
Disclosure Rules, 33 J. Corp. L. 777, 782-783 (2008) (“Companies engage in ‘backdating’ when they 
retroactively determine the grant date for options issued to management so that it appears that the company 
made the award on an earlier date. Because the exercise price of the options is also typically the stock’s market 
price on the date of the grant, this retroactive decision permits executives to choose a date when the market 
value of the stock was at a low point, or at least at a lower price than the current stock value.”). 
53 See Richard A. Booth, Why Stock Options are the Best Form of Executive Compensation (And How to Make 
Them Even Better), 6 N. Y. U. L. & Bus. 281, 310-323 (2010). And also see Randall S. Thomas and Kenneth J. 
Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option Plans, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 31, 35-36 
(2000) (“As stock option awards increase in size and value, the existing shareholders of a company will face 
potential dilution of their ownership stake as the company issues more shares of its stock to satisfy the exercise 
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scholars. However, I do not intend to discuss and analyze these problems in detail in 
this dissertation, as these problems are either resolved in law and practice or not 
serious in the US nor in China.  
In the case of China, the financial derivatives market is under-developed, and 
instances of executives buying financial derivatives to hedge the risks of stock options 
remain unseen. Second, it is almost impossible to backdate the day which determines 
a strike price in China because of strict regulations.
54
 Neither such case has been ever 
heard of in practice to date. Third, the dilution effect of executive stock option  
compensation is indeed a problem, but it is not so serious. The reasons are: 1. Article 
10(1) of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans provides that the aggregate stocks 
involved in all the effective equity incentive plans of a listed company shall not 
exceed 10% of the total equity of the company accumulatively. So, there exists an 
upper limit on the dilution effect; 2. A company usually buys stocks from the stock 
markets to fulfill its duty when executives exercise their rights, thus reducing the 
number of shares in the market. Actually, this behavior is functionally equivalent to 
cash distribution, which is warmly encouraged and welcomed by shareholders and the 
CSRC; 3. If shareholders think their rights have been diluted, they can sell their stocks. 
Ultimately, the problem lies in whether the costs of dilution effect could be offset by 
the benefits brought by executive stock option compensation. It depends on whether 
the aforementioned agency problems of executive stock option compensation can be 
successfully and efficiently addressed. 
B. The purpose of this dissertation 
The aforementioned five agency problems affecting executive stock option 
compensation are quite common in China though the practice has been legally 
allowed since 2006. Some problems, such as executives being paid without heed to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
of new stock options. When these options are exercised, existing shareholders will have a smaller claim on the 
company’s assets and property. This dilutive effect has three parts: lower per share earnings, less voting power 
and the allocation of stock price gains.”).  
54 Article 24 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans provides, “a listed company shall, when granting stock 
options to the eligible participants, determine the exercise price or the method for determining the exercise 
price. The exercise price shall be no less than the following prices, whichever is higher: 1. The closing sales 
price of the target stock of the company at one trading day before the promulgation of the excerpts of the draft 
of the equity incentive plan; and 2. The average closing sales price of the target stock of the company within 30 
trading days before the promulgation of the excerpts of the draft of the equity incentive plan”. At the same time, 
Article 30 (1) of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans provides, “a listed company shall, within 2 trading 
days after its board of directors has adopted the draft of the equity incentive plan through deliberation, 
announce the resolutions of the board of directors, the excerpts of the draft of the equity incentive plan, and the 
opinions of the independent director.” So if the board wants to backdate the granting day in order to give the 
executives a lower strike price, it has to backdate the day of board meeting. But, subject to securities law and 
regulations, a listed company shall disclose information concerning the board meeting, including when it holds. 
So, it is impossible for the board to backdate the day which determines the strike price. 
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performance,
55
 a lack of a proper supervision mechanism existing in listed 
companies,
56
 executives timing information disclosures
57
 and so on have been 
strongly criticized by shareholders, scholars, and the media. Since certain markets, 
such as the managerial labor market, the market for control, the market for additional 
capital, and the products market can play a very limited role in addressing the five 
agency problems,
58
 the law is expected to play an important role in resolving these 
problems.
59
 
Though some law scholars have pointed out several agency problems in executive 
stock option compensation and have made some suggestions, they have yet to discuss 
these problems in detail nor made suggestions on how to address these them. For 
some important issues, such as clawback provisions, compensation consultants and 
“comply or explain” rules have received no attention from law scholars. Furthermore, 
there are quite a few faults and uncertainties regarding the regulations on executive 
stock option compensation, and this dissertation intends to fill in the gap.  
In sum, the purpose of this dissertation is to efficiently resolve these problems via  
legal approaches with reference to the laws and practices of the US, the UK and Japan. 
I hope that the suggestions made in this dissertation can contribute to the 
improvement and development of the law and practices regarding executive stock 
option compensation in Chinese listed companies.   
III. Addressing the Agency Problems of Executive Stock Option 
Compensation Through Legal Approaches and Strategies 
This dissertation intends to address the five aforementioned agency problems of 
executive stock option compensation in three different legal approaches and each 
approach is divided into two strategies: ex ante and ex post.  
The three legal approaches include: enhancing supervision inside the company, 
enhancing supervision by compensation consultants and enhancing supervision by 
public authorities. Companies shall be allowed to make their own executive stock 
                                                          
55 See Fu Qiong& Yu Yong Ning, The Legal Myth of Executives’ Compensation, Vol. 6 Science of Law 123, 124 
(2009) (“The practice of equity incentive compensation indicates that compensation does not link up with the 
performance.”).  
56 See Cao Nai Cheng, Could They Make So Much Money?: Analysis of the Executives’ Compensation in Listed 
Companies, Vol. 10 Innovation 85 (2011) (The author found that only 40% of all listed companies have proper 
supervision mechanisms). 
57 See Wen Xiu, The Controversial Chinese Equity Incentive Compensation, No. 3 Financial Practices (2008), 
available athttp://magazine.caijing.com.cn/2008-03-03/110070938.html. 
58 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 33, at 53-58. 
59 Kraakman et al, supra note 2, at 37. 
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option compensation systems based on their own unique circumstances. They shall 
also respond quickly to changes in the market.
60
 In short, corporate self-governance 
should be highly respected. Hence, it is efficient and justified to address the agency 
problems of executive stock option compensation by enhancing supervision inside the 
company, such as expanding the role of the compensation committee and its 
independent directors and improving the disclosure on executive stock option 
compensation. Because of the “collective action hazard” and “majority rule”, minority 
shareholders are unwilling and unable to supervise executives or controlling 
shareholders (e.g. approving or objecting to a stock option plan at a shareholders’ 
meeting).
61
 So, this dissertation does not intend to discuss the role of minority 
shareholders in addressing the five agency problems ex ante. Though minority 
shareholders can pursue the liabilities of independent directors through shareholder’s 
derivative suits, such cases rarely happen in practice in China because of various 
obstacles. Thus, I will discuss how to remove the obstacles to make it easier for 
minority shareholders to bring derivative suits. Because the job of supervisors in 
listed companies is only to check the list of eligible compensation recipients, they 
cannot play a substantial role in addressing the agency problems of executive stock 
option compensation. Therefore, this dissertation does not intend to discuss the role of 
supervisors. 
Actually, the strategy of enhancing supervision inside the company by itself cannot 
completely resolve the five agency problems. An independent compensation 
consultant is needed to provide objective and professional opinions to the directors 
and supervise the reasonableness of the compensation allocated to executives. The 
CSRC is also needed to make “comply or explain” rules to address various agency 
problems, for example, executives may time information disclosure or pursue 
short-term profits, to protect the shareholders while respecting the uniqueness of each 
company. Finally, a judicial review in court cannot only adjudicate the independent 
directors who breach their duty of care to pay for damages to their company, but also 
enhance the threat of civil liabilities of independent directors in the compensation 
                                                          
60 The Conference Board, The Conference Board Task Force on Executive Compensation, at 12 (2009), available 
at http://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/execcompensation2009.pdf. (“To succeed in a competitive global 
economy, a company should be able to tailor compensation programs to address the success drivers for its 
business, its unique business strategy, and its status within the evolution of that strategy. Companies should 
also be able to adjust the elements of their compensation programs from time to time as market needs and other 
conditions change. For these reasons, a ‘one-size-fits-all’ or ‘rules-based’ approach to executive compensation 
is not workable”.). 
61 Bebchuk &Fried, supra note 33, at 48-51. And James E. Heard, Executive Compensation: Perspective Of The 
Institutional Investor, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 749, 758 (1995) (“In most cases, objectionable pay practices come to 
light after the fact, when voting can have only a very limited and largely symbolic impact.”). 
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committee. 
What needs to be emphasized is that the focus of supervision inside the company, 
by compensation consultants or public authorities should be the process of how 
executive stock option compensation is made, rather than focusing on concrete 
compensation numbers. As long as an executive’s compensation mode really serves 
the interests of shareholders, even high compensation is acceptable.
62
 
The ex ante strategy refers to the approach of addressing agency problems before 
executive stock option compensation becomes effective (namely during the process of 
creating the compensation scheme); meanwhile, the ex post strategy refers to the 
approach of addressing agency problems after executive stock option compensation 
becomes effective. In contrast to ex post strategies, the ex ante strategies are more 
efficient in China. But, in practice, the line between ex ante and ex post strategy is not 
so rigid. This is because if someone can anticipate that their behavior may be 
punished by laws and regulations ex post, they will adjust their behaviors ex ante so 
as to be free of punishment. For instance, clawing back executive stock option 
compensation cannot only recoup unjust compensation ex post, but also discourage 
executives from breaking securities law and regulations in the first place. Specifically:  
A. Enhancing supervision inside the company 
The ex ante strategies of this approach include: expanding the role of the 
compensation committee and its independent directors and improving the disclosure 
of executive stock option compensations; meanwhile, the ex post strategies of this 
approach include: clarifying the provision of clawing back executive stock option 
compensation and making it easier for minority shareholders to bring derivative suits. 
Since the shareholders’ derivative suits have a close relationship with the judicial 
review, I will discuss the issues of shareholders’ derivative suits together with the 
judicial review.  
B. Enhancing supervision by compensation consultants 
The ex ante strategies of this approach include: granting the compensation 
committee the exclusive power to hire, compensate, supervise and fire its own 
independent financial consultant (compensation consultant); establishing the 
non-independence standard of a compensation consultant and preventing the  
                                                          
62  Bebchuk &Fried, supra note 33, at 8. 
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non-independent compensation consultant from issuing professional opinions on the 
stock option plans; the ex post strategy of approach is imposing more efficient civil 
liabilities on the compensation consultants. 
C. Enhancing supervision by public authorities 
The ex ante strategy of this approach is the CSRC shall make “comply or explain” 
rules to address some specific agency problems of executives stock option 
compensation; the ex post of this strategy is the court shall clarify the standard of 
judicial review when they have to determine whether the independent directors in the 
compensation committee break their duty of care when they make executive stock 
option compensation.  
The following table sets out the approaches and strategies for addressing the five 
agency problems within executive stock option compensation.
63
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
63 This framework of addressing the five agency problems is gained from the famous book “The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach”, especially chapter two. See Kraakman et al, supra 
note 2, at 35-53. 
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Enhancing 
supervision  
inside the company 
Enhancing 
supervision by 
compensation 
consultants 
Enhancing 
supervision public 
authorities 
Ex ante strategies 
1. Expanding the 
role of the 
compensation 
committee and its 
independent 
directors; 
2. Improving the 
disclosure of 
executive stock 
option compensation 
1. Granting the 
compensation 
committee the 
exclusive power 
to hire, 
compensate, 
supervise and fire 
its own 
compensation 
consultant 
2. Establishing 
the 
non-independence 
standard of a 
compensation 
consultant 
3. preventing 
the 
non-independent 
compensation 
consultant from 
issuing 
professional 
opinions; 
1. The CSRC shall 
make “comply or 
explain” rules to 
address some  
specific agency 
problems 
Ex post strategies 
1.Clarifying the 
provision of clawing 
back executive stock 
option compensation 
2. Making it easier 
for minority 
shareholders to bring 
derivative suits 
1.Imposing more 
efficient civil 
liabilities on 
compensation 
consultants 
1. The courts shall 
clarify the standard 
of judicial review 
IV. Methodology 
A. Legal Interpretation 
The main methodology used in this dissertation is legal interpretation. I will clarify 
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the meanings of various legal terminologies (literal interpretation), systematize the 
laws and regulations on executive stock option compensation (systematical 
interpretation), and seek the objectives of legislators and regulators (teleological 
interpretation). In addition, I will fill in the gaps in laws and regulations with my 
suggestions. 
B. Comparative Analysis of Law 
As for the legal approaches and strategies for addressing the five agency problems 
of executive stock option compensation in China, we can learn a lot from the 
experience of the US, the UK and Japan.
64
 When faced with the same problems in a 
business context, the legal approaches and strategies of dealing with them in each 
country will not be quite different. In my opinion, there are some basic principles that 
we could follow. Surely, since there are many differences between these countries, 
some questions, for example, like what approaches we could use directly and to which 
approaches we should make changes so as to fit them into the Chinese reality, are 
difficult to answer.  
C. Economic Analysis of Law 
When explaining laws and regulations or making suggestions to address the five 
agency problems affecting executive stock option compensation, I will compare the 
costs with the benefits of these explanations or suggestions, then choose the most 
efficient explanation or suggestion. Addressing agency problems at a minimum cost is 
the goal of this dissertation. 
D. Empirical Analysis of Law 
Financial and accounting research papers are used in this dissertation to discuss and 
analyze the agency problems of executive stock option compensation from a macro 
perspective via the effectiveness of stock option compensation or the compensation 
committee and its independent directors and so on. Moreover, case studies are also 
used in this dissertation to discuss and analyze the agency problems from a micro 
perspective, for instance, by taking a glance at a stock option plan from a specific 
company or a piece of news.  
                                                          
64 For the functions and shortcomings of comparative company law, see Donald C. Clarke, “Nothing But 
Wind”?The Past and Future of Comparative Corporate Governance, 59 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 75 (2011).  
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V. Notes about This Dissertation 
I do not intend to (and cannot) discuss every issue related to executive stock option 
compensation, so I would like to limit the scope of my dissertation here.  
First, I do not intend to discuss the accounting
65
 nor tax issues
66
 of executive stock 
option compensation. The two causes are said to be popular reasons for executive 
stock option compensation in the US.
67
 In China, the accounting treatment of stock 
option compensation is the same as the US, namely, stock option compensation is 
regarded as a cost. And only when executives exercise their rights and when the 
difference between the strike price and stock price is positive will executives pay 
income tax based on the profits they make by exercising their rights. There is no limit 
on the deductibility of the executives’ compensation.68 
Second, I do not intend to discuss executive stock option compensation with any 
particular emphasis on financial companies. Compared with ordinary companies, the 
capital structure of financial companies is risky and their function in modern society 
is of critical importance, so they face more serious problems than ordinary companies, 
such as their “too-big-to-fall” situation and their systematic risks. Therefore, the most 
serious problem in financial companies is that stock option compensation may induce 
executives to pursue excessively risky investments, which bring negative externality 
to the creditors and the whole society. So, the approaches and strategies for addressing 
                                                          
65 In the US, before 2005, at-the-money or out-the-money stock option compensation was not reported as costs to 
the company, so it was treated as free-of-charge by the board. But after 2005, “companies were required to 
recognize as compensation expense the grant date intrinsic value of stock options issued to employees. The 
intrinsic value of an option, also known as the option spread, is the positive difference, if any, between the 
value of the underlying stock and the option exercise price.” see David I. Walker, The Law and Economics of 
Executive Compensation: Theory and Evidence, at 8 (Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 10-32, 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1688560. 
66 In the US, the IRC §162(m), which was enacted in 1993, limits the deductibility of non-performance based 
compensation issued to certain senior executives to $1 million per year. The performance goals must be 
decided by a compensation committee composed solely of outside directors, and the goals must be approved by 
shareholders in a separate shareholder vote before payment is made. Stock option compensation is seem as 
performance based and could be deduced. 
67 Hall & Murphy, supra note 14, at 53 (“The popularity of stock options reflects in large part their favorable tax 
and accounting treatments, which we believe are critical in understanding why, how and to whom options are 
granted.”). 
68 Article 2 of Notice of the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation on the Issue of Levying 
Individual Income Taxes on Incomes from Individual Stock Options (promulgated by Ministry of Finance and 
State Administration of Taxation, effective July 1, 2005 ) provides, “as a general rule, the stock options that are 
received by an employee in an enterprise implementing the stock option plan may not be taken as taxable 
incomes, unless it is otherwise prescribed by relevant taxation provisions; When an employee exercises her 
right, if the strike price at which an employee gets stocks from her enterprise is lower than the fair market price 
on the purchase day, the difference is the incomes relating to her service and employment due to her 
performance and accomplishments in this enterprise, therefore, the individual income taxes on such kind of 
incomes shall be levied pursuant to the provisions on incomes from wages and salaries. If an employee gets the 
price difference from the re-transfer price, which is higher than the fair market price on the purchase day after 
she exercises the right, the individual income taxes on such price difference shall be levied pursuant to the tax 
collection and exemption provisions on “incomes from transfer of property”, because it is obtained by an 
individual from the transfer of such securities as stocks in the securities secondary market.” 
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the problems of financial companies are different from the aforementioned 
approaches and strategies in this dissertation.   
Third, I do not intend to discuss executive stock option compensation in 
state-owned listed companies (“SOLCs”). The reasons are: 1. Executive stock option 
compensation is not popular in SOLCs;
69
 2. Maximizing the interests of shareholders 
is not the goal of SOLCs; and 3. Different standards are used to evaluate the 
executives’ contributions to their companies.70 
Fourth, I do not intend to compare stock option compensation with other kinds of 
incentive compensation, such as bonuses, restricted stock compensation or stock 
appreciation rights, and I will not discuss the advantages and disadvantages of these 
different incentive compensation schemes. I will show stock option compensation to 
be an important part of executives’ compensation packages, point out its innate 
problems and provide some suggestions to make the scheme work better. This 
dissertation does not intend to argue that stock option compensation is the best way to 
pay executives.
71
 However, at least in China, stock option compensation is the most 
popular way to incentive executives.  
VI. Proceedings of This Dissertation 
This dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter one points out three factors that 
cripple the role of the compensation committee and its independent directors, and 
makes suggestions on how to fix the problem of the compensation committee having 
limited power and independent directors being paid without incentive compensation. 
Chapter two points out some deficiencies in the current executive stock option 
compensation disclosure system in China and makes suggestions on how to improve it. 
Chapter three clarifies some uncertainties regarding clawback provisions of executive 
stock option compensation in China. Chapter four discusses how to make 
compensation consultants really serve the interests of shareholders rather than 
surrender themselves to executives. Chapter five argues that the CSRC shall make 
                                                          
69 Some scholars doubt whether it is suitable for SOLCs to grant stock option compensation to executives. 
Because most of them are monopoly enterprises, it is difficult to evaluate the executives’ contributions to the 
companies. See Kong Jie Ming, Changing of Executive Compensation in Listed Companies, Vol. 5 CFO World 
31, 35-36 (2011). 
70 See Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance, 31 DJCL 125, 141 (2006) 
(“It is no secret that one of the very purposes of state ownership of enterprises is to enable the state to use its 
ownership, and thereby control, to cause the enterprise to engage in activities that a profit-maximizing firm 
would avoid, such as the sale of essential products at below-market prices, enforcement of state birth control 
policies among employees, or pursuit of an urban full employment policy.”). 
71 Some scholar believes that “stock compensation is the most expensive way to pay future cash”, see Johnson, 
supra note 45. 
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“comply or explain” rules to address some specific agency problems of executive 
stock option compensation. Chapter six makes some suggestions on how to make it 
easier for minority shareholders to bring derivative suits and discusses what standard 
of judicial review the courts shall apply to determine whether the independent 
directors are breaching their duty of care when they create executive stock option 
compensation. The last chapter offers a short conclusion with regard to the whole 
dissertation, the contribution of this dissertation as well as the limits and shortcomings 
of this dissertation. 
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Chapter One  Ex Ante Strategy (1) of Enhancing 
Supervision Inside the Company: Expanding the Role of the 
Compensation Committee and Awarding Stock 
Compensation to Independent Directors 
I. Introduction 
This chapter discusses how to expand the role of the compensation committee and 
its independent directors, so as to partly address the first agency problem of executive 
stock option compensation; that is, the compensation committee and its independent 
directors are not able to perform their duty to supervise executive stock option 
compensation, making it possible for executives to be granted excessive 
compensation that they could not obtain under “at the arm’s length” dealings. 
Excessive stock option compensation has a variety of forms: executives may be 
granted more stock option compensation for a given incentive purpose; the conditions 
for executives to exercise their rights are easy to satisfy; or executives gain windfalls 
from their stock option compensation, which means the strike price will not be raised 
in the event of favorable developments in the market or industry and so on.  
In China, three factors cripple the functions of the compensation committee and its 
independent directors: First, executives have huge influence on the board and 
independent directors in the compensation committee. Specifically, executives have 
huge influence in nominating the candidates who can become independent directors, 
and they can also collude with controlling shareholders to gain private benefits. The 
more influence executives have on the board and among independent directors, the 
more likely it is that they will be granted excessive stock option compensation. 
Second, the compensation committee cannot solely decide executive stock option 
compensation numbers. Third, there are some shortcomings in the institution of 
independent directors, such as limits on the standard of non-independence, the 
independent directors themselves having little business experience, the independent 
directors being paid without incentive compensation and so on. The weaker the power 
wielded by the compensation committee and its independent directors, the greater the 
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stock option compensation that executives can receive. Hence, for most companies 
that grant stock option compensation to executives, a critical question is how to 
expand the roles of the compensation committee and its independent directors so as to 
encourage them to pursue the interests of shareholders and supervise illegal or 
unethical behaviors during the implementation process of stock option compensation. 
The strategy of expanding the roles of the compensation committee and its 
independent directors is the cornerstone of all strategies for addressing agency 
problems within executive stock option compensation. Right at the start when a stock 
option plan is being drafted, if the compensation committee and its independent 
directors can engage in arm’s-length bargaining with the executives, and the 
compensation committee and its independent directors can closely supervise any 
illegal or unethical behaviors of executives during the duration of the stock option 
plan, the other agency problems will also be resolved. Therefore, compensation 
consultants, the China Securities Regulatory Commission ( CSRC ), and the courts are 
less needed in addressing these agency problems of executive stock option 
compensation. But, unfortunately, lessons from other developed countries show that 
compensation committees and their independent directors can only play a very limited 
role in supervising executive stock option compensation. So, the question of how to 
expand the roles of the compensation committee and its independent directors is one 
of the global concerns within corporate governance. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Part II introduces the laws and rules within the 
process of making executive stock option compensation (or executive stock option 
plans) in China. Part III introduces some empirical research on the effectiveness of 
compensation committees and their independent directors, then analyzes why they 
have trouble performing their responsibilities. Part IV makes some suggestions on 
how to expand the roles of the compensation committees and their independent 
directors. Part V offers a conclusion. 
II. The Law and Rules on the Process of Making Executive Stock 
Option Compensation in China 
According to the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2005 Revision) 
(promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, effective 
Jan. 1, 2006, hereinafter Company Law), directors’ compensation shall be approved 
at the shareholders’ meeting; and executives’ compensation shall be decided by the 
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board. However, subject to Article 34 of the Measures for the Administration of 
Equity Incentive Plans of Listed Companies (For Trial Implementation) (promulgated 
by the CSRC, effective Jan. 1, 2006, hereinafter Measures for Equity Incentive Plans), 
executive stock option compensation should be approved at the shareholders’ meeting. 
The reasons why the Company Law and the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans have 
different requirements are: First, if a company fulfills its duty through issuing new 
stocks when executives exercise their rights, which will change its registered capital, 
it shall be approved at the shareholders’ meeting according to the Company Law.1 
Second, if a company fulfills its duty through repurchasing its stocks when an 
executive exercises their rights, it shall also be approved at the shareholders’ meeting 
according to the Company Law.
2
 In principle, any shareholder who owns more than 
5% of the company’s shares shall not become an eligible participant.3 In addition, 
neither the independent directors
4
 nor the supervisors
5
 shall become eligible 
participants. When implementing a stock option plan, the directors, supervisors, and 
senior executives shall be “honest and in good faith, diligent, and maintain the 
interests of the company and all its shareholders.” 6 Specifically, the process of 
making executive stock option compensation is: 
First, the stock option plan shall be drafted by the compensation committee.
7
 The 
majority members of the compensation committee shall be independent directors.
8
 
                                                          
1 Article 38 of the Company Law provides, “the shareholders’ meeting shall exercise the following functions: ...(7) 
making resolutions about the increase or reduction of the company’s registered capital.”  
2 Article 143 of the Company Law provides, “a company shall not purchase its own shares except under any of 
the following circumstances:...(3) To award the employees of this company with shares. Where a company 
needs to purchase its own shares for any of the reasons as mentioned in items (3) of the preceding paragraph, it  
shall be subject to a resolution of the shareholders’ meeting.” 
3 Here, the “eligible participants” refers to those who are granted stock options according to the stock option plans, 
such as executives and employees.  
4 Article 8 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans provides, “eligible participants may include the directors, 
supervisors, senior executives, and core technicians or business personnel of a listed company, and other 
employees that shall be granted the equity incentive as the company may deem necessary, but shall not include 
independent directors.” 
5 Article 1 of the Memo No. 2 on the Matters of Equity Incentive (promulgated by the CSRC, effective Mar. 17, 
2008, hereinafter Memo No.2) provides, “in order to assure the independence of the supervisors and let them 
perform their duty fully, the supervisors shall not be the eligible participants.” 
6 Article 3 the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans. 
7 Article 28 (1) of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans provides, “the compensation and examination 
committee established under the board of directors of a listed company shall be responsible for drafting out the 
draft of an equity incentive plan.” 
8 According to article 1(1) of the Guidance Opinion on the Establishment of an Independent Director System in 
Listed Companies (promulgated by the CSRC, effective Aug. 16, 2001, hereinafter Independent Director 
Opinion). The term “independent director” refers to “a director who does not hold any position other than the 
positon of director in the company she works and has no relationship with the company or the controlling 
shareholder of the company that may affect her independent and objective judgment upon company affairs.” By 
the end of 2008, 98% of all the listed companies have already established compensation committee, see Gao 
Wen Liang & Luo Hong, Compensation Regulation, Remuneration Committee and Corporate Performance, 
Vol.33 No.8 Journal of Shanxi Finance and Economics University 84, 85 (2011). Concerning the institution of 
independent directors in China, see Donald C. Clarke, The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate 
Governance, 31 DJCL 125 (2006). Article 3 of Independent Director Opinion provides, “anyone falling under 
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The chairperson of the compensation committee shall be an independent director.
9
 
Second, the draft shall be submitted to the board of directors for discussion.
10
 Also, 
any conflicted directors have to withdraw from the discussion.
11
 Independent 
directors shall present their independent opinions on whether the stock option plan is 
conducive to the sustained development of a listed company, and whether it obviously 
impairs the interests of the listed company and all of its shareholders.
12
 The 
supervising committee shall check the list of eligible participants.
13
 A listed company 
shall retain an attorney to issue legal opinions to its stock option plan, and present 
professional opinions.
14
 When the compensation committee deems it necessary, it 
may request the listed company retain an independent financial consultant to issue 
professional opinions on the feasibility of the stock option plan, whether it is 
conducive to the sustained development of the listed company, whether it will impair 
the interests of the listed company, and its affect to the shareholders’ interests. 15 
“Within 2 trading days after the board has adopted the draft through deliberation, the 
company shall announce the resolutions of the board, the excerpts of the draft of the 
stock option plan, and the opinions of the independent director.”16 
Third, after the board has adopted the compensation draft, the company shall 
submit the documents and materials comprising the stock option plan to the CSRC for 
archival filing.
17
 If the CSRC does not reject the application documents and materials 
                                                                                                                                                                      
any of the following circumstances may not be an independent director: (1) a person who holds a position in the 
listed company or its subordinate affiliates as well as the direct relatives of, and those with important social 
connections to, the former; (2) a person, or the direct relative of a person, who directly or indirectly holds at 
least 1% of the company's stock or is among the top ten shareholders of the company; (3) a person, or the direct 
relative of a person, who is employed by an entity that directly or indirectly holds at least 5% of the company's 
stock or is among the top five non-natural person shareholders of the company; a person about whom any of the 
above conditions have been met within the last year; (5) a person who supplies accounting, legal, consulting, or 
other similar services to the company or its subordinate affiliates; (6) any other person specified in the 
company's articles of association; and (7) any other person specified by the CSRC.” 
9 Article 52 of the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China (promulgated by the CSRC, 
effective Jan. 7, 2002, hereinafter Code of Corporate Governance). 
10 Article 28 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans. 
11 Article 4(2) of the Memo No.2.  
12 Article 29 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans. 
13 Article 1(1) of the Memo No.2.  
14 Article 31 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans provides, “a listed company shall retain an attorney to 
issue legal opinions to its stock option plan, and present professional opinions at least on the following matters: 
1.Whether the stock option plan complies with the provisions of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans; 2. 
Whether it has gone through legal procedures for the stock option plan; 3. Whether the listed company has 
fulfilled its obligation on information disclosure; 4. Whether there is any circumstance that obviously impairs 
the interests of the listed company and all of its shareholders, and circumstance that is in violation of the 
relevant laws and administrative regulations in the stock option plan; and 5. Other matters need to be stated.” 
15 Article 32 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans. 
16 Article 30 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans. 
17 Article 33 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans provides, “after an stock option plan is adopted by the 
board of directors through deliberation, a listed company shall report the relevant materials to the CSRC for 
archival filing, and send a copy to the stock exchange and the securities regulatory bureau at the locality of the 
company at the same time.” 
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for archival filing within 20 workdays from the day it receives the full application and 
related materials, a listed company may begin sending out notifications to hold a 
shareholders’ meeting for discussing and implementing the stock option plan. If the 
CSRC sends out a rejection within the aforementioned time limit, the listed company 
cannot deliver a notice to convene the shareholders meeting.
18
 
Finally, when the stock option plan is submitted to the shareholders’ meeting for 
approval and a shareholder has any relation with any matter to be deliberated at the 
shareholders’ meeting, “she/it shall withdraw from the voting, her/its voting shares 
shall not be included in the total amount of voting shares of the shareholders that 
attend the general assembly of shareholders.” 19  After the stock option plan is 
approved by the shareholders’ meeting, the company shall handle information 
disclosure matters at the stock exchange upon the strength of the relevant documents, 
and handle the relevant depository and clearing matters at the securities depository 
and clearing institutions.
20
 
The compensation committee and its independent directors are expected to play a 
very important role in creating executive stock option compensation, but then the 
question arises of whether they can responsibly perform their duties. 
III. The Reality of the Compensation Committee and its 
Independent Directors and the Reasons for Their Dysfunction 
A. Can the compensation committee and its independent directors function 
correctly in China? 
Though almost all listed companies have already established compensation 
committees and the majority members of these committees are independent directors, 
can they function well and assure that executives are granted fair stock option 
compensation that truly reflects their contributions while bringing benefits to 
shareholders? Empirical studies show pessimistic results. Niu Jian Bo and Liu Xu 
Guang collected panel data from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 
2002 to 2005, and they concluded that “no evidence shows that a compensation 
committee can positively benefit shareholders and the compensation committee 
                                                          
18 Article 34 of the Measures of Equity Incentive Plans. 
19 Article 31 (1) of the Rules for the Shareholders’ Meeting of Listed Companies (promulgated by the CSRC, 
effective Mar. 16, in 2006). 
20 Article 38 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans. 
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cannot efficiently supervise the executives.” 21  Made in 2008, one study also 
confirmed that “although 90% of all  listed companies have already established 
compensation committees, the committees play a very limited role in supervising 
executives’ compensation.”22 Based on a sample of listed companies in 2001-2008, 
Gao Wen Liang and Luo Hong found that the establishment of compensation 
committees was positively related to executive pay. At the same time, it had no 
significant effect on pay-performance sensitivity in listed companies, which meant 
that the role of the compensation committee needed to be expanded.
23
 Relying on 
data from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2005 to 2010, Yang Wei 
Guo and Wu Bang Zheng found that a compensation committee could reduce the level 
of executives’ monetary remuneration and inhibit the expansion of executive pay. 
However, the compensation committee’s impact on managerial ownership and 
compensation sensitivity was not significant.
24
 As for the effectiveness of 
independent directors in supervising executives’ compensation, one study shows that 
“the implementation of the independent director system has increased executive 
salaries while decreasing executives’ salary-performance sensitivity... Therefore, it 
can be concluded that the independent director system has become a tool for 
executives to increase their salary without the function of improving the salary system 
in China.”25 
It is very unfortunate that neither compensation committees nor their independent 
directors can function well and serve the interests of shareholders. The next question 
to ask is, why exactly do they fail? 
B. The reasons why the compensation committee and its independent directors 
cannot function well 
In my point of view, there are three factors that cripple the functions of the 
compensation committee and its independent directors: First, executives have huge 
influence on the board and the independent directors in compensation committees. 
Second, compensation committees by themselves cannot approve executive stock 
                                                          
21 Niu Jian Bo & Liu Xu Guang, The Effectiveness and Governance Premium of Sub-Committee-Based on the 
Experience of Chinese Listed Companies, No. 1 Securities Market Herald 64, 70 (2008). 
22 Kong Jie Min, The Changing of Executives’ Compensation in Listed Companies, No.5 CFO World 31, 33 
(2011). 
23 Gao & Luo, supra note 8, at 91. 
24 Yang Wei Guo & Wu Bang Zheng, Remuneration Committee and Senior Managers Compensation, No.2 
Lanzhou Academic Journal 109, 115 (2013). 
25 Yang Lei & Lu Yue, Independent Director and Executive Salary: Empirical Evidences from China’s Security 
Market, No. 5 Contemporary Finance & Economics 110, 113 (2009).  
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option compensation. And third, there are some shortcomings within the institution of 
independent directors. 
1. Executives have a huge influence on the board and the independent directors of 
the compensation committee 
In China, subject to the Independent Director Opinion, at least one-third of the 
board must be independent directors. Generally, executives also occupy one-third of 
board seats, while controlling shareholders (if they are natural persons) or people 
acting on the behalf of controlling shareholders (if they are legal persons or other 
entities) serve as the remaining directors. If there are no controlling shareholders, 
executives may occupy more than one-third of the seats on the board. So, in both 
dispersed-ownership companies and concentered-ownership companies, executives 
have huge influence on the board. Thus, executives can also have huge influence on 
the independent directors in the compensation committee. The reasons are: 
(1) The independent directors are usually recommended by executives and 
nominated by the board 
According to the Independent Director Opinion, the board of directors, the board of 
supervisors and individuals or groups representing at 1% of the shares could nominate 
independent director candidates. In practice, 75% independent directors are 
nominated by the board and 18% are nominated by the controlling shareholders.
26
 
Usually, the chairperson of the board or CEO recommends independent directors to 
the board. Since independent director can gain financial and non-financial benefits,
27
 
one who wants to be nominated again or in other companies will try to please, at least 
not oppose, the CEOs. “Developing a reputation for haggling with the CEO over 
compensation would hurt rather than help a director’s chances of being invited to join 
other companies’ boards.”28 Levitt vividly describes the feeling of those persons: 
“Once we are on that board, how likely are we to challenge the person who invited us 
and to go against the persons who will reinvite us if we enjoy that service? The 
culture is almost fraternal.”29 
(2) Independent directors gain benefits from the board 
                                                          
26 Liu Hui Qing, The Reform of the Institution of Independent of Directors in China (Dec. 18, 2010), available 
athttp://money.163.com/10/1218/16/6O6USJC100254KRA.html. 
27 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 71, 73 (2003) (“Besides an attractive salary, a directorship is also likely to provide 
prestige and valuable business and social connections.”) In China, the independent director’s pay is not 
generous. So, the main reasons she is willing to become a independent director are: (1) acquiring business 
experience; (2) expanding her social network; and (3) increasing her social reputation.  
28 Id. at 74. 
29 Arthur Levitt, Jr., Corporate Culture and the Problem of Executive Compensation, 30 J. Corp. Law. 749, 750 
(2005). 
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According to the Independent Director Opinion, independent directors’ salaries are 
drafted and submitted at shareholder’s meeting by the board and are approved at the 
meeting. In reality, how much the independent directors can get depends on how 
much the board drafts. So, if the compensation committee grants the executives 
“good” stock option compensation, as an exchange, its independent directors can also 
be awarded “good” salaries.  
In short, “for the independent directors, generally, they are recommended by the 
executives and paid by the company. So, they usually do not want to go against the 
executives. As long as the decisions or executives’ behaviors do not break laws or 
rules, the independent directors will turn a blind eye to them. If the decisions or 
executives’ behaviors break laws or rules, they will resign rather than use their 
power.”30 Under the influence of executives, the independent directors are “reluctant 
to bargain effectively with management because, despite their fiduciary obligations, 
the independent directors find themselves more closely aligned with management than 
with the shareholders. The product of such a ‘bargain’ is no bargain at all to the 
corporation and its owners. ”31 
In China, the ownership of listed companies is highly concentrated.
32
 “In most 
firms there is a single dominant shareholder whose large share ownership gives 
considerable power and influence over the way the firm is run. This is especially the 
case with regard to the appointment and compensation of the CEO and the board.” 33 
Thus, the executives’ influence can be reduced by the strict supervision by controlling 
shareholders. However, since controlling shareholder’s tunneling behaviors (e.g. 
selling assets, goods and services to listed companies at high prices or transferring 
assets from listed companies to member firms under controlling shareholders at low 
prices) are usually achieved through collusion with executives,
34
 executives may use 
their influence to gain more stock option compensation in exchange for supporting 
                                                          
30 The Association of Secretaries of the Board of Listed Companies in Shanghai& Jin Xin Securities Research 
Institute, What’s Wrong with the Independent Directors, Securities Times, Aug. 7, 2003. 
31 Charles M. Elson, The Duty Of Care, Compensation, And Stock Ownership, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 649 , 
655(1995).  
32 In China, though most companies have controlling shareholders, a few of them are also dispersed-ownership 
companies. For example, the largest shareholder of PingAn Insurance, a company listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, only holds 8.43% shares of the company, which means that the 
executives in PingAn have huge influence in practice. So, it is not surprising that Ma Ming Zhe, the chairman 
of the board & CEO of PingAn, gained more than RMB 60 million (about US dollars 10 million) in 2007 
(more than 90% was the result of him exercising his stock options), which was strongly criticized by 
shareholders and media at that time. 
33 Martin J. Conyon & Lerong He, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China, 17 Journal of 
Corporate Finance 1158, 1160 (2011). 
34 Kun Wang & Xing Xiao, Controlling Shareholders’ Tunneling and Executive Compensation: Evidence From 
China, 30 J. Account. Public Policy 89, 89-91 (2011). 
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controlling shareholder’s tunneling behaviors.35 While, on the other hand, controlling 
shareholder’s tunneling behaviors may depress stock prices, thus reducing the profits 
executives earn from their options. So, there is a dynamic balance between the 
numbers of stock options and stock prices. As a result, executives may support some 
tunneling behaviors in favor of more stock options; or they may object to some 
tunneling behaviors in favor of higher stock prices.  
In practice, executives may use their influence on the board and among 
independent directors to obtain excessive stock option compensation or incentive 
compensation, which has been confirmed by empirical studies. Looking at the data of 
Chinese listed companies from 2003 to 2009, Wang Qing Gang and Hu Ya Jun studied 
the relationship between atypical executive compensation (compensation paid to 
executives was highly unrelated to the performance of the company) and managerial 
power. They found that there was a significant positive correlation between atypical 
executive compensation and managerial power. The more power managers had, the 
more seriously they could set their own compensation in companies, especially in 
companies where CEOs were seated as chairman simultaneously, and these 
companies also had dispersed shareholding patterns and a lesser first shareholder 
proportion.
36
 With regard to data between 2006 and 2010 of listed companies 
implementing stock incentive plans, Gong Yong Hong and He Fan found that high 
managerial power increased stock compensation level and the compensation gap; and 
high managerial power was positively related to enterprise performance level and 
increased its fluctuation.
37
 Another study made in 2009 found that managerial 
compensation incentives were more related to net non-operating income with the 
interference of manger power. In addition, managerial power lowered the sensitivity 
between core performance and compensation, which implied that compensation 
                                                          
35 Article 125 of the Company Law provides, “where any of the directors has any relationship with the enterprise 
involved in the matter to be decided at the meeting of the board of directors, she shall not vote on this 
resolution, nor may she vote on behalf of any other person. The meeting of the board of directors shall not be 
held unless more than half of the unrelated directors are present at the meeting. A resolution of the board of 
directors shall be adopted by more than half of the unrelated directors....” According to this article, related 
directors (controlling shareholders themselves or on behave of controlling shareholders) cannot vote on the 
meeting, so the remaining directors include executives (act as directors), independent directors and a few 
unrelated directors. So, without the executives’ support, controlling shareholder’s tunneling behaviors cannot 
be successful in China. See Zhao Chun Xiang, Does Managerial Power Harm the Validity of Compensation 
Incentive Contracts? No. 1 Accounting Forum 87, 90 (2012).  
36 Wang Qing Gang & Hu Ya Jun, Research on Managerial Power and Atypical Executive Compensation 
Behavior, No.10 China Soft Science 166, 174 (2011). 
37 Gong Yong Hong & He Fan, Managerial Power, Stock Compensation Gap and Stock Incentive Performance: 
An Analysis Based on the Unbalanced Panel Data of Chinese Listed Companies after the Implementation of 
the “Measures of Equity Incentive Plans”, No.1 Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University( Social Sciences 
Edition) 113, 119 (2013). 
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contracts are indeed a part of agency problems.
38
 
2. The compensation committee does not enjoy the exclusive power to make stock 
option compensation 
According to Article 28 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans, the power of 
compensation committees only allows for the drafting of a stock option plan -- 
whether the plan can actually be adopted or not falls within the discretion of the board. 
Thus, this requirement has a fatal flaw: “if the committee only has the power to 
propose but not to decide, its function will be crippled. The main function of the 
committee is to provide a mechanism for the independent directors to make 
independent decisions on some matters of the company without the participation of 
executives so they can supervise them. If the committee cannot decide independently, 
the independent directors and the committee cannot work well.” 39  Under such 
circumstances, the compensation committee just acts as a comparatively independent 
compensation consultant but without its professional knowledge and experience.
40
 
Another problem affiliated with this flaw is the “obscurity of accountability” effect. 
Suppose that a stock option plan is fiercely criticized by minority shareholders and the 
media, then the compensation committee could blame it on the board, which has 
adopted the plan. Meanwhile, the board could also blame it on the committee, which 
has drafted the plan. In the end, no party will be accountable for the controversial 
stock option plan. 
3. The shortcomings of the institution of independent directors in China
41
 
(1) The limits of the standard of non-independence 
According to Article 3 of the Independent Director Opinion, when a director or a 
director’s direct relatives have some sort of relationship with the company or its 
controlling shareholders which may impair the director’s independent or objective 
judgments, she cannot be regarded as an independent director anymore.
42
 However, 
another circumstance may also discourage an independent director from fulfilling her 
duty independently and objectively, but it is not included in the Independent Director 
Opinion. Namely, the independent director has some economic relationship with 
executives:
43
 a. “Interlock directors”. Suppose that A is an executive at a firm on 
                                                          
38 Zhao, supra note 35, at 100. 
39 Xie Zheng Yi, Board Committees and Corporate Governance, No.5 Legal Studies 60, 67 (2005). 
40 Chen Jun Ren, Corporate Governance and The Power to Make Compensation Decision, Vol. 207 Yue Dan 
Legal Journal 48, 48 (2012). 
41 The focus of this part is the shortcomings of the institution of independent directors in the compensation 
committee, but it also applies to other independent directors. 
42 See supra note 9. 
43 According to Article 3 of the Independent Director Opinion, companies and the CRSC can also make 
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whose compensation committee B sits, meanwhile B is an executive at a firm on 
whose compensation committee A sits. In this case, both of them can benefit from 
each other by using what influence they have has as a member of the other company’s 
compensation committee; or b. The independent director and one executive (or some 
executives) have a business relationship, for example, they are the only two partners 
in a venture capital. 
(2) The independent directors lack of business knowledge and experience
44
 
Though the “determination of meaningful long-term incentives requires profound 
knowledge of the company’s core business,”45 the Independent Director Opinion does 
not require the independent directors in the compensation committee to have any 
professional knowledge or experience in compensation. In contrast, Article 52 of the 
Code of Corporate Governance requires that at least one independent director in the 
auditor committee shall be an expert in accounting. “We find that few compensation 
committee members have the experience of being executives. Without this 
background, discussions on compensation are not practical. In fact, the chairpersons 
of compensation committees in many listed companies are professors, who have no 
experience in managing companies. So, their opinions and suggestions are from the 
perspective of the academics, not the managements.”46 Therefore, even though the 
independent directors are well-meaning, well-intentioned and smart people, they still 
cannot understand some of the key aspects of compensation schemes. This problem 
can be resolved by hiring a compensation consultant.
47
 But, obviously, there is an 
incentive for it to please executives.
48
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
additional conditions that deny some directors as independent directors, but, in practice, they never have made 
such additional conditions.  
44 See Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 
Ind. L. J. 59, 76 (1992) (“As for ability, these committees suffer several handicaps, including: (1) Because the 
committees are composed of other executives, not compensation specialists, they often lack technical expertise 
in compensation issues; (2) Time constraints preclude a thorough analysis of extremely complicated contracts; 
(3) As outsiders, they seldom know enough about a company’s inner workings to effectively review corporate 
plans and objectives or evaluate executive performance; and (4) They rely heavily on outside consultants who 
in turn are hired and fired by the CEOs whose pay packages are under consideration, making their 
recommendations suspect.”). 
45 Stas Getmanenko, Executive Compensation: The Law and Incentives, at 18 (October 2010), available at  
http://works.bepress.com/stas_getmanenko/1. 
46 Yan Xue Feng, The Chairman of Compensation Committee Should be More Powerful, No. 4 Directors 
&Boards 96, 97 (2012). The reasons why university professors are welcomed by listed companies are: (1) 
They are more independent (compared with others); (2) Their opinions and suggestions are more macro and 
logical; (3) They are trusted by public investors. See Zhu Bao Chen, Independent Directors: the Persons and 
Stories, Securities Daily, Aug.5, 2011. 
47 See Mary-Hunter Morris, The Price of Advice, 86 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 153, 166 (2009) (“Seeking to 
counteract the board’s inherent informational disadvantage, companies routinely employ compensation 
consultants from outside firms who scrutinize the company’s situation and provide the board with the 
information and advice it needs to make a quick and rational decision.”). 
48 In chapter four, I will discuss problems relating to compensation consultants in detail.  
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(3) The Independent directors are paid without performance-based compensation 
Currently, Chinese independent directors are paid fixed salaries mainly based on 
the following considerations: (a) the company’s scale; (b) the standards of the 
industry; and (c) the experience level of the independent directors.
49
 Because they are 
paid without performance-based compensation, they have little incentive to seriously 
supervise executives and maximize the shareholders’ profits. 
(4) The independent directors are faced with little in terms of shame sanctions. 
Because of the “obscurity of accountability” effect and the flaws and limits of 
transparency regarding executive stock option compensation, the minority 
shareholders and the media cannot tell whether independent directors have fulfilled 
their duties or not. Hence, there is not much of a difference between good independent 
directors (who pursue the interests of minority shareholders) and bad independent 
directors (who pursue the interests of controlling shareholders or executives) from the 
perspective of minority shareholders and the media. Thus, why would the independent 
directors bother opposing executives at the risk of losing their benefits? 
(5) The independent directors are unlikely to be sued and found liable 
Because it is difficult for minority shareholders to bring derivative suits against the 
independent directors who breach their fiduciary duties, few cases involves the civil 
liabilities of independent directors.
50
 For example, “nearly 70 independent directors 
were publicly condemned by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange by the end of 2007, but 
among these directors who failed to perform their fiduciary duties, only one director 
was penalized with a fine of RMB 100,000 by the CSRC. None of them were held 
liable for violating their fiduciary duties in the courts.”51 
C. Some reflections on the limited functions of the compensation committee 
and its independent directors 
Though a dysfunction of a compensation committee and its independent directors 
can lead to excessive stock option compensation, we cannot say that the huge amounts 
of stock options paid to executives are just the result of the executives’ influence, the 
limited power of the compensation committee or the shortcomings of the institution of 
independent directors. The reasons are: 
                                                          
49 Wu Jian Bin, On Independent Directors’ Responsibilities and Restrictions of Listed Companies, No.3 Journal 
of NaJing University (Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences) 36, 39 (2006). 
50 Zhu Yi Kun, Directors’ Accountability: Institutional Structure and Efficiency (Beijing: Law Press, 2012), at 
185.  
51 Peng Wen Ge & Qiu Yong Hong, On Improving the Institution of Independent Directors from the Perspective 
of Stock Exchange, No.2 Securities Market Herald 36, 41 (2007). 
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  First, both in China and other countries, creating an absolutely fair stock option 
compensation scheme is almost mission impossible, as “to determine what part of 
one’s pay is deserved and what part is not, we must first determine the precise value 
of one’s services. Unfortunately, this is not an easy task; for what is the true value of 
the deployment of human capital?”52 
Second, executives are scarce resources in the competitive human capital market. 
So, executives have “bargaining power” when they negotiate with compensation 
committees.
53
 Hence, “boards that try to hire a top-performing manager from another 
company will often have to pay top dollar. This high-performing manager has 
tremendous leverage.”54 
Finally, executives have many high-pay alternatives -- if they are not paid well in 
public companies, they can create venture capital or hedge funds themselves.
55
 In 
short, we cannot apply the concept of “arm’s-length transactions” to the corporate 
scene,
56
 especially in the stock option compensation scene, although there is much 
room to improve this kind of compensation.  
The objective of this dissertation is to make some suggestions to partly address the 
agency problems in executive stock option compensation, thus making it more 
reasonable from the perspective of shareholders, especially the minority shareholders.  
At the same time, I do not want to amend or revise current laws and rules too much. I 
only hope that my suggestions will do better than current laws and rules. 
IV. Expanding the Role of the Compensation Committee and 
Awarding Stock Compensation to Independent Directors 
As aforementioned, the reasons why the compensation committee and its 
independent directors have not been performing well are: first, executives carry huge 
influence among board members and the independent directors in the compensation 
committee; second, the compensation committee cannot finalize executive stock 
option compensation figures on its own; and third, there are shortcomings in the 
institution of independent directors. In theory, by reducing the influence of executives; 
                                                          
52 Elson, supra note 31, at 654.  
53 Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock 
Options, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 847, 854-855 (2002). 
54 Symposium, Current Issues in Executive Compensation, 3 NYU J. L. & BUS. 519, 527 (2007). 
55 In China, a few managers from public offering funds have resigned and joined in or created their own private 
offering funds because they can be paid more money, see Zhao Juan & Wang Li Ming, Saving the Public 
Offering Funds, Economics Observers, July 4, 2009. I think such a situation can also occur in listed companies 
if executives cannot get what they want. 
56 Bevis Longstreth, A Real World Critique of Pay without Performance, 30 J. Corp. L. 767,767 (2005). 
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expanding the role of the compensation committee, and fixing the shortcomings of the 
independent directors, the compensation committee and its independent directors will 
be able to better fulfill their duties and grant fair stock option compensation to 
executives, thus serving the interests of the shareholders. In practice, reducing the 
influence of executives is a difficult task in China, although expanding the role of the 
compensation committee can reduce executives’ influence over the board. The reason 
is that most listed companies have controlling shareholders in China, and as long as 
executives collude with the controlling shareholders, minority shareholders cannot 
really play a role in nominating and creating benefits for the independent directors, let 
alone collectively act.
57
 Though we can improve shareholders’ proposal system58 and 
cumulative voting system
59
 to encourage minority shareholders to speak up regarding 
executives’ pay, I doubt these methods will work well in practice.  
Considering the framework of this dissertation, this chapter only discusses two 
problems: a compensation committee having limited power and independent directors 
being paid without incentivized compensation. Chapter two will discuss how to 
address the problem of the limits on non-independence in addition to the independent 
directors being faced with little shame sanctions within regard to creating 
transparency for executive stock option compensation. Chapter four will discuss how 
to address the problem of inadequate experience among independent directors with 
the help of real independent compensation consultants. Chapter five will discuss how 
to reduce the executives’ influence by enhancing supervision by the CSRC. Chapter 
six will discuss how to address the problem of independent directors facing little civil 
liabilities.   
In short, the compensation committee should be responsible for executive stock 
                                                          
57 Edward M. Iacobucci, The Effects of Disclosure on Executive Compensation, 48 U. Toronto L.J. 489, 496 
(1998) (“The benefits of disciplinary activity, either through monitoring or influencing the board, are shared 
equally by all shareholders, yet each would individually bear the cost of such activity. Consequently, each 
shareholder faces an incentive to take a free ride on the disciplinary actions of others. Since each shareholder 
relies on others to take action, no action is taken, and disciplinary activity is underprovided.”). 
58 Article 103 of the Company Law provides, “the shareholders separately or aggregately holding 3% or more of 
the shares of the company may put forward a written interim proposal to the board of directors 10 days before 
a shareholders’ meeting is held. The board of directors may notify other shareholders within 2 days and submit 
the interim proposal to the shareholders’ meeting for deliberation. The contents of an interim proposal shall fall 
within the scope to be decided by the shareholders’ meeting, and the interim proposal shall have a clear topic 
for discussion and matters to be decided.” But, the 3% shareholding requirement is too high for minority 
shareholders. 
59 Article 106 of the Company Law provides, “a shareholders’ meeting may adopt a cumulative voting system to 
elect the directors or supervisors according to the bylaw or its resolutions. The term ‘cumulative voting system’ 
as mentioned in the Company Law refers to a system of voting by shareholders for the election of directors or 
supervisors at the shareholders’ meeting in which the shareholder can multiply his voting rights by the number 
of candidates and vote them all for one candidate for director or supervisor.” But, in practice, most listed 
companies do not use this system. See Hu Ru Yin, The Reform of the Institution of Independent of Directors in 
China (Dec. 18, 2010), available at http://money.163.com/10/1218/ 16/6O6USJC100254 KRA.html. 
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option compensation and independent directors should practice true independence 
from other company parties while working diligently to serve the interests of 
shareholders, especially minority shareholders, who pay and rely on them. Frankly 
speaking, my suggestions will not completely solve agency problems relating to 
executive stock option compensation, but they will certain prove superior to current 
laws and rules.   
A. Expanding the role of the compensation committee 
This dissertation suggests two ways (not compatible) to expand the role of the 
compensation committee.  
1. The CSRC shall amend the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans and the Code of 
Corporate Governance to grant the compensation committee the exclusive power to 
make a stock option plan and submit it for approval at a shareholders’ meeting, 
granting it the right to hire, pay, supervise and fire its own compensation consultant. 
The stock option plan, on the other hand, is not to be submitted to the board for 
discussion. The inclusion of independent directors and a special committee under the 
board was brought over from the US to China in 2002, although China had no 
experience with this system. So, in order to accumulate experience and not to violate 
the power of the board, which would make it easier to transplant this corporate 
practice to China, it made sense at that time to grant the compensation committee 
limited power. But after more than 10 years of practice, it is evident that Chinese 
compensation committees have been unable to fulfill their duties with their limited 
power. In my point of view, it is high time that the situation shall be changed, because, 
“ultimately, the solution to the pay problem is a compensation committee that has 
reclaimed its dual role as the sole arbiter of compensation and the ultimate custodian 
of the shareholders’ interest throughout compensation negotiations.” 60  Once the 
compensation committee is granted exclusive power, the compensation committee, 
the majority of whose members are independent directors, could create a “win-win” 
stock option plan for both shareholders and executives with the help of independent 
compensation consultants. Moreover, the executives’ influence in the board will be 
reduced, as the board would not be able to play any role in creating the company’s 
executive stock option plan. In turn, the compensation committee would not be able to 
blame the board for adopting a controversial stock option plan. So, besides resolving 
                                                          
60 Morris, supra note 47, at 174 ; and Xie, supra note 39, at 68. 
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the “obscurity of accountability” problem, granting compensation committees 
exclusive power would also make the independent directors in the committee more 
sensitive to bad decision-making. The independent directors would become the only 
people who would be blamed or applauded by minority shareholders and the media, 
causing them to heighten their sensitivity. “If the independent directors can maintain 
their objectiveness and independence, their reputation will improve, which will grant 
them more job opportunities; otherwise, if they commit fraud, their reputations would 
be seriously damaged, thus reducing their worth in the labor market. Therefore, in 
order to maintain their reputations, the independent directors would choose to work 
hard rather than collude with executives.”61 Not only would shame sanctions become 
more efficient, but the executives’ influence over the independent directors would also 
be reduced. Compared with gaining influence over the board, it would likely be more 
difficult for executives to influence the majority independent director members in the 
compensation committee. It would also become more difficult for controlling 
shareholders to influence the independent directors in the compensation committee 
than to influence the board, thus making it difficult for controlling shareholders to 
grant excessive stock option compensation to executives in exchange for support of 
their tunneling behaviors. 
2. Alternatively, the CSRC could make a small alternation to Article 28 of the 
Measures for Equity Incentive Plans via adding just one requirement: if the board 
decides to amend or withdraw the draft made by the compensation committee, it shall 
disclose the reasons why it does so in detail. Hence, unless the board has sufficient 
justifiable reasons, it will not amend or withdraw the compensation committee’s draft; 
otherwise, minority shareholders and the media would criticize the board and the 
company would be penalized by a reduction in its stock price.
62
 Much worse, if the 
stock option plan were to be criticized by the country’s top news sources, it is very 
possible that the stock option plan would be rejected by the CSRC.
63
 
B. Awarding stock compensation to independent directors 
When granted an appropriate level of stock compensation, the independent 
                                                          
61 Li Ming Hui, Incentives and Constraints of Independent Directors, Vol. 28 No. 3Journal of ShanXi Finance 
and Economics University 73, 74 (2006). 
62 Annaleen Steeno, Note: Corporate Governance: Economic Analysis of a “Comply or Explain” Approach , 11 
Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 387, 397 (2006). 
63 Yang De Ming & Zhao Can, Media Monitoring, Media Governance and Managers’ Compensation, No. 6 
Economic Research Journal 116 (2012) (The authors argue that though the media reports can not directly 
reduce the excessive compensation, they can urge the regulators to intervene in the compensation matters.). 
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directors in the compensation committee would see their interests aligned with those 
of the shareholders. They will monitor executives more closely so as to protect their 
own interests. “Because of this apparent link between effective oversight and equity 
ownership, an equity based approach to the problem of the passive board appears to 
be highly desirable and, is the most effective solution.” 64  Furthermore, as the 
chairperson is in charge of the committee and should be doing more work than other 
members, she may be paid more than the others.
65
 Although the Measures for Equity 
Incentive Plans prohibits listed companies from granting restricted stocks and stock 
options to their independent directors, stock compensation has never been banned. 
Thus, the CSRC should require listed companies to pay their independent directors 
some amount of stock compensation based on their personal wealth, the time they 
spend on their jobs, the skills required by the jobs and so on.  
Surely, we cannot put too much emphasis on this method, because the independent 
directors have to trade off benefits for costs to gain their enhanced supervision. If the 
gains from the stock compensation are smaller than the losses from their enhanced 
supervision, this method would not be viable.
66
 For example, suppose an independent 
director holds 0.005 percent of the company’s shares and the shareholder value will be 
reduced by 10 million dollars through a value-reducing stock option plan, what an 
independent director can get is only 500, but she will lose much more than that  
amount, and risk not being nominated again by executives or hired by other 
companies.
67
 In short, there are limits to what laws and rules can really do. Serving 
on a board is akin to belonging to a club, and that is not likely to change.
68
 
V. Conclusion 
This chapter points out that three factors cripple the functions of compensation 
committees and their independent directors: first, executives command a huge 
influence over the board and the independent directors of compensation committees; 
second, compensation committees are unable to create executives stock option 
                                                          
64 Elson, supra note 31, at 653. 
65 Yang Hong Chang, The Structure Change of Outside Directors’ Compensation in US Companies and its 
Implication, No.6 Journal of Nanjing University of Finance and Economics 70, 71 (2005). 
66 Zhang Jian Feng, Looking on the Institutional Defect of Stock Option from the View of Financial Scandal of U. 
S. Large Companies, No . 2 Journal of Liaoning University ( Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition) 109, 111 
(2004).  
67  Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive 
Compensation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), at 34. 
68 Arthur Levitt, Jr., Corporate Culture and the Problem of Executive Compensation, 30 J. Corp. Law. 749, 752 
(2005). 
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packages by themselves; and third, there are shortcomings that exist within employing 
the use of independent directors. In China, most listed companies have controlling 
shareholders, and as long as executives collude with controlling shareholders, 
minority shareholder cannot really play a role in nominating and benefiting the 
independent directors, thus reducing executives’ influence on the independent 
directors. 
Considering the framework of this dissertation, this chapter only focuses on 
addressing two problems: the compensation committee having limited power and 
independent directors being paid without incentivized compensation. This chapter 
suggests that the compensation committee should be granted the exclusive power to 
make executive stock option compensation packages, including hiring, paying, 
supervising and firing its own compensation consultant. If this method seems too 
radical, the chapter also suggests another method: if the board decides to amend or 
withdraw a draft made by the compensation committee, it has to disclose the reasons 
why it did so in detail. Furthermore, the independent directors in the compensation 
committee shall be granted stock compensation so as to align their interests with those 
of shareholders. 
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Chapter Two  Ex Ante Strategy (2) of Enhancing 
Supervision Inside the Company: Improving the Disclosure 
of Executive Stock Option Compensation 
I. Introduction 
The disclosure of executive stock option compensation can play a critical role in 
addressing agency problems of the compensation. More understandable, transparent 
and comprehensive disclosure can expand the role of independent directors in the 
compensation committee and make them more independent from the executives and 
the controlling shareholder
1
 in the company. Specifically, the disclosure can remedy 
non-independence limits experienced by independent directors, prevent independent 
directors from being recruited away by professional consultants, and force 
independent directors in the compensation committee to work under more efficient 
shame sanctions, which maybe the most important tool for supervising independent 
directors in China. With independent directors able to play a more key role in 
supervising executives, the influence of the executives over the independent directors 
in the company can be reduced. Thus, when they perform their duties, they will be 
truly “in good faith, honest and diligent” and “maintain the interests of the company 
and all its shareholders”. 2  In this scenario, it becomes more difficult for the 
executives to gain excessive stock option compensation.   
Since the rules on disclosure of executive stock option compensation are made by 
the CSRC itself, the CSRC can update or amend these rules quickly to meet the needs 
of the current market and address certain agency problems related to executive stock 
option compensation, which is useful and efficient with regard to resolving agency 
problems in China. For example, just in 2008, the CSRC promulgated three memos on 
                                                          
1 See Martin J. Conyon & Lerong He, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China, 17 Journal 
of Corporate Finance 1158, 1160 (2011) (“The ownership of China’s publicly traded firms is highly 
concentrated. In most firms there is a single dominant shareholder whose large share ownership gives 
considerable power and influence over the way the firm is run. This is especially the case regarding the 
appointment and compensation of the CEO or the board. Typically, the largest shareholder owns about 43% of 
the Firm’s shares, the second largest about 9%, and the third largest about 4% . ... China’s ownership pattern 
stands in stark contrast to the US, where low-concentration and ownership diffusion is the norm. It is rare for 
investors to own more than 10% of common equity in Anglo-Saxon firms.” ). 
2 Article 3 of the Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentive Plans of Listed Companies (For Trial 
Implementation) (promulgated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), effective Jan. 1, 2006, 
hereinafter Measures for Equity Incentive Plans). 
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the matters of equity incentives to address some controversial issues about the 
disclosure of executive stock option compensation (as well as other issues within 
executive stock option compensation).
3
 The disclosure rules of the CSRC are 
important instruments for regulating executive stock option compensation, 
considering other supervision mechanisms are weak in China. 
Surely, increasing the disclosure of executive stock option compensation has costs. 
First, companies have to pay for the drafting, printing and act of disclosing the 
information, as well as bearing the costs of hiring accountants, lawyers or independent 
financial consultants and so on.
4
 Second, disclosing executive stock option 
compensation would likely give rise to the “Lake Wobegon” effect and “Ratchet” 
effect, as “company boards generally believed that their executives were above 
average, or believed that admitting that their executives were below average would 
undermine investor confidence. In both cases, fuller disclosure of pay appeared to 
lead more often to pay increases than decreases, as low-pay firms sought to bring pay 
levels up at least to the average of the relevant peer group.”5 A rising tide floats all 
boats. Thus, every time a CEO moves up the median, the median goes up, thus 
ratcheting up executives’ compensation.6 Third, since more disclosure means more 
potential legal liabilities for directors, it may cause the board to choose a suboptimal 
compensation plan. Considering that stock option compensation is not popular despite 
its positive functions in China, too much disclosure maybe not good for shareholders. 
Ultimately, when determining the optimal amount of transparency for executive 
pay, the important but often ignored costs of disclosure must be weighed against the 
benefits, namely, helping minority shareholders to collect and analyze information as 
well as supervise the independent directors in the compensation committee.
7
 What I 
want to emphasize here, is that the disclosure of executive stock option compensation 
                                                          
3 Respectively, Memo No. 1 on the Matters of Equity Incentive (promulgated by the CSRC, effective Mar. 17, 
2008, hereinafter Memo No.1), Memo No. 2 on the Matters of Equity Incentive (promulgated by the CSRC, 
effective Mar. 17, 2008, hereinafter Memo No.2); and Memo No. 3 on the Matters of Equity Incentive 
(promulgated by the CSRC, effective Sept. 18, 2008, hereinafter Memo No.3). 
4 Deng Hui& Zhang Yi Chao, Rethinking the Functions of Executives’ Compensation Disclosure, No.6 Modern 
Legal Study 55, 61 (2010). 
5 David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 435, 
453-454 (2010); Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and If So, What If Anything Should Be Done 
About It? 58 Duke L.J. 1013, 1035 (2009) (“If the true level of compensation were publicized it would actually 
drive up compensation. Some CEOs would learn that they were being paid less than their peers, and they would 
push for more. This is especially likely because people are highly sensitive to their relative as well as their 
absolute wage.” ). 
6 Charles M. Elson, The Answer to Excessive Executive Compensation Is Risk, Not the Market , 2 J. Bus. & Tech. 
L. 403,405 (2007). 
7 Kevin J. Murphy, The Politics of Pay: A Legislative History of Executive Compensation, at 10 (Marshall 
Research Paper Series Working Paper FBE 01.11, August 24, 2011), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1916358. 
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is not directly aimed at limiting executives’ compensation, but rather at shedding 
more light on pay practices to create greater restraint.
8
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Part II briefly discusses the roles that the media 
and shame sanctions can play in supervising independent directors in the 
compensation committee in China (It also applies to other independent directors, 
non-independent directors and even the executives). Part III introduces the rules and 
practices of executive compensation disclosure (including stock option compensation) 
in the US. Part IV synthesizes the rules on the disclosure of executive stock option 
compensation in China. Part V points out several problems in these rules and practices. 
Part VI makes some suggestions for improving the disclosure of executive stock 
option compensation. Lastly, part VII offers a short conclusion. 
II. The Roles of the Media and Shame Sanctions in Supervising the 
Independent Directors in China 
It is generally accepted that shareholders have the right to know how much the 
executives are paid, and that more disclosure is always preferred to less.
9
 Disclosing 
executive stock option compensation can help minority shareholders to save the costs 
of collecting and analyzing it, thus encouraging them to take active parts in corporate 
governance and supervising the independent directors in the compensation 
committee.
10
 With more understandable, transparent, and comprehensive disclosure, 
minority shareholders can express their outrages, complaints and dissatisfactions on 
executive stock option compensation through the media (e.g. interviewed by 
newspapers, magazines or TVs),
11
 which may indirectly influence the companies and 
behaviors of the independent directors, thus, to some extent, supervising executive  
stock option compensation.
12
 
                                                          
8 Walker, supra note 5, at 453.  
9 Murphy, supra note 7, at 9.  
10 Edward M. Iacobucci, The Effects of Disclosure on Executive Compensation, 48 U. Toronto L.J. 489, 500 
(1998) (“Disclosure lowers the shareholders’ cost of monitoring the setting of executive compensation and 
publicizes the results of shareholder activism, thus encouraging shareholder supervision, particularly because 
of the recent rise of the institutional investor.”).  
11 Such case has never happened in China till now, but minority shareholders can always complain executive 
stock option compensation by the way of being interviewed by financial presses. 
12 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 71, 75 (2003) (“Outrage caused by the public opinion might bring embarrassment or 
reputational harm to directors and managers, and it might reduce shareholders’ willingness to support 
incumbents in proxy contests or takeover bids. The more outrage a compensation arrangement is expected to 
generate, the more reluctant directors will be to approve the arrangement and the more hesitant managers will 
be to propose it in the first instance.”). 
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A. The role of the media in corporate governance and supervising the 
independent directors in China 
In China, the media can play an important role in corporate governance and 
supervising the independent directors with the intervention of public authorities.
13
 As 
a result, the media could play a role in supervising executive stock option 
compensation. Just as Liebman and Milhaupt believed that “at first glimpse the 
important role of China’s non-free media in corporate governance issues might appear 
counterintuitive. In practice, however, the Chinese media enjoy significantly more 
autonomy in reporting on financial misconduct than they do reporting on most other 
areas of Chinese law and society. The media are perhaps the most effective regulator 
of corporate wrongdoing in China today. China’s leadership has clearly recognized the 
valuable role the media can play in curbing corporate misdeeds—even as they 
continue to limit the media’s ability to report on many other areas.”14 I cannot agree 
with them anymore.  
Cu Wei Hua & Li Pei Gong found that among all 96 sanctioned listed companies by 
the CSRC, 60.42% of which were challenged by various media before the 
investigation of the CSRC. This evidence indicated that the Chinese media fulfilled an 
active “watchdog” role in monitoring corporate governance violation and protecting 
minority shareholders. Descriptive results showed that negative reports by media 
invoked significant market reaction, mean abnormal return and cumulative abnormal 
return was -0.83% (t=-2.076) and -3.19% (t=-2.447) respectively.
15
 Li Pei Gong and 
Shen Yi Feng found that the media took a positive part in improving corporate 
governance and protecting minority shareholders. The probability for listed 
companies to redress violations of corporate governance increased as the number of 
media exposure climbed. The mechanism that the media shaped its governance role in 
China was the involvement of administrative organizations, which was motivated by 
the media exposure of governance violations of the listed firms.
16
 Yang De Ming and 
Zhao Can found problematic executives’ compensation were more likely to be 
                                                          
13 Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions In China’s Securities Market, 108 Colum. 
L. Rev. 929, 933 (2008) (“Domestic media coverage of the sanctions of affected firms and individuals serves as 
an important mechanism of discipline, particularly in the Chinese context.”). 
14 Id. at 980. Also see Cu Wei Hua & Li Pei Gong, Empirical Study on Media as Watchdog in Corporate 
Governance, Vol.15, No. 1 Nankai Business Review 33, 34 (2012) (“The increasing competition for 
advertising revenues and circulation as well as the sheer cut of government fund force Chinese media to 
respond more actively without touching the bottom line which government set.”). 
15 Cu & Li, supra note 14, at 40. 
16 Li Pei Gong & Shen Yi Feng, The Corporate Governance Role of Media: Empirical Evidence from China, 
No.4 Economic Research Journal 14, 25-26 (2010).  
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reported natively by the media, but only by using the path of government could the 
media play a role in monitoring executives’ compensation.17 One paper studied the 
relationship between the media coverage and the resignation of independent directors, 
based on the panel data of Chinese listed companies which were negatively reported 
by the media from 2006 to 2009, it found that the number of negative media had 
significant positive relations to the probability of independent directors’ resignation. 
The more influential of the media, the higher probability of resignation of 
independent directors, which meant that media coverage played a positive role, while 
influential media played a key role. After the media coverage, the more independent 
director cared about her reputation, the higher probability of independent director 
resignation was, which meant that reputation played a positive role in company 
governance of independent directors.
18
 There is no empirical study on the 
relationship between the media and executive stock option compensation. But one 
piece of news reported that the CSRC, in 2008, objected the stock option plan of 
Midea, a electric appliances company listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange, because of 
its low strike price and huge amounts of options granted to executives.
19
 I could not 
find the exact reasons why the CSRC objected the plan, but the media’s negative 
reports maybe one of them.  
In short, with the improved disclosure of executive stock option compensation 
information, it becomes more easily for minority shareholders and the media to find 
the excessive or problematic stock option compensation. With the negative reports, 
the CSRC will be urged to intervene in the matters of executive stock option 
compensation.  
B. Shame sanctions and independent directors 
When required to make more understandable, transparent and comprehensive 
disclosure on executive stock option compensation, the independent directors in the 
compensation committee will exercise more restraint in determining executive 
compensation.
20
 They must provide a reasonable justification for their choices, 
                                                          
17 Yang De Ming & Zhao Can, Media Monitoring, Media Governance and Managers’ Compensation, No. 6 
Economic Research Journal 116, 125 (2012). 
18 Li Yan & Qin Yi Hu, Media Coverage, Reputation Mechanism and Resignation of Independent Directors, No.3 
Finance & Trade Economics 36, 41 (2011). 
19 Huang Han Ying, The “Face Off” of Midea’s Stock Option Plan, Southern Metropolis Daily, Jan. 16, 2008. 
20 Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation and a Modest Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 
S.M.U. L. Rev. 201, 216 (1996); Iacobucci, supra note 10, at 500 (“Disclosure compels directors to give 
reasons for their choice of compensation structures, and therefore directors who care about their reputations 
will carefully consider how executives are paid.”). Empirical study shows that disclosure does not appear to 
alter pay levels but it does enhance incentives. And when pay is opaque to shareholders, the managerial 
Chapter Two  Ex Ante Strategy (2) of Enhancing Supervision Inside the Company 
 
44 
otherwise, they will be criticized as either doing their jobs in bad faith (or gloss 
negligence) or lacking of competence, which will bring severe shame sanctions down 
on them.
21
 
In China, the reputation mechanism is a crucial factor motivating and restricting the 
behavior of independent directors. Whether independent directors will accept the 
invitation to join a company, how they will behave during their tenure, and under 
what circumstances they will remain in the company or resign all depend on 
reputation considerations.
22
 Because independent directors cannot earn as much 
compensation in China, the main reason they choose to act as independent directors is 
to enhance their reputation and social position. Since the community of independent 
directors is small, most of them are social elites, such as lawyers, professors and 
retired officials, they care about their reputation very much. Moreover, they often 
share the same social networks and values, so shame sanctions can play a critical role 
in their supervising.
23
 Examining 75 independent directors’ job-switches from 
2001-2005, Fan et al. believed that economic factors did not provide enough incentive 
for independent directors, although their reputations appeared to be of high concern.
24
 
One study showed that after receiving the media coverage, independent directors 
caring more about their reputation, had a higher probability of resigning from their 
posts, indicating that reputation played a positive role in company governance for 
independent directors.
25
 Chen Yan also found that when listed companies chose their 
independent directors, they would avoid choosing those from the companies which 
had been involved in scandals in order to not tarnish their own reputations.
26
 So, not 
only does reputation hold high importance for independent directors, but also for the 
companies hiring them as well. Shame sanctions, therefore, play an important role 
(maybe the most important role) in supervising independent directors’ behavior.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
incentive contracts will fail. See Peter L. Swan & Xian Ming Zhou, Does Executive Compensation Disclosure 
Alter Pay at the Expense of Incentives?, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract-id= 
910865. 
21 David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1811, 1848 (2001). 
22 Ning Xiang Dong et al. On Reputation and Behavior of Independent Directors, No.1 Journal of Tsinghua 
University (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 129, 130 (2012). Liebman & Milhaupt, supra note 13, at 978 
(“Reputational sanctions may have particular force in China given both the underdeveloped status of China’s 
legal institutions and the strong emphasis on reputation evident in Chinese society today.”). 
23 Skeel, supra note 11, at 108 (“Shaming works best in closely knit communities whose members hold similar 
views about morality and appropriate social behavior.”). 
24 Fan Zhou et al. Reputation Incentive or Economic Incentive-An Empirical Study on Jobbing-Hopping 
Behaviors of Independent Directors, No.2 China Accounting Review 177, 189-190 (2008). 
25 Li Yan & Qin Yi Hu, Media Coverage, Reputation Mechanism and Resignation of Independent Directors, No.3 
Finance & Trade Economics 36, 41 (2011). 
26 Chen Yan, The Reputation of Independent Directors and the Efficiency of Their Labor Force Market , No.4 
Economist 5, 14 (2009).  
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In China, the effect of shame sanctions on independent directors can be enhanced 
by “public censure”, which is enforced by the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges. If the independent directors break listing rules or their promises to the 
exchanges, the exchanges may publicly condemn them.
27
 From 2001-2006, the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange sanctioned 25 independent directors and the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange sanctioned 40 --10 were in 2005 and 28 were in 2006. There are two 
main reasons that the two stock exchanges publicly condemn independent directors or 
others. The first one is for maintaining their high reputation. Because the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges have to compete with stock exchanges of other 
countries or districts, for example, many good Chinese companies are listed on the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange. So, if investors know that the stock exchanges do not 
punish illegal or unethical behaviors, they may invest in the companies listed in the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The second one is that the two stock exchanges are 
quasi-public authorities in China, meaning they must protect the interests of the 
public.
28
 In practice, independent directors are censured for a variety of reasons: such 
when an independent director continuously fails to participate in board meetings or 
committee meetings,
29
 fails to supervise the company in its timely disclosure of 
information
30
 and so on. “A variety of collateral consequences befall individuals who 
have been criticized by the stock exchanges. Publicly criticized directors may in 
practice, if not formally, be forced to resign, in particular for companies listed in 
Shenzhen (Stock Exchange).”31 What is worse, is that they are regarded as unsuitable 
candidates for directorship, which means it then nearly impossible for them to be 
elected again as directors, both within the same company or at other companies.
32
 
These directors also suffer severe reputation losses, as “officials, lawyers, and 
                                                          
27 Article 37 of the Guidelines for Nomination and Behavior of Directors of Companies Listed in Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (promulgated by the Shanghai Stock Exchange, effective Aug. 25, 2009, hereinafter Guidelines for 
Nomination and Behavior of Directors); and Article 40 of the Guidelines for Behavior of Directors of 
Companies Listed on the Small and Medium Enterprise Board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (promulgated 
by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, effective Mar. 1, 2005, hereinafter Guidelines for Behavior of Directors). 
28 Lu Wen Dao & Wang Wen Xin, Is Public Censure Efficient? No.7 Securities Law Review 176, 177-179 
(2012). 
29 For example, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange publicly censured Yang Cang, an independent director of Yulong 
Tour, for being absent at board meetings six times in a row in 2006.  
30 For example, the Shanghai Stock Exchange publicly censured Wu Mao Qing and Xiao Lian Zhang, two 
independent directors of Liaoning Baike, for not disclosing RMB 9.93 million in losses caused by the company 
investing in securities and futures trading in 2011. 
31 Liebman & Milhaupt, supra note 13, at 971. 
32 Article 8 (2) of the Guidelines for Nomination and Behavior of Directors provides that an individual who has 
been subject to one or more exchange public criticisms within a three year period will be deemed to be 
unsuitable to serve as a director for listed companies; article 41 (2) of Guidelines for Behavior of Directors 
provides that an individual who has been subject to two or more exchange public criticisms within a three year 
period will be deemed to be unsuitable to serve as a director for listed companies. 
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corporate officials all stated that the consequences of a public criticism on an 
individual’s reputation can be severe.”33 So, it is quite understandable that “corporate 
officers and independent directors frequently attempt to persuade the exchanges to 
sanctions only the company, not them individually.”34 
C. Short conclusion 
In short, independent directors care highly about their own reputations, while 
shame sanctions can play a important role in supervising their behaviors and urge 
them to serve the interests of shareholders, especially those of minority shareholders. 
With more information, transparency and comprehensive disclosure of executive 
stock option compensation, the effectiveness of shame sanctions can be enhanced by 
media reports (because the media can more easily catch wind of problematic stock 
option compensation) and public censures.
35
 
III. The Rules and Practices of Executives’ Compensation 
Disclosure in the US
36
 
“Under the theory that sunlight is the best disinfectant, the disclosure rules of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have long been a favorite method used 
by the SEC and Congress in attempts to curb perceived excesses in executive 
compensation.”37 But the SEC has never expressed an opinion regarding executive 
compensation levels. Rather, its interest is in ensuring that the shareholders receive 
the information they need to make an informed judgment, and that they have a vehicle 
through which they can express their judgment to the board.
38
 The SEC has made 
three big reforms on executive compensation disclosure in 1992, 2006 and 2010, 
which will be introduced as follows: 
                                                          
33 Liebman & Milhaupt, supra note 13, at 974. 
34 Id. at 974. 
35 Id. at 973 (“The criticisms are virtually always reported in the Chinese media, which ensures broad public 
exposure of the fact that a company or individual has received scrutiny and criticism by a stock exchange.”). 
36 This chapter does not intend to introduce the whole content of the rules of executives’ compensation disclosure 
in the US, it only focuses on the issues closely related to the topic of this paper, namely stock option 
compensation, and what can be learned from the perspective of Chinese law and practice. 
37 Murphy, supra note 7, at 4. 
38 Chairman Mary L. Schapiro, Remarks at the George Washington University Center for Law, Economics and 
Finance Fourth Annual Regulatory Reform Symposium (October 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch102612mls.htm. Also see Symposium, Current Issues in Executive 
Compensation, 3 NYU J. L. & BUS. 519, 532 (2007) (“The SEC has articulated its role as simply one of 
making executive compensation as transparent as possible. The SEC’s role is not to limit compensation, not to 
be a compensation review board, but merely to encourage full disclosures to shareholders.”). 
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A. 1992 Reform39 
Largely in response to escalating executive compensation packages and the 
criticisms which accompanied them,
40
 the SEC adopted major revisions to Item 402 
of Regulation S-K, the item governing disclosures of issues pertaining to executive 
compensation in 1992.
41
 The new rules represent sweeping reforms of executive 
compensation disclosure. Essentially, they require compensation data to be presented 
in a concise, tabular format and require new disclosures regarding stock options.
42“In 
fact, the new SEC disclosure rules introduced in 1992 were focused primarily on 
providing better details on stock option compensation, thus making it harder for CEOs 
to camouflage or hide compensation in stock options.”43 Among other things, the 
1992 rules include: 
1. A compensation committee report 
The 1992 rules require the compensation committee of a board (or the board as a 
whole if there is no committee) to disclose its compensation philosophy and the 
specific reasons for pay awards to the CEO made during the previous year
44
, 
including the relationship between executives’ compensation and companies’ 
performance in a report to shareholders. The goal of this report is to enhance 
shareholders’ ability to assess how well directors are representing their interests. 45 
The report is not subject to liability under Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. 
2. A performance graph 
A graph is required to compare the company’s cumulative total shareholder return, 
including dividends, on its common stock with (1) a broad equity index such as the 
S&P 500 or equivalent; and (2) a published industry or line-of-business index 
comprised of peer companies
46
 selected in good faith on an industry or 
                                                          
39 Generally see Halle Fine Terrion, Regulation S-K, Item 402: The New Executive Compensation Disclosure 
Rules, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1175 (1993). 
40 In that political year (1992), public attention focused on executive compensation when President Bush traveled 
to Japan accompanied by the CEOs of twelve major United States corporations. Comparisons were made 
between the relatively low pay of Japan’s top managers and the multimillion dollar pay packages that 
American executives receive. See Susan Lorde Martin, The Executive Compensation Problem, 98 Dick. L. Rev. 
237, 237 (1993). 
41 Terrion, supra note 39, at 1175.  
42 Michael E. Ragsdale, Executive Compensation: Will the New SEC Disclosure Rules Control “Excessive” Pay 
at the Top? 61 UMKC L. Rev. 537, 538 (1993). 
43 Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock 
Options, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 847, 856 (2002). 
44 James E. Heard, Executive Compensation: Perspective Of The Institutional Investor, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 749, 
753 (1995).  
45 Terrion, supra note 39, at 1184. 
46 When a company refers to a peer group used for benchmarking purposes, the SEC will ask for the names of the 
peer group companies and how the company selected them, and where actual awards fell relative to the 
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line-of-business basis. If the company cannot reasonably identify its peer group and it 
does not use an industry or line-of-business index, then an index must be comprised 
of companies with similar market capitalizations.
47
 The graph
48
 can bring benefits to 
shareholders, because “the inclusion of the performance graph and a desire to improve 
performance as depicted on the performance graph will help drive companies toward 
more effective compensation policies.”49 Following is a sample of a performance 
graph: 
 
3. Certain compensation committee “interlocks” between corporations 
In order to expose potential conflicts of interest due to interlocking parties who may 
be setting each other’s compensation, the 1992 rules require companies to disclose the 
following circumstances, when: (1) there are interlocks between compensation 
committee members at two companies; (2) a company executive serves on the board of 
(a second) company and an executive from (that) second company serves on the first 
company’s (executive) compensation committee; or (3) a company executive serves on 
                                                                                                                                                                      
benchmark. See Shelley Parratt, Executive Compensation Disclosure: Observations on the 2009 Proxy Season 
and Expectations for 2010, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch110909sp.htm.  
47 Mark A. Clawson and Thomas C. Klein, Indexed Stock Options: A Proposal for Compensation Commensurate 
with Performance, 3 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 31, 48(1997). Companies may omit specific quantitative or 
qualitative performance-related targets, even where they are material to compensation policies and decisions, if 
disclosing them would likely cause competitive harm to the company.  
48 The graph is a very simple line graph - one line represents company return, a second line represents the 
“market” return, and a third line indicates an “industry” or “peer group” return. See Ragsdale, supra note 30, at 
558. 
49 Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics, And Executive Compensation, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 713, 736 (1995). 
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the compensation committee of another company, and an executive of the second 
company serves on the first company’s board.50 
B. 2006 Reform51 
Faced with corporation scandals at the beginning of the new century, the SEC made 
comprehensive new reforms to the 1992 rules.
52
 The goal of the 2006 reforms was to 
provide investors with a more transparent and comprehensive picture of executive and 
director compensation through extensive tabular presentations supplemented by 
improved narrative disclosures.
53
 Among other things, the 2006 rules include: 
1. Plain English disclosure 
“Philosophy, plans, and disclosures (on executives’ pay) should be easily 
understood and presented in plain English.”54 As a starting point, the 2006 rules 
generally require companies to disclose executive and director compensation in plain 
English, such as: (1) using clear, concise sections, paragraphs and short sentences; (2) 
using definite, everyday words and active voice; (3) avoiding multiple negatives, legal 
jargon, highly technical terminology, glossaries and defined terms; (4) using 
descriptive headings and subheadings; and (5) using tabular presentation or bullet lists 
for complex material. Companies should avoid legalistic, overly complex and 
“boilerplate” disclosures.55 
2. Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) 
The board has to explain the material factors underlying compensation policies and 
decisions according to data presented in the compensation tables in the CD&A, which 
includes: (1) an examination of such items as the company’s compensation objectives 
and what a compensation program is designed to reward, (2) an identification of each 
element of compensation and (3) an explanation of why the company chose to pay an 
element, how the company determined the amount for each element, and how the 
company’s decisions in terms of each element fit into the company’s overall 
compensation objectives.
56
 The CD&A, which is supposed to explain the objectives 
                                                          
50 Ragsdale, supra note 42, at 560 (quoting Andrew R. Brownstein, Compensation Committees Face New Rules, 
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 7,1992). 
51 Generally see Leigh Johnson et al., Preparing Proxy Statements under the SEC’s New Rules Regarding 
Executive and Director Compensation Disclosures, 7 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. 373 (2007). 
52 See Du Jing, The Theories and Practice of Executives’ Compensation in Listed Companies, No.3 Tsinghua Law 
Review 131, 141-142 (2009) 
53 Johnson et al., supra note 51, at 375. 
54 California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CALSTRS), Principles for Executive Compensation, at 2, 
available at http://www.calstrs.com/corporategovernance/PrinciplesExecutiveCompensation.pdf. 
55 More detailed standards, see Securities and Exchange Commission: Executive Compensation and Related 
Party Disclosure Final Rules, at 191-195.  
56 Johnson, supra note 51, at 380. 
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of the compensation program as well as each component part of the program and the 
rationale supporting each component part,
57
 is essential to providing investors with 
meaningful insight into the compensation policies and decisions of the companies in 
which they choose to invest.
58
 Additionally, CD&As are treated as SEC filings, so 
the parties who sign one will be subject to liabilities under Section 18 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. 
3. Compensation committee report 
The 2006 rules also require the company to disclose a brief compensation 
committee report similar to an audit committee report. In this report, the compensation 
committee must disclose whether it has reviewed and discussed the CD&A with 
management, and, based on the review and discussions, whether the committee 
recommended to the entire board of directors that the company include the CD&A in 
the company’s annual report and proxy statement. 
The CD&A and the compensation committee report replace the previously required 
board compensation committee report on executive compensation. 
4. Identifying and describing the roles of all consultants 
2006 rules require companies identify and describe the roles of all consultants who 
provided advice on executive compensation, as well as to disclose whether the 
consultants are engaged directly by the compensation committee rather than by the 
company’s management.59 
C. 2010 Reform60 
“The current economic crisis, precipitated by a meltdown in the financial services 
industry, has led to a loss of public trust incorporations and other institutions. 
Executive compensation has become a flashpoint for this frustration and anger.”61 As 
a response to the crisis, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank 
                                                          
57  Marisa Anne Pagnattaro & Stephanie Greene, “Say on Pay”: The Movement to Reform Executive 
Compensation in the United States and European Union, 31 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 593, 599 (2011). 
58 Parratt, supra note 46.  
59 In December 2009, the SEC expanded its disclosure rules by requiring firms that purchase more than $120,000 
in other services from their executive-pay consultants to disclose fees paid for both compensation consulting 
and other services. Under the new regulations, firms could avoid such disclosures if the board retained its own 
compensation consultant and if that consultant provided no other services. Murphy, supra note7, at 7-8. 
60 Generally see David S. Huntington, Corporate Governance and Executive Compensation Provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Act (July 8, 2010), available at  
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/07/08/corporate-governance-and-executive-compensation-provision
s-of-the-dodd-frank-act/. 
61 The Conference Board, The Conference Board Task Force on Executive Compensation, at 6 (2009), available 
at http://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/execcompensation2009.pdf. 
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Act) adds some disclosure requirements for executive compensation. Among other 
things, the 2010 rules include: 
1.Disclosure of pay versus performance 
Section 953 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires that the SEC shall devise rules 
requiring companies to disclose, in any proxy or consented solicitation material for an 
annual shareholder meeting, a “clear description” of the relationship between the 
compensation actually paid to the company’s executives and its financial performance, 
taking into account any changes in the value of the company’s stock, dividends and 
other distributions. This disclosure can include a graphic representation of the 
required information.
62
 
2. Conflicts of interest for compensation consultants 
Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires that each issuer must disclose, in 
accordance with regulations of the SEC, whether: (1) The compensation committee 
has retained or obtained the advice of a compensation consultant; and (2) The work of 
the compensation consultant has raised any conflict of interest and, if so, the nature of 
the conflict and how the conflict is being addressed.
63
 
3. Disclosure of CEO compensation versus median employee compensation 
Section 953 of the Dodd-Frank Act also requires that the SEC devise rules 
requiring companies to disclose the median of the annual total compensation of all 
employees of the issuer, excluding the compensation of the chief executive officer; 
the annual total compensation of the chief executive officer; and the ratio of these two 
amounts.
64
 However, a “lack of consistency and the absence of firm specific data 
minimize the ability to use the metric to assess CEO compensation within a particular 
company. Thus, while they can demonstrate broad trends in compensation, they have 
not been particularly helpful in providing shareholders with a tool for assessing the 
reasonableness of compensation in their own company.”65 
                                                          
62 Huntington, supra note 60.  
63 See Chadbourne & Parke LLP, Dodd-Frank Act: Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance 
Provisions, at 3 (August 12, 2010), available at http://www.hblr.org/2011/10/compensation/. 
64 Pagnattaro & Greene, supra note 57, at 606. 
65 J. Robert Brown, Jr., Dodd-Frank, Compensation Ratios, and the Expanding Role of Shareholders in the 
Governance Process, 2 Harvard Business Law Review Online 91, 93 (2011), available at 
http://www.hblr.org/2011/10/compensation/. 
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IV. Rules on the Disclosure of Executive Stock Option 
Compensation in China 
The rules for the disclosure of executive stock option compensation in China are 
scattered in the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans, the Administrative Measures for 
the Disclosure of Information of Listed Companies (promulgated by the CSRC, 
effective Jan. 30, 2007, hereinafter Measures for the Disclosure of Information) and 
the Administrative Measures for the Content and Format of Annual Report 
(promulgated by The CSRC, effective Jan.1, 2013, hereinafter Content and Format of 
the Annual Report). 
A. Rules on the disclosure of the process of granting stock option 
compensation to executives 
A listed company shall disclose: 1. How the executives are paid;
66
 2. The important 
opinions presented and suggestions are made by the compensation committee;
67
 3. 
How the independent directors perform their duties, including: what their names are; 
how many times they have attended board meetings; the content of their dissenting 
opinions; how many times they have attended shareholders’ meetings; and whether 
the company generally heeds their advice.
68
 Each independent director shall present 
her independent opinions on whether the stock option plan is conducive to the 
sustained development of the listed company, and whether it impairs the interests of 
the listed company and all of its shareholders.
69
 4. A lawyer’s legal opinion on the 
stock option plan as well as the independent financial consultant’s opinion (if hired by 
the company);
70
 and 5. Identifying the independent financial consultant and 
disclosing how much compensation shall be paid (if the consultant is hired by the 
company).
71
 
B. Rules on the disclosure of information relating to executive stock option 
compensation implementation 
According to Article 13 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans, a listed 
company shall set out or specify the following matters in its stock option plan: 1. the 
                                                          
66 Article 41 of the Content and Format of Annual Report. 
67 Article 47 of the Content and Format of Annual Report. 
68 Article 46 of the Content and Format of Annual Report. 
69 Article 31, 32 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans. 
70 Article 29 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans. 
71 Article 34 (2) of the Content and Format of Annual Report. 
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purpose of the plan; 2. the basis for determining the eligible participants
72
 and the 
scope thereof; 3. the quantity of rights and interests to be granted pursuant to, and the 
class, source, and number of the stocks involved in the stock option plan; 4. in case 
the eligible participants are directors, supervisors, or senior executives, the quantity of 
rights and interests may be granted to them respectively, and their proportions to the 
aggregate amount of rights and interests to be granted pursuant to the stock option 
plan; 5. the effective duration of the stock option plan, the date of grant, and date of 
exercise; 6. the exercise price of stock options or the method for determining the 
exercise price; 7. the conditions for an eligible participant to be granted the rights and 
interests, and to exercise the rights; 8. the quantity of rights and interests involved in 
the stock option plan or the methods and procedures for adjusting the exercise price; 9. 
the procedures for the company to grant rights and interests and for the eligible 
participants to exercise their rights; 10. the rights and obligations of the company and 
its eligible participants respectively;11. how to implement the stock option plan in 
case any alteration is made to the controlling power of the company, merger, or 
division of the company, or the eligible participants have their posts changed, 
removed, or die, and other matters; 12. alteration or termination of the stock option 
plan; and 13. other important matters. 
A listed company also must disclose how it implements its stock option plan in its 
regular report within its regular reporting period.
73
 
Compared to other kinds of compensation disclosures, the disclosure of executive 
stock options in China is comprehensive and concrete, which includes almost every 
aspect of stock option compensation. In particular, it incorporates many ideas from 
the rules and practices of the US, such as reporting stock options as costs to the 
company and strictly regulating adjustments to the strike price. But there are still 
some problems in these rules and practices. 
                                                          
72 Here, “eligible participants” refers to those who are granted stock options according to the stock option plan, 
such as executives and employees. 
73 According to Article 41 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans, a company shall disclose:1. the scope of 
eligible participants within the report period; 2. the aggregate amount of rights and interests granted, exercised, 
and invalidated within the report period; 3. the aggregate amount of rights and interests having been granted 
but not exercised accumulatively till the end of the report period; 4. each adjustment on the exercise price 
within the report period and the updated grant price and exercise price after the adjustment; 5. name and duties 
of directors, supervisors, and senior executives respectively, and each grant to and exercise of power by them 
within the report period; 6.equity alteration conditions given rise due to the exercise of power by eligible 
participants; and 7. accounting disposal method for equity incentive. 
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V. Problems in the Rules and Practices 
Though it seems that the rules on the disclosure of executive stock option 
compensation are comprehensive, there are still several problems in these rules and 
practices, which, in my point of view, make it difficult for minority shareholders and  
the media to understand and evaluate the stock option plans. 
A. The disclosure of executive stock option compensation is not 
understandable 
In reality, the documents that disclose stock option compensation plans are not 
easily readable. They are full of legal jargon, highly technical terminology and 
mathematical models.
74
 The independent opinions represented by each independent 
director are boilerplate and similar to the opinions released by the lawyers and 
independent financial consultants, so their opinions are not from the unique 
perspectives of the independent directors, thus their opinions cannot bring any special 
information about the company to the attention of minority shareholders and the 
media. Moreover, there is no graph nor chart to show important figures that minority 
shareholders and the media are eager to know, including the relationship between the 
stock option compensation and the performance of the company. Furthermore, a 
company’s performance compared with the index of the marker or the industry is also 
lacking. “Through comparing the company’s performance with the index of the 
market or industry, the performance of the company in recent years will be clearly 
displayed. With the help of this, shareholders, the media or other outsiders can 
evaluate the reasonableness of the executives’ compensation.”75 
B. The disclosure of the process of making executive stock option 
compensation is not transparent 
Most companies simply disclose the fact that they have a thorough compensation 
decision-making mechanism without presenting any other meaningful information to 
minority shareholders and the media.
76
 Other important information regarding the 
                                                          
74 For example, there were several problems in the 2011 Vanke Stock Option Plan, a real estate company listed in 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange: 1. It did not explain the meaning of ROE and its relationship with the 
performance of the company; 2. It was difficult to understand how the company would adjust the conditions 
for executives to exercise their options if it issued new shares to the market; 3. It was difficult to understand the 
accounting treatment of stock option compensation and so on. 
75 Tong Wei Hua et al., Research on Disclosure of the Executive Compensation in Listed Companies, Vol. 12 No. 
5 Journal Of ChongQing University (Social Science Edition) 47, 52 (2006) . 
76 Ge Jia Shu & Tian Zhi Gang, Study of Mandatory Disclosure of Executives’ Remuneration in Listed Companies, 
No. 3 Journal of Xiamen University (Arts & Social Sciences) 34, 39 (2012). 
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process of making stock option compensation is also lacking, for example: 1. The role 
that insider directors in the compensation committee play in granting executive stock 
option compensation, and whether these directors who have conflicts of interest 
participate in the decision-making and how the conflicts of interest are prevented; 2. 
Whether the company hires a professional agency
77
 to help the compensation 
committee or the board to draft its executives stock option compensation packages; 
and 3. Whether the lawyers and independent financial consultants (if hired by the 
company) have any conflicts of interest.  
C.The disclosure of the executive stock option compensation with regard to 
content is not comprehensive 
The following key information, which is needed by minority shareholders and the 
media, is not disclosed: 1. The philosophy, background, and specific objectives of the 
company’s executive stock option compensation;78 2. Whether the conditions for 
exercising one’s rights are feasible or not;79 3. Whether executive stock option 
compensation scheme may bring excessive risks to the long-term interests of the 
shareholders nor not;
80
 and 4. How effective the executive stock option compensation 
plan will be.  
As for these questions, China can learn a lot from the experiences of the US.  
VI. Some Suggestions on Improving the Disclosure of Executive 
Stock Option Compensation 
Since paying executives with stock options is not quite popular in China, the 
disclosure of executive stock option compensation should not bring too high of a cost 
to companies so as to encourage them to use this kind of compensation. Therefore, the 
suggestions made in this chapter intend to balance the costs and benefits of disclosure 
                                                          
77 The function of the professional agency here is to assist the compensation committee or the board to create a 
stock option compensation plan, not supervise its reasonableness. 
78 For instance, the objectives of 2011 Vanke Stock Option Plan are: 1. to initiate a value-creating performance 
culture and establish a benefits-and-risks sharing mechanism between shareholders and executives; 2. to ensure 
the sustainable development of the company; 3.to balance the executives’ short-term and long-term goals; and 
4. to maintain the stability of the managers group and middle-level group. But it does not tell: 1. How the stock 
option compensation of this plan can realize these objects; and 2. Whether it is necessary for the company to 
grant stock option compensation to its executives in the current situation, and so on.  
79 The conditions for exercising rights which are easy to satisfy are often criticized by minority shareholders and 
the media, see Ye Tan, The Troubles Caused by Excess Incentives, No. 4 Directors & Boards 27 (2008). 
80 “Currently, the rules do not require the companies to disclose the risks that the executives’ compensation will 
bring to the companies. Because the financial market and financial derivative products are not as developed as 
the US, the relationship between executive compensation and the risks to companies has not caught the eyes of 
the regulators’.” Ge & Tian, supra note 76, at 39. 
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against the background of the realities and legal environment of China. For example, 
as for comparing the performance of a company with the index of the market or 
industry, it costs little for the company, but makes it much easier for minority 
shareholders and the media to understand the effectiveness of stock option 
compensation.
81
 Using everyday words while avoiding legal jargon, mathematical 
models, highly technical terminology as well as boilerplate disclosure will actually 
add to a company’s expenses, because it cannot simply copy or make small changes to 
templates provided by professional agencies or HR departments. On the contrary, the 
company will have to write out its own disclosure documents. On the other hand, the 
benefits of this approach, which makes disclosure documents easier to understand, 
will exceed the costs. Though the costs of disclosing more information about the 
process and the content of executive stock option compensation maybe huge and 
require more work such as writing more materials, doing more research and putting 
the directors and executives under more potential legal liabilities,
82
 disclosing such 
information will help avoid conflicts of interest and enhance the effectiveness of 
shame sanctions. This in turn will encourage the independent directors in the 
compensation committee to do their jobs diligently and in good faith.
83
 In contrast, 
the costs of disclosure of CEO compensation versus median employee compensation 
are huge, but the benefits are quite small. “The calculation costs alone can be 
immense for large multinational or multi-segment corporations where payroll is 
decentralized; to compute the median the company needs an often non-existent single 
compensation database with all employees worldwide. More importantly, however, is 
what shareholders are supposed to do with this new information, or how they should 
determine whether a ratio is too high or too low. ”84 In short, the main principles for 
the disclosure of executive stock option compensation are: understandability, 
transparency, and comprehensiveness. Specifically speaking:  
                                                          
81 Currently, in China, there are several market indices and industry indices which can be selected by listed 
companies to serve as a benchmark. 
82 Article 58 of the Measures for the Disclosure of Information provides, “the directors, supervisors and senior 
managers of a listed company shall be liable for the genuineness, accuracy, completeness, timeliness and 
fairness of the information disclosure of the company, unless adequate evidence shows they have fulfilled the 
obligation to be diligent and duteous.” So more disclosure means more potential legal liabilities.  
83 Article 5 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans. 
84 Murphy, supra note 7, at 9.  
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A. The disclosure of executive stock option compensation shall be easy 
to understand for minority shareholders and the media85 
When information about executive stock option compensation may have a major 
impact on investors’ investment decisions, companies should disclose such 
information in an easily-understood way, such as: 1. using clear and concise sections, 
paragraphs and short sentences; 2. using everyday words; and 3. using graphs or 
charts to display key financial figures while avoiding using too much legal jargon, 
highly technical terminologies and complex mathematics models. Particularly, 
companies should avoid boilerplate disclosures and disclose their own information to 
the shareholders. 
B. Disclosures about the process of creating stock option compensation for 
executives shall be transparent so as to prevent conflicts of interest 
Since drafting and adopting executive stock option compensation is assigned to 
two different authorities, each of these authorities should disclose their 
decision-making processes.  
Among other things, the compensation committee shall disclose:1. Whether the 
following relationships exist between independent any directors and executives: (1) 
“interlock directors” or (2) business relationship. 2. Whether any insider director in 
the compensation committee is also an eligible participant in the decision-making 
process, and if so, what role the inside director plays and how conflicts of interest 
are prevented; 3.Whether the committee has hired a professional agency to assist it 
or the board in drafting the stock option compensation, and if so, its identity, the 
compensation paid to it and whether it provides other services to the company; also, 
if so, what measures have been taken to prevent conflicts of interest; and 4.Whether 
the lawyers and independent financial consultants (if hired by the company) provide 
other services for the company; if so, what measures have been taken to prevent  
conflicts of interest.  
Among other things, the board shall disclose: whether the board has amended the 
stock option compensation draft made by the compensation committee; and if so, 
what the board has amended and the detailed reasons for doing so.  
                                                          
85 It is also encouraged by the CSRC, see Article 8 (4) and Article 20 (6) of the Content and Format of the 
Annual Report. 
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Disclosing such information cannot only help to remedy the non-independence 
limits of independent directors, but also to prevent conflicts of interest and the 
independent directors from being recruited by insiders and professional agencies. 
C. The disclosure of the content of executive stock option compensation shall 
be comprehensive so as to let minority shareholders and the media evaluate the 
performance of the board and the compensation committee 
Among other things, the company shall disclose the following information:1. The  
background of the company granting the executives stock option compensation; 2.  
What the objectives of the stock option compensation scheme are and how it can 
realize these objectives, written in detail; 3. How the company chooses eligible 
participants for its stock option plan; 4. How the company determines the conditions 
for exercising rights (whether these conditions are easy, difficult or feasible to 
satisfy); 5. How the company determines the vesting time and the duration of stock 
option compensation (whether they will bring excessive risks to the company);
86
 6. 
Whether the company has chosen indexed stock options, and if so, what kind of 
indexes does the company choose and how does it choose them; 7. When the 
company grants stock option compensation or when the executives exercise their 
rights, whether the company will take precautions for any potential illegal or 
unethical behaviors, if so, what these precautions are; 8. The effectiveness of the 
stock option compensation scheme shall be shown using one graph to convey the 
relationship between the compensation plan and the performance of the company 
and by comparing the performance of the company with the market or industry 
standards from five years before the company began granting stock option 
compensation until present.
87
  
Disclosing such information will not only help minority shareholders and the 
media to clearly understand the objectives and effectiveness of stock option 
compensation, but also help to enhance the effectiveness of shame sanctions on the 
independent directors in the compensation committee by the way of evaluating the 
performance of the compensation committee. 
                                                          
86 The CSRC may require financial companies to disclose such information in the first place. When enough 
experience is accumulated, then it can ask all listed companies to disclose such information so as to improve 
corporate governance in China. See Ge & Tian, supra note 76, at 40. 
87 “Using a graph to show the company’s performance will help to evaluate the reasonableness of executives’ 
compensation and prevent the executives from raising their pay in unjustified ways.” Tong et al., supra note 75, 
at 53. 
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All of these information shall be disclosed when the company grants stock option 
compensation to its executives for the first time, except disclosures of the 
relationship between the stock option compensation and the performance of the 
company; and comparisons of the performance of the company with the market or 
industry standards. This information shall be disclosed at least one year after the 
company begins its stock option compensation scheme. To reduce the costs of 
disclosing such information, the annual report may quote the information that has 
already been disclosed. If disclosing some information may break the laws or rules 
or may harm the interests of the company, the company can apply for exempting 
certain information from disclosure.  
VII. Conclusion 
Compared to other kinds of compensation disclosure, the disclosure of executive 
stock option compensation in China is comprehensive and concrete, but there are still 
some problems in its rules and practices, mainly that the disclosure documents of 
executive stock option compensation are not easy to understand, the disclosure of the 
creation process is not transparent, and the disclosure of the content is not 
comprehensive. All of these problems make it difficult for minority shareholders and 
the media to understand and evaluate executive stock option compensation plans.  
Based on the rules and practices of the US and considering the current situation and 
legal environment in China, this chapter suggests: first, the disclosure of executive 
stock option compensation shall be easy for minority shareholders and the media to 
understand; second, the disclosure of the process of making stock option 
compensation shall be transparent so as to prevent conflicts of interest; and third, the 
disclosure of the content of executive stock option compensation shall be 
comprehensive so as to let minority shareholders and the media evaluate the 
performance of the board and compensation committee. 
Understandable, transparent, and comprehensive disclosure of executive stock 
option compensation will not only help minority shareholders reduce the costs of 
collecting and analyzing the information, and thus helping them to express their 
complaints; but also force the independent directors in the compensation committee to 
work under more effective shame sanctions, which maybe the most efficient method 
of supervising independent directors in China. 
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Chapter Three  Ex Post Strategy of Enhancing 
Supervision Inside the Company: Clarifying the Provision of 
Clawing Back Executive Stock Option Compensation 
I. Introduction 
This chapter discusses how to clarify the provision of clawing back executive stock 
option compensation in China in order to address the second agency problem of 
executive stock option compensation in this dissertation: executives may break 
securities law and rules, for example, by manipulating earnings or other accounting 
figures, to satisfy the conditions for gaining their stock options, for exercising their 
rights, or for artificially raising the stock price when they exercise their rights so as to 
make excessive and unjust profits from their options.
1
 
According to Lawrence E. Mitchell, there maybe three ways to keep earnings on 
the upswing (at the same time, to keep raising stock prices): the first way is the 
old-fashioned way: to earn the additional funds. This approach, however, takes time; 
the second way is to cut costs as much as possible, for example, by laying off masses 
of skillful workers; the third option is to cook the books to show better earnings than 
the company actually has, a path which Enron once chose.
2
 In China, a positive 
relationship between stock incentives and financial restatement has been confirmed by 
empirical studies. Looking a sample of firms that had implemented stock incentives 
and paired firms from 2005 to 2007, Hu Gao Qiang and Peng Jia Sheng found that 
“the firms that have implemented stock incentives have a significantly higher 
                                                          
1 Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and If So, What If Anything Should Be Done About It? , 58 
Duke L.J. 1013, 1026 (2009) (“Tying an executive’s compensation to the value of the corporation’s stock 
creates an incentive to manipulate the stock price, and there is evidence that this incentive has been responsible 
for a number of financial debacles.”); Richard L. Kaplan, Mother of All Conflicts: Auditors and Their Clients, 
29 J. Corp. Law 363, 366 (2004) (“The proliferation of managers’ compensation formulate that are tied to 
corporate financial performance measures, exacerbated in many cases with munificent grants of options on the 
corporation’s stock, make managers keenly interested in their corporation’s financial statements”). 
2 Lawrence E. Mitchell, Learning the Lessons of Enron (Before It's Too Late), JURIST, June 13, 2002, available 
at http://www.jurist.org/forum/forumnew55.php. “Two years predating Enron’s bankruptcy, Enron’s top 
executives created artificially high trading values for Enron stock by managing corporate earnings in a way that 
kept ‘debt off the balance sheet’ and created the ‘illusion of exploding cash flow.’ Enron’s top corporate 
executives capitalized on this manipulation by acquiring millions of shares of stock under outstanding 
fixed-price stock option grants and then disposing of those shares prior to the issuance of financial restatements 
that caused a dramatic decline in stock price.” see Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: 
Regulating Executive Compensation to Realign Management and Shareholders’ Interests and Promote 
Corporate Long-Term Productivity, Wake Forest L. Rev. 971, 974-975 (2004). 
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possibility of financial restatement than the firms that do not have stock incentives. 
Compared to other firms that have implemented stock incentives based on 
performance, in firms that have implemented stock incentives based on stock prices,  
financial restatements are more likely to happen.”3 Another empirical study by Ren  
Chuan Yan and Li Yang found that “listed companies that have proposed equity 
incentive programs are more likely to make financial restatements, indicating that the 
implementation of domestic equity incentive has turned executives into opportunists  
who are more motivated to adopt aggressive accounting policies or commit financial 
fraud. Hereinto, stock options and the possibility of financial restatements are 
related.” 4  In short, “when one pays the CEO with stock options, one creates 
incentives for short-term financial manipulation and accounting gamesmanship,”5 
thus, “absent special controls, more options means more fraud.”6 
So, the provision of clawing back executive stock option compensation has been  
used as a method to deter such illegal behaviors.
7
 Here, “illegal behaviors” refers to 
executives illegally satisfying the conditions under which they can be granted stock 
options( or exercise their rights), or artificially raising the stock price while exercising 
their rights via “false records, misleading statements or serious omissions” in the 
companies’ accounting statements. These are three common methods that executives 
in Chinese listed companies use to manipulate accounting statements.  
Article 46 of the Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentive Plans of 
Listed Companies (For Trial Implementation) (promulgated by the China Securities 
                                                          
3 Hu Guo Qiang & Peng Jia Sheng, Stock Incentives and Financial Restatement: Empirical Evidence from the 
Listed Firms in Chinese A Share Market, 11 Finance & Economics39, 45 (2009). 
4 Ren Chun Yan & Li Yang, The Equity Incentives of the Listed Companies in China and Financial Restatements, 
at 11-12 (2012), available at 
http://www.cnki.net/KCMS/detail/detail.aspx?QueryID=26&CurRec=1&recid=&filename=ZGKU2012050020
32&dbname=CPFD2012&dbcode=CPFD&pr=&urlid=&yx=&uid=WEEvREcwSlJHSldTTGJhYkdReU16MnJ
VcHhBYmRHZ0VpR2FHbWhYUFgyYTQxM0FrV050dUVnMlZCL1FkbG1GSA==. Other foreign empirical 
studies see Natasha Burns & Simi Kedia, The Impact of Performance-Based Compensation on Misreporting, 79 
Journal of Financial Economics 35 (2006) ( “Stock options are associated with stronger incentives to misreport 
because convexity in CEO wealth introduced by stock options limits the downside risk on detection of the 
misreporting.”); Daniel Bergstresser & Thomas Philippon, CEO Incentives and Earnings Management, 80 
Journal of Financial Economics 511 (2006) (“The use of discretionary accruals to manipulate reported earnings 
is more pronounced at firms where the CEO’s potential total compensation is more closely tied to the value of 
stock and option holdings.”). 
5 John C. Coffee Jr., Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance (London: Oxford University Press, 
2006), at 63; Fu Qiong & Yu Yong Ning, The Legal Myth of Executives Compensation, No 6. Science of Law 
(Journal of Northwest University of Political Science and Law) 123, 125(2009).  
6 Coffee, supra note 5, at 64. 
7  Generally, clawback is defined as “are policies that allow corporate boards to recoup incentive-based 
compensation paid for results that are later found to be inaccurate or fraudulent.” see Donald Delves, Clawback 
Requirement Removes Board Discretion, Forbes, July 14, 2011, available at  
http://www.forbes.com/sites/donalddelves/2011/07/14/clawback-requirement-removes-board-discretion/.All 
incentive compensation, such as bonus, stock compensation and stock option compensation, can be clawed back. 
But this chapter solely focuses on the clawback of executive stock option compensation.  
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Regulatory Commission (CSRC), effective Jan. 1, 2006, hereinafter Measures for 
Equity Incentive Plans) provides that “in case there are any false records in the 
financial and accounting documents of a listed company, an eligible participant
8
 who 
is responsible shall return all the interests she has obtained pursuant to the equity 
incentive plan within 12 months from the day when the financial and accounting 
documents were announced.” Because this Article has never been discussed or 
analyzed in detail by Chinese law scholars
9
 and no related cases have reached courts 
in China, some confusing uncertainties exist within this Article, including: First, what 
exactly are financial and accounting documents? Second, is it only when false records 
are used in financial and accounting documents that eligible participants should return 
all of their interests? If not, are there any other circumstances? Third, what is the 
specific range of executives whose stock option compensation should be clawed back? 
Forth, what does all the interests means? And fifth, who exactly can claw back 
executive stock option compensation? This chapter intends to clarify these 
uncertainties, thus embodying this Article so as to make it more applicable in practice.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. Part II introduces the legal requirements, 
objectives, and effectiveness of clawback provisions in the US. Obviously, Article 46 
of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans was copied from the US, so how the 
clawback provisions really work in the US; what controversies they have caused 
among scholars and practitioners; and what suggestions scholars have made on it will 
bring inspiration and reference to Chinese law and practice. Part III analyzes four 
specific questions in clawback provisions in the US: What is the trigger event? Who is 
covered? How much should be clawed back? And, who can claw back the 
compensation? Part IV points out and clarifies some uncertainties of Article 46 of the 
Measures for Equity Incentive Plans. Part V offers a short conclusion. 
                                                          
8 The “eligible participant” refers to anyone who is granted stock option compensation according to the stock 
option plan, such as manager or employee.  
9 I used key word “clawback” to search related Articles, cases and news reports in the database CNKI, but 
unfortunately, I found only two short papers written on the subject by accounting professors, and no law 
scholars have ever discussed or analyzed it, lasted visiting day: Nov. 6, 2012.  
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II. The Legal Requirements, Objectives, and Effectiveness of 
Clawback Provisions in the US 
A. The legal requirements of clawing back executives’ compensation 
Three federal legislations require that executives’ incentive compensation shall be 
clawed back under certain circumstances: 
1. Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX 304)  
As “a reaction to excesses at WorldCom and Enron, where executives received 
substantial incentive compensation as a result of blatantly fraudulent accounting”,10 
SOX 304 requires that CEOs and CFOs, belonging to companies that are required to 
restate their earnings due to material non-compliance under any financial reporting 
requirements of securities laws, must pay back to their company their bonuses or other 
incentive-based or equity-based compensation and turn over to their companies their 
profits from company stock sales, that is, if there statement is a result of misconduct. 
According to rulings by the federal courts, only the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) can recoup executives’ compensation, so it is no surprise that this 
section is seldom used in practice.
11
 This has been satirized by Murphy as “notable 
mostly for its ineffectiveness”.12 From 2002 to 2008, only two cases were brought by 
the SEC, in which the executives all had been charged with frauds.
13
 But new trends 
after 2008 Financial Crisis show that even if CEOs and CFOs do nothing wrong, the 
SEC may still recoup their compensation.
14
 
2. Section 111of The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA 111) 
(As added by Section 7001 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009) 
EESA 111 requires that any Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) recipient must 
provide a means to claw back any bonuses, retention awards, or incentive 
                                                          
10 Delves, supra note 7. 
11 Joseph McCafferty, When Clawbacks Attack, available at  
http://www.complianceweek.com/when-clawbacks-attack/article/253998/ (“The clawback provision of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was rarely used; the SEC invoked it fewer than a dozen times from 2002 to 2009.”). 
12 Kevin J. Murphy, The Politics of Pay: A Legislative History of Executive Compensation, at 23 (Marshall 
Research Paper Series Working Paper FBE 01.11, August 24, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1916358. 
13 Former United Health Group CEO/Chairman Settles Stock Options Backdating Case for $468 Million, 
Litigation Release No. 20387 (Dec. 6, 2007); SEC v. Sycamore Networks, Inc., No. 08 CA 11166 DPW (D. 
Mass. July 9, 2008). See Rachael E. Schwartz, The Clawback Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley: An Underutilized 
Incentive to Keep the Corporate House Clean, 64 Bus. Law. 1, 13-14 (2008). 
14 Securities and Exchange Comm’n v. Jenkins, Case No. cv 09-1510 (D.Ariz.) (Litigation Release No. 21149A, 
July 23, 2009). See Spencer C. Barasch & Sara J. Chesnut, Controversial Uses Of The “Clawback” Remedy In 
The Current Financial Crisis, 72 Tex. B. J. 922, 924 (2009) (In this case, the SEC seeked to claw back 
incentive-based compensation from Maynard L. Jenkins, the former chief executive officer of a public 
company, without any allegations that Jenkins had any involvement in or knowledge of the corporate 
misconduct.). 
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compensation paid to a senior executive officer or any of the next 20 most highly 
compensated employees based on statements of earnings, revenues, gains, or other 
criteria that are later found to be materially inaccurate. As opposed to SOX 304, 
EESA 111 clearly requires that the company itself is able to recoup the compensation 
from its executives. In addition, the “TARP recipient must enforce the clawback 
provisions unless the TARP recipient can show that it would be unreasonable to do so 
(i.e. if the cost of enforcement exceeds the potential recovery).”15 After the TARP 
recipient repays its obligations to the US Treasury, it will cease to be subject to the 
requirement of EESA 111.
16
 
3. 954 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank 954) 
Dodd-Frank 954 instructs the SEC to adopt regulations
17
 which require every listed 
public company to adopt a policy, whereby in the event of a restatement, the company 
will recover from current and former executives any incentive-based compensation. 
All compensation earned within three years preceding the restatement which would 
not have been awarded under the restated financial statements would be recovered. 
According to Dodd-Frank 954, a failure to do so will result in delisting.
18
 This new 
provision can co-exist with SOX 304, but differs from it in a number of ways: (1) 
Perhaps most importantly, this section puts the onus to force the clawback on the 
company itself rather than the SEC;
19
 (2) The restatement need not be due to 
executives’ fraud or misconduct; rather, a restatement caused by an errant (or 
aggressive) interpretation of GAAP is sufficient; (3) SOX 304 only applies to CEOs 
and CFOs, while Dodd-Frank 954 requires reimbursement from all current and former 
executives; (4) SOX 304 reaches to all incentive-based and equity-based 
compensation, plus profits from selling stocks, while Dodd-Frank 954 claws back 
only excess incentive-based compensation which shall not be paid under accurate 
financial metrics; (5) The period of receipt of compensation subject to clawback under  
SOX 304 is the year following issuance of a financial statement that was misstated, 
while Dodd-Frank 954 covers the three years preceding the date on which the 
company was required to file the restatement.  
                                                          
15 Id. at 924. 
16  Joseph E. Bachelder III, Clawbacks Under Dodd-Frank and Other Federal Statutes, available at 
http://www.jebachelder.com/articles/110527.html. 
17 As of today’s (May 26, 2013) completion of this chapter, the SEC is still developing regulations to implement 
this new clawback provision. 
18 Roger A. Lane et al., Dodd-Frank’s Mandatory Executive Compensation Clawback: A Practical Review and 
Assessment, available at http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications_update.aspx?ArticleKey=1868. 
19 Lawrence A. West & J. Christian Word, A Tale of Two Clawbacks: The Compensation Consequences of 
Misstated Financials, available at 
http://www.lw.com/Resources.aspx?page=FirmPublicationDetail&publication=3662. 
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4. A map of clawback provisions can be seen on the following chart  
This chart is based on the one made by Joseph E. Bachelder III. 
 SOX 304 EESA 111  
Dodd-Frank 
954 
The trigger 
event 
Misconduct 
resulting in 
required 
restatement of any 
financial reporting 
required under 
securities laws 
 
Statements of 
earnings, revenues, 
gains, or other 
criteria…found to 
be materially 
inaccurate 
Accounting 
restatement due to 
material 
noncompliance 
with reporting 
requirements under 
securities laws 
Who shall be 
clawed back 
CEO and CFO 
A senior executive 
officer and any of 
the next 20 most 
highly 
compensated 
employees 
Current and former 
executives 
Enforcement The SEC The company  The company 
How much shall 
be clawed back 
Bonus or other 
incentive-based or 
equity-based 
compensation; in 
addition to 
recovery of profits 
of certain sales of 
securities 
Bonus, retention 
award, or incentive 
compensation 
Incentive-based 
compensation 
(including stock 
options) in excess 
of what would have 
been paid under the 
accounting 
restatement 
 
Time period 
The12-month 
period following 
the first public 
issuance or filing 
with the SEC 
(whichever occurs 
first) of the 
financial document 
giving rise to the 
required 
restatement 
 
Three-year period 
preceding the date 
the company is 
required to prepare 
the accounting 
restatement 
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B. The objectives of clawing back executives’ compensation20 
1. Reducing executives’ motivation to engage in illegal behaviors 
Incentivized compensation through benefits like stock options can align executives’ 
interests with the shareholders’, but it could also induce executives to engage in 
illegal behaviors, such as cooking the books to falsely satisfy the conditions to be 
granted stock options, or to falsely satisfy the conditions for exercising their rights or 
artificially raise the stock price so as to make unearned profits from their stock option 
compensation. Subject to the clawback provisions, once executives are found to have 
gained unjust compensation through illegal behaviors, the SEC or the company can 
recoup all benefits from the executives. Especially, according to SOX 304, what can 
be recouped includes the profits of certain securities sales, which are quite punitive 
for executives.
21
 As a result, clawbacks can reduce executives’ inclination to act 
illegally.
22
 Moreover, “permitting executives to keep pay that is not merited by actual 
performance reduces the payoff differential between good and poor performance, 
thereby weakening pay-performance sensitivity and executives’ incentives to increase 
firm value.”23 
2. Preventing executives from getting unjust benefits 
“The concept of corporate clawback is derived from the breaching of fiduciary 
duties, but operates as an equitable notion of restitution. The theory is that the 
employee has received an unjust benefit by getting money that was not properly 
earned.”24 The goal of restitution is to return the defendant to the position it would 
have been in but for the wrongdoing, and prevent the defendant from profiting at the 
plaintiff’s expense.  
According to the theory of restitution, even for executives who committed no faults 
and acted in good faith, the SEC or the company can still recover unjust benefits these 
executives may have received.
25
 “Very few people think that executives should be 
                                                          
20 Generally see James E. Earle & Allison Wilkerson, Dodd-Frank Clawbacks: Hot Issue for 2012, available at 
http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/bb10169e-d26f-476f-ad8c-13aadba4841f/Presentation/PublicationAtt
achment/a8c14bfa-f86f-459f-aa18-9bea13d9cd25/DoddFrank_Clawback.pdf. (Clawback serves three purposes: 
(1) To limit the risk of manipulation; (2) To penalize bad behaviors; and (3) The Prevention of windfall. ). 
21 Jesse M. Fried & Nitzan Shilon, Excess Pay and the Dodd-Frank Clawback, at 2 (Director Notes, October 
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1953317 (“Relative to a clawback targeted solely at excess pay, 
the SOX recovery provision appears quite punitive.”). 
22 Delves, supra note 7 (“clawbacks are a remedy for and deterrent against fraudulent, unethical or erroneous  
accounting practices.”). 
23 Fried & Shilon, supra note 21, at 2. 
24 Tracy A. Thomas, Bailouts, Bonuses, and the Return of Unjust Gains, 87 Wash. U. L. Rev. 437, 442-443 
(2009). 
25 The new tendency of SOX 304, the EESA 111 and the Dodd-Frank 954 all do not require any direct illegal 
action by executives. 
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able to keep bonuses that were obtained under false premises, even if they didn’t take 
part in the fraud, but just benefited from it.”26 The money recouped from executives’ 
unjust benefits can then be distributed to shareholders or invested in other ventures, 
thus protecting the interests of shareholders’. 
C. The effectiveness of clawing back executives’ compensation 
In Walker’s opinion, “clawback provisions in executive compensation agreements 
that allow firms to recoup bonuses paid based on inaccurate financial results may be 
an effective means of combating earnings manipulation.”27 Since only the SEC can 
recoup compensation from CEOs and CFOs, the effectiveness of SOX 304 is 
disappointing. But, for those companies who have voluntarily adopted clawback 
policies, one empirical study shows that “the incidence of accounting restatements 
declines after firms initiate such provisions. In addition, investors and auditors view 
such provisions as increased accounting quality and lower audit risk. Specifically, a 
firm’s earnings response coefficients (ERC) increase after the adoption of clawback 
provisions. Furthermore, for firms that adopt clawbacks, auditors are less likely to 
report material internal control weaknesses but more likely to charge lower audit fees 
as well as issue audit reports with a shorter lag.”28 Another study shows that “firms 
that have paid large M&A bonuses and experienced value-reducing mergers and 
acquisitions are more likely to adopt clawback provisions,” 29  which hints that 
compensation clawback policy will deter such behaviors. Surely, clawback provisions 
have their own limits, because they “(do) not offer a remedy for a lack of foresight, (it) 
merely offers token assurance that ‘bad-boy’ executives will not collect a windfall at 
the expense of shareholders.”30 
III. Four Specific Questions in Clawing Back Executives’ 
Compensation in the US 
In this part, four specific questions will be discussed and analyzed as follows: 
                                                          
26 McCafferty, supra note 11. 
27 David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 435, 
439 (2010). 
28 Lilian H. Chan et al., The Effects of Firm-initiated Clawback Provisions on Earnings Quality and Auditor 
Behavior (January 13, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1965921. 
29 Anna Bergman Brown et al., Economic Determinants of the Voluntary Adoption of Clawback Provisions in 
Executive Compensation Contracts (June 17, 2011), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1866495. 
30 Stas Getmanenko, Executive Compensation: The Law and Incentives, at 22-23, available at  
http://works.bepress.com/stas_getmanenko/1. 
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A. What is the trigger event? 
A trigger event refers to under what circumstances an executive’s compensation 
will be recouped. Under SOX 304 and Dodd-Frank 954, the trigger event is the 
restatement of any financial reporting required under securities laws. Generally, a 
public company must restate its financial statements if they do not comply with 
GAAP or violate federal securities laws.
31
 But ESSA 111 makes different 
requirements for trigger events, including: the statements of earnings, revenues, gains, 
or other figures that are later found to be materially inaccurate. Here, non-quantitative 
elements such as consumer satisfaction may lead to a clawback. Some criticisms have 
been aimed at the requirement for a trigger event in SOX 304 and Dodd-Frank 954: 
1. Since the restatement of a financial report will lead to a clawback, it will deter 
the company from revealing its errors 
Because restating financial reports or other criteria will cause executives to return 
their compensation, the consequences will “discourage corporate accounting 
departments from revealing errors that might trigger restatements because of the 
corporate tumult that might ensue... Alternatively, the clawback provision may 
encourage accounting and finance departments to take the most conservative 
accounting positions possible, lowering the risk of restatements but also lowering 
reported results more than necessary.”32 In particular, disclosing soft information 
may lead to more restatements of financial reports, so a requirement for all companies 
to provide restatements of their financial reports will also discourage them from 
disclosing such information. Ultimately, as opposed to focusing on the trigger event, 
“the appropriate allocation of the risk of accounting mistakes or fraud between the 
company and the executive should be left to firm-specific contracts.”33  
2. Companies may use more fixed compensation or more subjectivity based 
incentive compensation programs 
Fears exist that, “given the inherent risks that a triggering financial restatement 
could occur, combined with the broad scope and ‘no fault’ nature of Section 954, 
some companies may consider shifting their compensation policy towards greater 
proportions of fixed compensation (such as salaries) or to more subjectively based 
incentive compensation programs that may escape the risk of clawback under Section 
                                                          
31 David R. Brown & Julia Lifshits, Publications: Keeping Up With Clawback Provisions – An Analysis of 
Recent Developments, available at http://www.uhlaw.com/keeping-up-with-clawback-provisions/ 
32 Delves, supra note 7. 
33 Larry Ribstein, Clawbacks, available at http://truthonthemarket.com/2010/06/23/clawbacks/. 
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954.” 34 This result may happen, but it is also not so serious. Because 
pay-for-performance, especially pay-for-stock-performance, is welcomed and strongly 
encouraged by institutional shareholders, if any executives’ compensation goes 
against this principle, the compensation arrangements will be objected to by them. 
Because shareholders can have a voice with regard to executives compensation now 
in the US,
35
 institutional shareholders’ opinions will be given more attention than in 
the past. Furthermore, IRC§162(m) enacted in 1993, limits the deductibility of 
non-performance-based compensation issued to certain senior executives to 1 million 
dollars per year. If a company wants to reduce an executive’s compensation, the 
compensation shall be performance-based and approved at a shareholders’ meeting. 
Simply, clawbacks will not lead to more fixed compensation or subjective-based 
incentive compensation. 
B. Who should be clawed back? 
The scope of executives whose compensation shall be clawed back are different in 
three federal legislations: only the CEO and CFO in SOX 304; a senior executive 
officer and any of the next 20 most highly-compensated employees in ESSA 111 and 
current and former executives in Dodd-Frank 954. 
One controversial problem of who should be recouped is whether executives should 
be responsible for material non-compliance with securities law or material 
inaccuracies in financial reports or other documents. Though some argue that only 
those who have personal culpability with respect to the underlying misconduct shall be 
recouped, both the new trends of SOX 304
36
 and the requirements of ESSA111 and 
Dodd-Frank 954 make it clear that even executives who are at no fault themselves, if 
their incentive compensation is based on false financial reporting or other data, will 
still be clawed back. Only in this way can executives be prevented from receiving 
dishonest payments. One concern of such “no-fault liability” is that it will hurt 
                                                          
34 Earle & Wilkerson, supra note 20. Also see Ribstein, supra note 34 (“If the law subjects ‘incentive-based’ 
compensation to a potential penalty for bad accounting, the parties can always contract for non-incentive-based 
pay, or increase the non-incentive component of pay to reflect the risk. It is not clear how shareholders or 
society benefit from messing with incentive compensation in this way.”). 
35 Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act creates a new § 14A of the Securities Exchange Act, pursuant to which 
companies must conduct a shareholder advisory vote on specified executive compensation not less frequently 
than every three years. At least once every six years, shareholders must vote on how frequently to hold such an 
advisory vote, which is called “say-on-pay”. 
36 In SEC v. Jenkins, a federal district court held that the misconduct referred to is that of the issuer itself and 
does not require misconduct by the CEO or CFO. The court stated that “the plain language of the statute 
indicates that the misconduct of corporate officers, agents or employees acting within the scope of their agency 
or employment is sufficient misconduct to meet this element of the statute.” See Bachelder, supra note 16. 
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innocent executives,
37
 which will deters them from choosing incentivized 
compensation. Anyway, “if such misconduct has occurred and the CEO and CFO did 
not know about it, then they were not doing the jobs for which they were paid and 
should give up a large part of their compensation.”38 
C. How much shall be clawed back? 
The amount that can be recovered under SOX 304 and ESSA 111 is quite punitive 
compared to the excess-pay clawback
39
 in Dodd–Frank 954. 40  For example, 
according to SOX 304, the SEC could recover not only excess pay, but the entirety of 
incentive pay received during the 12-month period following the misleading statement 
and profits of certain sales of securities. But, in reality, “how a financial restatement 
might have retrospectively impacted stock prices is anybody’s guess. Consequently, 
determining what constitutes ‘excess’ compensation under Section 954 may prove 
extremely problematic.”41 
D. Who can claw back? 
Since only the SEC can recoup executives’ compensation according to SOX 304, 
this provision has been rarely used after it became effective. Therefore, the goal of the 
legislation has not yet been reached. This being the case, both ESSA 111 and 
Dodd–Frank 954 grant the power of recouping executives’ compensation to the 
company itself. The controversy among scholars in the US lies within whether the 
board will have the discretion to claw back the compensation. 
Those who support that the board has the discretion to recover the funds argue that: 
1. Mandatory clawback will discourage companies from using incentivized 
compensation;
42
 and 2. “The inevitable, real-world variation in possible 
                                                          
37 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Corporate Governance Provisions of Dodd-Frank, at 9 (UCLA School of Law, 
Law-Econ Research Paper No. 10-14, October, 27 2010), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1698898. 
38 Schwartz, supra note 13, at 4. 
39 Excess compensation in Dodd-Frank 954 is defined as the difference between what the executive was paid and 
what the executive would have received if the financials had been correct. See Bainbridge, supra note 37, at 8. 
40 Jesse Fried & Nitzan Shilon, Excess-Pay Clawbacks, 36 J. Corp. L.722, 730 (2011). However, “Dodd-Frank, in 
effect, merely trying to insure that the compensation was in fact fairly earned rather than attempting to punish 
certain executives for the company’s failure to have correct financials.” See A Clark Consulting Technical 
Resource Group White Paper, Fortifying Your Defenses: Choosing a Multifaceted Approach to 
Incentive-compensation Recoupment, available at  
http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/executive-compensation/executivecompensation-22.pdf. 
41 Earle & Wilkerson, supra note 20. 
42 Stuart R. Lombardi, Note, Interpreting Dodd-Frank Section 954: A Case For Corporate Discretion In 
Clawback Policies, 2011 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 881, 910 (2011) (“Granting companies such discretion is both 
desirable and reasonable because: (1) it will reduce the risk that Section 954 will produce unintended 
consequences by encouraging companies to abandon incentive-based compensation...”). 
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circumstances supports giving the board discretion to find the facts and make 
appropriate individual holdback or clawback determinations (with advice and counsel 
of management when it is not implicated).”43 So the board may not perform their 
clawback even in minor amounts, where costs would outweigh the benefits.  
Those who object that the board has the discretion to recoup the funds argue that: 1. 
There requirements of ESSA 111 and Dodd-Frank 954 to recoup erroneous 
compensation are mandatory and allow no discretion by the board;
44
 2. “Directors 
have been influenced by management, sympathetic to executives, insufficiently 
motivated to bargain over compensation, or simply ineffectual in overseeing 
compensation,” 45  so if the board has the discretion, it will not claw back the 
compensation from the executives. From the costs-and-benefits perspective, what the 
directors can get from a clawback is quite small, but what they can end up losing is 
quite large and real, such gaining a reputation as a dishonest person, which would ruin 
their relationship with the executives and lose them their chance of being nominated 
again;
46
 3. Mandatory clawbacks will lower the cost of recovery. “If an executive 
knows that the firm will pursue him until the excess pay is recovered, he has little 
incentive to resist recoupment; thus, the cost of recovery will be low;”47 and 4. Even if 
the cost of recovery always exceeds the excess pay recouped, there are likely to be 
desirable deterrent effects associated with mandatory clawbacks.
48
 Because the 
executive knows that no matter how trivial the unjust compensation is, if the company 
can recover it ex post, her or she will have no motivation to engage in illegal 
behaviors ex ante.  
IV. The Uncertainties and Clarifications of the Chinese Clawback 
Provision 
Article 46 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans (hereinafter Article 46) 
provides that “in case there are any false records in the financial and accounting 
documents of a listed company, the eligible participant who is responsible shall return 
all the interests she has obtained pursuant to the equity incentive plan within 12 
months from the day when the financial and accounting documents are announced.” 
                                                          
43 Brown & Lifshits, supra note 31. 
44 Delves, supra note 7. 
45  Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive 
Compensation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), at 4. 
46 See Fried and Shilon, supra note 40, at 732-734. 
47 Id. at 739. 
48 Id.  
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Based on this Article and what was discussed in part III, this part will also discuss 
four questions about this Article: What is the trigger event? Who shall be clawed back? 
How much shall be clawed back? And, who can claw back? I will clarify these 
questions in order to make this Article more applicable in practice. 
A. What is the trigger event in the Chinese clawback provision? 
As for the trigger event, the requirement of Article 46 is quite brief and vague. The 
trigger event is only one, namely that “there are any false records in the financial and 
accounting documents of a listed company”. So some confusing questions emerge:  
1. what exactly is the meaning of financial and accounting documents?  
Does this term refer to “accounting documents, account books, accounting 
statements and other accounting materials” (Article 13 (1) of Accounting Law of the 
People's Republic of China (1999 Revision) (promulgated by Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress, effective July 1, 2000))? Or does it only refer to 
accounting statements, which should be disclosed according to securities law and 
rules? Considering Article 46 also requires that “the financial and accounting 
documents are announced”, while only accounting statements in listed companies’ 
annual
49
 and interim
50
 reports shall be disclosed according to securities law and rules. 
So, in my point of view, the financial and accounting documents only refer to 
accounting statements that will be disclosed. 
In current Chinese practice, almost all the listed companies use the same financial 
metrics in accounting statements, like earnings, basic earnings per share, return on 
equity, compound growth rate or net profits, as the conditions for the companies to 
grate stock options or for the executives to exercise their rights. Though, in some 
situations, the executives may manipulate some financial metrics which need not be 
disclosed in accounting statements or non-financial metrics to artificially raise the 
stock price and maximize the difference between the stock price and strike price. Such 
behaviors have rarely been seen in current practice. So, at least currently, it is proper 
                                                          
49 According to Article 21 of the Administrative Measures for the Disclosure of Information of Listed Companies 
(promulgated by the CSRC, effective Jan. 30, 2007, hereinafter Measures for the Disclosure of Information), 
among other things, the listed company shall disclose the full texts of the financial accounting statements in its 
annual report, which shall be audited by an accounting firm which has the relevant qualifications for business 
of securities or futures (Article 19 (2) of the Measures for the Disclosure of Information).  
50 According to Article 22 of the Measures for the Disclosure of Information, among other things, the company 
shall disclose the financial accounting statements in its interim report. 
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to only require any false records
51
 in a company’s accounting statements as a trigger 
event.  
(2) Besides any false records in the financial and accounting documents, are there 
any other circumstances in which executives shall also return their compensation to 
the company?  
The answer is definitely yes. From my point of view, misleading statements or 
serious omissions in the accounting statements should be equally treated with false 
records.
52
 Therefore, these two illegal behaviors should also lead to a clawback of 
executive stock option compensation. 
B. Who should be clawed back in the Chinese clawback provision? 
Article 46 demands that the eligible participant who is responsible for false records 
(also including misleading statements and serious omissions) in accounting statements 
shall return their compensation. Three issues shall be discussed about this 
requirement. 
1. The considerations in determining the scope of executives 
In my opinion, the determination of the scope of executives’ involvement depends 
on two considerations: 
(1) Executives’ influence on the financial report or other criteria  
  The more influence the executives have on the truthfulness, accurateness and 
completeness on the accounting statements or other criteria (“policy-making” 
authority), the more possibility that the executives will engage in illegal behaviors to 
artificially satisfy the conditions to be granted stock options (or exercise their rights) 
or raise the stock price when they exercise their rights in order to make unjust profits. 
So the incentive compensation paid to them shall be recouped so as to discourage 
them from acting illegally.  
(2) The trade-off between how much can be recouped and how much the clawback 
will cost  
                                                          
51 Surely, it also shall include misleading statements or serious omissions in accounting statements, which I will 
discuss below.  
52 Article 63 of the Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China (2005Revision) (promulgated by the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, effective Jan. 1, 2006, hereinafter Securities Law) 
provides, “the information as disclosed by issuers and listed companies according to law shall be accurate, 
accurate and complete and shall not have any false record, misleading statement or serious omission.” And, 
article 2 of the “Administrative Measures for the Disclosure of Information” provides “an information 
disclosure obligor shall disclose its information truthfully, accurately, completely and in time. The information 
disclosed shall not contain any false record or mis leading statement or serious omission.” So there is no reason 
to exempt misleading statements or serious omissions. 
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  Since executives are rich and the number of them is small, the costs of clawback 
will be low meanwhile the profits of it are high. By contrast, most of the employees 
are middle-classes and the number of them are large. So, the costs of claw backing the 
compensation from the employees are high but the profits are low. As a result, from 
the cost-and-benefit perspective, it is economically justified to only claw back the 
compensation from executives. Therefore, even if ordinary employees and 
middle-level employee are responsible for the illegal behaviors, they need not return 
the stock option compensation. Considering their influence on the accounting 
statements, their number and their wealth, it makes senses that Article 46 exempted 
them from being clawed back. If one company find it necessary to recoup 
compensation from some middle-level employees, for example, the manager of a 
branch company, it can write it in the stock option plan. 
2. The specific range of who shall be clawed back 
According to Article 68 (3) of the Securities Law, “the directors, supervisors and 
senior managers of a listed company shall guarantee the accuracy and integrity of the 
information as disclosed by the listed company.” In addition, the independent 
directors
53
 and supervisors
54
 cannot be granted stock option compensation. Hence, 
the specific range of who shall be clawed back may be the current or former 
non-independent directors and senior managers if they are responsible for the illegal 
behaviors. Surely, the focus of this chapter is the senior managers, namely the 
executives.  
3. The fault requirement of Article 46 
According to Article 69 of the Securities Law, if the current or former executives 
are able to prove that they had no faults in making any false records, misleading 
statements or major omissions in the accounting statements, they shall not be 
responsible for such behaviors. As a result, if the current or former executives can 
prove that they have no faults, they will not have to return their stock option 
compensation. I think this requirement is appropriate, at least, currently. In part II, my 
argument is that clawback provision has two objectives:(1) reducing executives’ 
motivation to engage in illegal behaviors; and (2) preventing the executives from 
                                                          
53 Article 8 (1) of the Administration for Equity Incentive Plans provides, “the persons eligible for being granted 
the incentive under the equity incentive plan may include the directors, supervisors, senior executives, and core 
technicians or business personnel of a listed company, and other employees that shall be granted the equity 
incentive as the company may deem necessary, but shall not include independent directors.” 
54 Article 1 of the Memo No.2 of the Matters of Equity Incentive (promulgated by CSRC, effective Mar. 17, 2008, 
hereinafter Memo No.2 ) provides, “in order to assure the independence of the supervisors and perform their 
supervisory functions more effectively, supervisors can not granted with equity incentive compensation.” 
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getting unjust benefits. Although requiring those executives who have shown no 
involvement in making any false records, misleading statements or major omissions in 
accounting statements to return their stock option compensation could help prevent 
them from receiving unjust benefits, it will not help reduce executives’ motivation to 
engage in illegal behaviors. This is because, in this situation, their compensation is 
getting recouped under circumstances beyond their control. More worse, it may 
reduce executives’ willingness to receive stock option compensation, because they 
could be hurt by others’ illegal behaviors, which may be difficult for them to prevent. 
As the two goals of clawbacks cannot be compatible at the current time, we have to 
choose the primary one. Considering the positive functions of stock option 
compensation and that only a small portion of listed companies use this kind of 
compensation, we should encourage more executives to receive it, so the obstacles 
that discourage executives from receiving it shall be removed. Requiring executives 
who made no false records, misleading statements nor major omissions in accounting 
statements to return their stock option compensation funds, in my opinion, is an 
obstacle that should be removed. Actually, Article 46 does so. When stock option 
compensation becomes popular among listed companies in China, we then can 
improve this Article to require executives who have not erred to return compensation, 
which EESA 111 and Dodd-Frank 954 in the US do now. 
C. How much shall be clawed back in the Chinese clawback provision? 
As for the amount to be clawed back, Article 46 names “all the interests she has 
obtained pursuant to the equity incentive plan within 12 months”. The question then, 
is what is the exact meaning of “all the interests”? 
There may be existing two literal explanations: 1. One broad explanation: “all the 
interests” means: granted but not exercised stock options; the benefits from exercising 
options (the difference between the stock price and the strike price times the amount 
exercised); and profits from selling stocks which the executives gain after exercising 
options; and 2. One narrow explanation, “all the interests” means: granted but not 
exercised stock options and the benefits from exercising options. From the deterrent 
point of view, the broad explanation may have strong a deterrent effect with regard to 
reducing the motivation to perform illegal acts. But on the other hand, requiring 
executives to return all their interests may reduce their motivation to accept stock 
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option compensation. So, in order to encourage executives to accept stock option 
compensation, the narrow explanation is better than the broad one.
55
 
D.Who can claw back in the Chinese clawback provision? 
Article 46 requires that an eligible participant who is responsible for creating false 
records (misleading statements or serious omissions) in accounting statements shall 
return all the interests she has obtained pursuant to the equity incentive plan. But it is 
unclear who can claw back all the interests. It is naive to expect executives to return 
all the interests willingly by themselves. As for who can claw back, there are two 
parties:  
1. The CSRC. The reason is: Article 46 is in Chapter VI of the Measures for Equity 
Incentive Plans, titled “Supervision and Punishment”, the subject which can use the 
power of supervising and punishing in this chapter is only the CSRC.  
2. The company itself, because: (1) The reason why the executives shall return their 
compensation is that the conditions they could be granted stock options, or they could 
exercise their rights are not satisfied, or the stock price is artificially raised, so the 
company incurs losses and the executives obtain unjust compensation. This is a 
special circumstance of unjust enrichment, which is a private law relationship. Thus, 
the company rather than the CSRC can recoup the compensation; (2) Unlike other 
Articles in Chapter VI, “Supervision and Punishment”,56 Article 46 does not clearly 
require that the CSRC claw back the compensation, which hints that those who made 
the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans never expected the CSRC to utilize this 
power; (3) Experience from the US shows that if only the SEC can recoup the 
compensation, the objectives of the clawback provision cannot be realized. I agree 
with this explanation. 
                                                          
55 Actually, the most appropriate amount that shall be clawed back is excess compensation, which means the 
difference between what executives were paid and what executives would have received if the accounting 
statements had been truthful, accurate and complete. Because, for the company, the losses it incurs are only the 
excess compensation it paid to executives due to wrong accounting statements rather than the entirety of the 
incentive compensation, let alone the profits of certain sales of securities. If the company may recoup all the 
incentive compensation, on the contrary, it will get unjust benefits. Suppose, the CEO and the company made 
such a deal: if the company’s annual income growth rate reaches 10%, the CEO will be granted 1 million stock 
options. Based on this benchmark, if the growth rate increases with 1% more, the CEO can be granted 100,000 
more stock options. Suppose again, that the company’s real growth rate of annual income in this year is 11%, 
but the CEO manipulates the income report, raising the growth rate to 14%. As a result, the CEO will get an 
excessive 300,000 stock options. What the company loses are just the 300,000 stock options, not the whole 1.4 
million stock options. If the company can recover all 1.4 million stock options, it will get unjust benefits. 
56 For example, Article 47 in Chapter VI provides, “in case a listed company implements the equity incentive 
plan without complying with the provisions of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans”, the CSRC shall order 
it to correct, and give a punishment to the company and the relevant responsible persons according to law; 
during the period of ordering correction, the CSRC shall not accept the application documents of the 
company.” Similarly, article 48, 49, 50 in this chapter all grant the power of supervising and punishing to the 
CSRC. 
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When the company can claw back compensation, the following question is whether 
the board of the company has the discretion to claw back executive stock option 
compensation. The answer is no. Because according to the literal meaning of Article 
46, the executive shall return all the interests, in other words, the company shall claw 
back her stock option compensation. This explanation makes sense considering the 
realities of China.  
In chapter one, I proved that executives have a huge influence over the board, so if 
the board has the discretion to claw back, it is highly possible that there will be no 
clawbacks at all. Also, controlling shareholders in China also have huge influence 
over the board,
57
 so it is possible that a controlling shareholder will use this influence 
to demand the board not to claw back executive stock option compensation, thus the 
executives may then support the controlling shareholder to tunnel the company, which 
hurts the interests of minority shareholders.
58
 Furthermore, if the board decides not to 
claw back and supposes that minority shareholders are dissatisfied with its decision, it 
is difficult for minority shareholders to sue the directors of board and prove that the 
directors breached their duty of care. But if the board shall claw back executive stock 
option compensation, there will be no excuse for the board not to claw back. 
Therefore, it is quite easy for minority shareholders to prove that the directors of the 
board have breached their duty of care, though it is still difficult for them to bring a 
derivative suit against the directors of the board.
59
 Even if minority shareholders 
cannot efficiently supervise the board through a derivative suit, requiring that the 
board shall claw back executive stock option compensation may help the stock 
exchanges to determine whether the board violates Article 46 or not. Thus, if the 
board decides not to claw back, it is obvious that it violates Article 46, and the stock 
exchanges can publicly censure the directors of the board, which may bring financial 
and reputational losses to them.
60
 One disadvantage of this explanation is if the 
                                                          
57 “The ownership of China’s publicly traded firms is highly concentrated. In most firms there is a s ingle 
dominant shareholder whose large share ownership gives considerable power and influence over the way the 
firm is run. This is especially the case regarding the appointment and compensation of the CEO or the board.” 
See Martin J. Conyon & Lerong He, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China, 17 Journal 
of Corporate Finance 1158, 1160 (2011). 
58 The controlling shareholder’s tunneling behaviors usually needs the help of executives in China. See Kun 
Wang & Xing Xiao, Controlling Shareholders’ Tunneling and Executive Compensation: Evidence From China, 
30 J. Account. Public Policy 89, 89-91 (2011). 
59 This requirement is similar to recoup the profits from executives’ short-swing trading according to article 47 of 
the Securities Law, which provides “where any director, supervisor and senior manager of a listed company or 
any shareholder who holds more than 5% of the shares of a listed company, sells the stocks of the company as 
held within 6 months after purchase, or purchases any stock as sold within 6 months thereafter, the proceeds as 
generated therefrom shall be incorporated into the profits of the relevant company. The board of directors of 
the company shall take back the proceeds.” 
60 Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions In China’s Securities Market, 108 Colum. L. 
Rev. 929, 971-976 (2008). 
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benefit of recouping is indeed trivial or moot, the mandatory clawback requirement 
will force companies to incur high costs.
61
 
V. Conclusion 
Clawing back executive stock option compensation can reduce executives’ 
motivation to conduct illegal behaviors, such as manipulate earnings or other 
accounting figures, to satisfy the conditions which allow them to be granted stock 
options, to satisfy the conditions which allow them to exercise their rights or to 
artificially raise the stock price when they exercise their rights.  
This chapter introduces and compares three different clawback provisions in three 
federal legislations in the US and reaffirms the clawback provision’s positive 
functions. I also discuss four specific questions in clawback provisions in the US in 
detailed: What is the trigger event? Who shall be clawed back? How much shall be 
clawed back? And who can claw back?  
I clarify some uncertainties of Article 46 of the Measures for Equity Incentive 
Plans,: What exactly is the meaning of financial and accounting documents? Whether 
only in the circumstance of false records in the financial and accounting documents 
shall the eligible participant return all the interests. If not, are there any other 
circumstances? What is the specific range of executives whose stock option 
compensation shall be clawed back? What does “all the interests” mean? And, who 
can claw back executive stock option compensation?  
I hope that my clarifications will make this Article more applicable in practice in 
the future.  
                                                          
61 Another not bad choice is to grant the compensation committee the discretion to claw back executive stock 
option compensation. Specifically, the CSRC could require the compensation committee to claw back 
executive stock option compensation subject to Article 46. But, if the compensation committee decides not to 
claw back executives’ compensation, it shall disclose the reasons why it will do so in detail. Under some 
circumstances (e.g. the benefit of recouping is indeed trivial or moot), this suggestion may be better than the 
mandatory clawback. But, generally speaking, assigning clawbacks to the board is the best choice at present. 
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Chapter Four  Enhancing Supervision by Compensation 
Consultants: Preventing Conflicts of Interest and Imposing 
More Efficient Civil Liabilities 
A corporate official interviewing two accounting firms and asking each of the 
partners, “How much is two plus two?” The first firm’s partner said “four,” but the  
second firm’s partner replied, “What number did you have in mind?” The second firm  
won the client.* 
I. Introduction 
A compensation consultant
1
 can play an important role in addressing agency 
problems in executive stock option compensation. Briefly speaking, under the 
supervision by a compensation consultant, the influence that executives have over the 
board and the independent directors in the compensation committee will be weakened. 
The reason is that the stock option compensation which hurts the interests of 
shareholders will be objected or advised to be amended by the compensation 
consultant, thus the board and the compensation committee have to reconsider their 
compensation decisions and adjust their sympathetic to executives. Besides, the 
professional help offered by a compensation consultant can also address the problem 
that cripples the roles of independent directors in the compensation committee, 
namely, they lack of experience and necessary information in making stock option 
compensation.
2
 In short, “compensation consultants lower agency costs and help 
solve the latent principal-agent problem. Resulting pay contracts are optimal for 
                                                          
*Richard L. Kaplan, Mother of All Conflicts: Auditors and Their Clients, 29 J. Corp. Law 363, 367 (2004). 
1 According to Article 31 of The Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentive Plans of Listed Companies 
(For Trial Implementation) (promulgated by the China Securities Regulation Commission (CSRC), effective 
Jan. 1, 2006, hereinafter Measures for Equity Incentive Plans), the one who releases professional opinion on 
stock option plan is called a “independent financial consultant”. This chapter calls it as a compensation 
consultant in order to show its unique role in supervising executive stock option compensation. In the US and 
UK, those who help the board or the compensation committee to make compensation decisions are often called 
compensation consultants. See Martin J. Conyon, Executive Compensation Consultants and CEO Pay, 64 Vand. 
L. Rev.399,403 (2011) 
2 Mary-Hunter Morris, The Price of Advice, 86 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 153,166 (2009) (“Seeking to counteract the 
board’s inherent informational disadvantage, companies routinely employ compensation consultants from 
outside firms who scrutinize the company’s situation and provide the board with the information and advice it 
needs to make a quick and rational decision.”). 
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shareholders (and other stakeholders) and lead to better alignment of pay with 
performance.”3 
In the US and UK, since a compensation consultant takes an active part in the 
whole compensation-making process, it can play three different roles: first, providing 
professional advice and assistance to independent directors in the compensation 
committee, who are with neither the time nor the experience to undertake this task; 
second, legitimizing the compensation committee’s decisions; and third, serving as a 
intermediary between shareholders and the company.
4
 
In China, according to Article 32 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans,
5
 the 
primary function of a compensation consultant is to provide professional opinion on 
the feasibility of the stock option plan, whether it is conducive to the sustained 
development of the listed company, whether it will impair the interests of the listed 
company, and its affect to the shareholders’ interests, which, in my point of view, to 
scrutinize or check the reasonableness of the stock option plan. As a result, the 
decision of the board and compensation committee can be legitimized by the 
compensation consultant’s opinion. In most cases, a compensation consultant does not 
join in the making-process of executive stock option compensation and advise the 
board and compensation committee.
6
 So, in China, a compensation consultant only 
performs a supervising function ex post. This function of the compensation consultant 
                                                          
3 Conyon, supra note 1, at 408. 
4  See Ruth Bender, Executive Compensation Consultants, at 3-9 (March 12, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1788322. 
5 It provides, “where the salary and examination committee under the board of directors of a listed company 
believes it necessary, it may request the listed company to retain an independent financial consultant to issue 
professional opinions on the feasibility of the stock option plan, whether it is conducive to the sustained 
development of the listed company, whether it will impair the interests of the listed company, and its affect to 
the shareholders’ interests. The independent financial consultant shall issue a report of an independent financial 
consultant, and issue professional opinions at least on the following matters: 1. Whether the stock option plan 
complies with the provisions of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans; 2. The feasibility of the company to 
implement the stock option plan; 3. The checking opinions on the scope and qualification of eligible 
participants; 4. The checking opinions on the amount of rights and interests granted under the stock option plan; 
5. Financial measurement on the company’s implementation of the stock option plan; 6. The impact of the 
company’s implementation of stock option plan on the sustained management capacity of the listed company 
and shareholders’ rights and interests; 7. The checking opinions on whether the listed company has provided 
any form of financial subsidy to the eligible participants; 8. Whether the stock option plan is under any 
circumstance that obviously impairs the interests of the listed company and all of its shareholders; 9. The 
reasonableness of the performance examination system and examination measures of the listed company; and 
10. Other matters that shall be stated.” 
6 In practice, some listed companies do hire professional agencies to help the boards and compensation 
committees to make the stock option plans. For example, the 2006 Vanke Stock Option Plan was made by the 
help of Hewitt Associates, see Kong Jie Ming, Changing of Executive Compensation in Listed Companies, Vol. 
5 CFO World 31, 35 (2011). But, because the listed companies do not need to disclose whether they have hired 
professional agencies to help them to make stock option plans or not, this chapter cannot collect the necessary 
information and discuss its functions and problems. In chapter two, I have suggested that the company should 
disclose whether the company has hired a professional agency to assist the compensation committee and the 
board in drafting stock option plans, if so, its identity, compensation paid to it and whether the professional 
agency provides other services to the company; if so, what measures have been taken by the company to 
prevent conflicts of interest. 
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is similar to that of a law firm, who issues legal opinions on the stock option plan,
7
  
that of a accounting firm, who audits accounting statements in the company’s annual 
report, or that of a rating agency, who issues credit a rating for the company’s 
securities. All of these capital market intermediaries, who are also called gatekeepers, 
scrutinize the information disclosed by the company and release their professional 
opinion on the information so as to enhance the reliability of the information. As a 
result, they can reduce information asymmetry between shareholders and companies, 
thus also reducing agency costs in corporate governance.  
The premise that a compensation consultant can enhance the reliability of the stock 
option plan is that its opinion shall be objective and fair, which depends on whether it 
is independent of the executives or not. If its opinion is based on the consideration of 
providing other services to the company or maintaining a business relationship with 
the company, the so-called “independent compensation consultant” will surely 
surrender itself to executives. “A potential problem with (compensation) consultants, 
however, is that they are usually hired by the executives themselves to assist the 
compensation committee of the board. While these consultants no doubt generally act 
in good faith, they must feel at least implicit pressure to satisfy the executives who 
hired them.”8 
Though some rules in the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans regulate 
compensation consultants, such as how a compensation consultant shall perform its 
duty
9
 and the administrative liabilities if a compensation consultant breaks its duty,
10
 
but there still exist some serious problems which will disappoint the rule-makers and 
shareholders: 
                                                          
7 Article 31 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans provides, “ a listed company shall retain an attorney to 
issue legal opinions to its stock option plan, and present professional opinions at least on the following matters: 
1. Whether the stock option plan complies with the provisions of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans; 2. 
Whether it has gone through legal procedures for the stock option plan; 3. Whether the listed company has 
fulfilled its obligation on information disclosure; 4. Whether there is any circumstance that obviously impairs 
the interests of the listed company and all of its shareholders, and circumstance that is in violation of the 
relevant laws and administrative regulations in the stock option plan; and 5. Other matters need to be stated.” 
8 Edward M. Iacobucci, The Effects of Disclosure on Executive Compensation, 48 U. Toronto L.J. 489, 496 
(1998). 
9 Article 5 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans provides, “any professional institution that issues opinions 
for the equity incentive plan of a listed company shall be honest and in good faith, diligent, and ensure that the 
documents it issues are truthful, accurate, and complete.” 
10 Article 50 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans provides, “in case the relevant professional institutions 
that issue opinions on the equity incentive plan of a listed company fails to fulfill the diligent duty, or the 
professional opinions issued by them have false record, misrepresentation, or great omission, the CSRC shall 
take such measures as the supervision talk, issuing warning letter, ordering to rectify, and etc. to the relevant 
professional institutions and the personnel who sign their names on the opinions, and transfer them to the 
competent departments in charge of the relevant professional institutions for punishment; if the circumstance is 
serious, they shall be given warnings, fines and other punishment; if an illegal securities act is constituted, they 
shall be subject to legal liabilities according to law.” 
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First, the power of the compensation committee is limited. 1. It cannot directly hire 
its own compensation consultant without requesting the company to retain it. 2. It is 
not clear whether the compensation committee has the power to compensate, 
supervise and fire the hired compensation consultant directly. 
Second, although a compensation consultant is required to be independent, the 
standard of independence or no-independence is not established in the Measures for 
Equity Incentive Plans.   
Third, the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans only focuses on administrative 
liabilities if a compensation consultant breaches its fiduciary duty. How to expose it to 
more efficient civil liabilities is unknown, especially more efficient imputation of 
liabilities and scope of liabilities. At the same time, neither securities law nor rules 
efficiently solve this problem. 
So this chapter intends to make some suggestions to partly resolve these problems. 
I hope that my suggestions can do better jobs than the current securities law and rules. 
Because problems concerning compensation consultants have not been given enough 
attention by Chinese law scholars,
11
 this chapter will refer to the law and practice in 
the US as an important means to resolve the aforementioned problems. Though the 
laws and rules, the development stage of the capital market and the functions of 
compensation consultants in China are different from those in the US, as a rational 
institution, when facing the same conflicts of interest, compensation consultants or 
their employees will react similarly.    
This chapter proceeds as follows. Part II firstly discuses the roles of a compensation 
consultant, secondly points out the conflicts of interest faced by it, thirdly provides 
empirical studies to show the serious problem caused by the conflicts of interest. Part 
III analyzes how compensation consultants are regulated in the US ex ante and what 
suggestions scholars in the US have made to enforce gatekeepers to a more strict 
litigation ex post. Part IV first introduces the law, rules and practice about 
compensation consultants in China, then points out the problems in them; lastly it 
makes some suggestions. Part V offers a short conclusion.  
                                                          
11 I used the keywords “compensation consultant” and “independent financial consultant” to search related 
articles in the database CNKI. Unfortunately, no academic articles were found. I only found a few news reports 
on independent financial consultants, lasted visiting day: Nov. 19, 2012.  
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II. The Roles of A Compensation Consultant and the Conflicts of 
Interest Faced by It 
In this part, firstly, I will discuss the roles of a compensation consultant; secondly, 
points out two kinds of conflicts of interest faced by it; and thirdly, I  will provide 
empirical studies to show the conflicts of interest may lead the compensation 
consultant to favor executives. 
A. The roles of a compensation consultant 
1. A compensation consultant as a gatekeeper 
“The gatekeeper is an agent who acts as a reputational intermediary to assure 
investors as to the quality of the ‘signal’ sent by the corporate issuer. The reputational 
intermediary does so by lending or ‘pledging’ its reputational capital to the 
corporation, thus enabling investors or the market to rely on the corporation’s own 
disclosures or assurances where they otherwise might not.”12 Since the gatekeeper is 
the repeat player in the capital market, its success depends on its reputation which has 
accumulated for quite a long time. In theory, “because the gatekeeper’s business 
depends on its reputation for honesty, probity, and accuracy, it will not ruin that 
reputation to aid one client to cheat.”13 Based on the characteristics of gatekeeper, the 
compensation consultant in China who issues professional opinion on the 
reasonableness of stock option plan, is definitely, one kind of gatekeepers. In the US 
and UK, a compensation consultant also plays the role of justifying the decisions 
made by the compensation committee, so this chapter also regards it as one kind of 
gatekeepers. Here, I want to emphasize three points: 
(1) Those who a gatekeeper should really serve are the shareholders not the 
executives. But, in reality, the gatekeeper always colludes with the executives.  
(2) Though independence is a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition for 
a gatekeeper to provide objective and fair opinion, the independence is the solid 
foundation for it to perform its duty successfully. 
(3) Good reputation can help a gatekeeper gain the trust of shareholders, so it has 
the incentive to maintain and enhance its reputation. But only good reputation is far 
from enough. “The central theoretical point is that reputational arguments related to 
gatekeepers are complex and reputation alone is not necessarily a viable constraint on 
                                                          
12 John C. Coffee Jr., Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance (London: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), at 2. 
13 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Lawyers as Gatekeepers, at 1(UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research 
Paper No. 12-03, January 6, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1980975. 
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gatekeeper certification.”14 The reasons are: (a) It is difficult for shareholders to 
evaluate the opinions issued by gatekeepers; and (b) The employees and the firms 
have different interests, so the employees will do something benefiting themselves 
even at the costs of the firms. As for the case of accounting firm, “it matters little that 
the accounting firm is huge with hundreds of large clients. The individual audit  
partner has only a few. As a consequence, at the level where the most important 
decisions are made regarding financial statement disclosures, the balance of power 
lies with the client.”15 
2. The roles of a compensation consultant 
In the US and UK, a compensation consultant can play three different kinds of roles: 
(1) providing professional advice and assistance to independent directors in the 
compensation committee; (2) legitimizing the compensation committee’s decisions; 
and (3) serving as a intermediary between shareholders and the company.
16
 Because a  
compensation consultant takes an active part in the whole process of drafting the 
compensation package, its primary role is to advise the compensation committee to 
make compensation decision. The situation in China is a little bit different. The 
primary role of a compensation consultant is to legitimize the stock option plan made 
by the board and compensation committee. But such a difference cannot be 
exaggerated. On one hand, when a compensation consultant legitimizes the decision 
in China, it may communicate with the board and compensation committee at the 
same time. Suppose that some articles in the stock option plan are not reasonable from 
the perspective of shareholders, the compensation consultant may suggest the board 
and the compensation committee to amend these articles and provide their advice. 
From this point of view, the compensation consultant in China can also help the board 
and the compensation committee to make compensation decision and address the 
problem that the independent directors in the compensation committee lack of 
experience and necessary information in making executive stock option compensation. 
On the other hand, if the decision recommended by a compensation consultant is 
strongly criticized by shareholders in the US and UK, its reputation will be hurt. As a 
result, the compensation consultant will carefully choose its recommendations. From 
                                                          
14 Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 365, 367 (2004). 
15 Richard L. Kaplan, Mother of All Conflicts: Auditors and Their Clients, 29 J. Corp. Law 363, 367 (2004). Also 
see Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 
Wash. U. L.Q. 491, 502 (2001) (“Even if gatekeeper managers do not face incentives to deplete the reputation 
of the entity for short-term gain, lower level employees might face precisely those incentives. It is especially 
costly to monitor such employees, given the annual bonus compensation structure of most gatekeepers and the 
incentives for employees to maximize short-term profits.”). 
16 Bender, supra note 4, at 3-9. 
Chapter Four  Enhancing Supervision by Compensation Consultants 
 
85 
this perspective, the compensation consultant supervises the compensation 
committee’s decision. Besides, as a reputational intermediary in the capital market, 
the compensation consultant can explain the company’s compensation decision and 
policy to shareholders and feedback shareholders’ concerns to the company. In short, 
not matter in China or in the US and UK, the compensation consultant can play three 
different roles, but its primary role is not the same. Specifically speaking: 
(1) A compensation consultant can provide professional advice and assistance to 
independent directors in the compensation committee (the primary role of 
compensation consultant in the US and UK )
17
 
a. When the compensation committee makes compensation decision, it need refer 
to the executives’ compensation level and structure in the same industry as its 
benchmark. But the company itself has no such data or its data is not enough. “The 
(compensation) consultants are privy to pay data that are not shared directly among 
companies. Firms participate in consultant’s compensation surveys with the 
understanding that individual company data will be kept confidential. The consultants 
then use the date to improve the design of their clients’ compensation 
arrangements.”18 
b. Making executives’ compensation is a knowledge-and-experience-demanding 
job, it involves “the value of complex pay packages and associated tax, disclosure, 
and accounting issues.”19 So, with the help of a compensation consultant, the problem 
that independent directors in the compensation committee lack of information and 
experience can be addressed. 
(2) A compensation consultant can legitimize the board or/and compensation 
committee’s decision (the primary role of compensation consultant in China)20 
Because there is no world-widely recognized level and structure of executives’ 
                                                          
17 See United States House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Majority Staff 
(hereafter the 2007 Congress Report), Executive Pay: Conflicts Of Interest Among Compensation Consultants, 
at 1 (December 2007), available at http://www.erieri.com/PDF/Executive-Consultant-Conflicts.pdf. (“Large 
companies routinely retain compensation consultants to provide advice on executive pay, such as developing 
compensation peer groups, designing equity compensation plans, conducting compensation surveys, and 
analyzing the tax, accounting, and legal implications of specific pay packages. These consultants can be 
retained by either the corporate board (typically, the compensation committee of the board) or management, 
and they may advise the board, management, or both on executive pay issues. Whether retained by the board or 
management, these consultants can have a major impact on executive pay decisions.”).  
18 Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), at 70. 
19 Conyon, supra note 1, at 408. 
20 Ruth Bender, Paying For Advice: The Role of the Remuneration Consultant in U.K. Listed Companies , 64 
Vand. L. Rev. 361, 363-364 (2011) (“It suggests that the use of compensation consultants can be best 
explained using theories of legitimacy: by taking outside advice, the compensation committee legitimizes its 
decisions in the controversial area of executive pay.”). 
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compensation,
21
 if the board or/and compensation committees’ decision is advised or 
checked by a compensation consultant, their decision will be immunity from being 
criticized by shareholders or lawsuits.
22
 As a result, to “employ and rely on 
compensation consultants have become prevalent within judicial opinions and 
corporate best practices.”23 In fact, courts “have generally given greater deterrence to 
board decisions that relied on advice by outsiders,”24 thus, “compensation consultants 
can similarly add legitimacy to board compensation decision in the eyes of others.”25 
(3) A compensation consultant can serve as a intermediary between shareholders 
and the company 
Only executives’ compensation is accepted by shareholders, will the board and 
compensation committee be avoided of being criticized, blamed or even sued by them. 
On one hand, the compensation consultant can explain how and why the executive are 
paid for shareholders, thus quelling potential public outrage over executives 
compensation. This function is quite important in those counties that grant the 
shareholders the rights of say-on-pay. On the other hand, the compensation consultant 
can provide the concerns of shareholders, especially the institutional shareholders to 
the company. So, it can improve the understandings of both sides. 
The premise that a compensation consultant can successfully play the three roles is 
to maintain its independence. However, independence is the “Achilles Heel” of a 
compensation consultant. “The core criticism is that (compensation) consultants are 
not sufficiently independent or impartial and this leads to pay packages that are not 
optimal from the shareholders’ perspective.”26 
B. The conflicts of interest faced by a compensation consultant 
In theory, a compensation consultant is retained by the company and it shall serve 
                                                          
21 See Charles M. Elson, The Duty Of Care, Compensation, And Stock Ownership, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 649, 686 
(1995) (“Compensation structuring is not a precise art or science. It is based on comparisons with what other 
businesses are paying. There is tremendous subjectivity involved in deciding with what businesses the client’s 
compensation structure will be compared.”). 
22 Morris, supra note 2, at 186 (“Because directors can hide behind expert consultants and their contrived 
‘comparable’ data to justify exorbitant pay packages, shaming tactics are unlikely to be very effective.”).  
23 Id. at 155. 
24 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 18, at 70. In the court, “in order to survive a motion to dismiss in a case alleging 
due care violations where the board was advised by an expert, plaintiffs must: allege particularized facts ... that, 
if proved, would show, for example, that (a) the directors did not in fact rely on the expert; (b) their reliance 
was not in good faith; (c) they did not reasonably believe that the expert's advice was within the expert's 
professional competence; (d) the expert was not selected with reasonable care by or on behalf  of the 
corporation, and the faulty selection process was attributable to the directors; (e) the subject mater ... that was 
material and reasonably available was so obvious that the board's failure to consider it was grossly negligent 
regardless of the expert's advice or lack of advice; or (f) that the decision of the board was so unconscionable 
as to constitute waste or fraud.” see Morris, supra note 2, at 193. 
25 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 18, at 70.  
26 Conyon, supra note 1, at 408.  
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the interest of the company and its’ shareholders. But, as a matter of practice, the 
company is a artificial person, which is represented by the executives or those who 
under the control of them. “Often, a (compensation) consultant is selected to provide 
services to the committee because of the consultant’s established relationship with the 
corporation’s human resources department, a department that reports directly to the 
corporation’s CEO.”27 So, from the perspective of a compensation consultant, it is 
hired by the executives rather than the company. Consequently, “when pay 
consultants depend on management for their livelihood, they might be easily 
persuaded to recommend very generous compensation packages.” 28  Generally 
speaking, a compensation consultant faces two kinds of conflicts of interest: 
1. A compensation consultant wants to provide other service to the company 
(cross-selling problem) 
Besides providing executives’ compensation consultancy services to the company, a 
compensation consultant usually provides other services to it, such as “employee 
benefit administration, human resource management, and actuarial services,”29 thus 
“the ability of consultants to provide independent, unbiased advice to directors 
regarding the pay of senior executives can be compromised if the senior executives 
are at the same time paying the compensation consultants to provide other services to 
the company.”30 According to a report from the US Congress, “for each dollar these 
(compensation) consultants received for executive pay advice, they received almost 
$11 in payments for other services.”31 Therefore, cross-selling problem may turn a 
compensation consultant from “a watchdog to a salesman”.32 
2. A compensation consultant wants to continue the business relationship with the 
company (repeat business problem) 
Comparing to the competition of other gatekeeper industry, such as auditing and 
credit-rating service, the compensation consultant industry is quite competitive.
33
 In 
                                                          
27 Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive Compensation to Realign 
Management and Shareholders' Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, Wake Forest L. Rev. 
971, 993 (2004). 
28 Susan Lorde Martin, The Executive Compensation Problem, 98 Dick. L. Rev. 237, 253 (1993).  
29 The 2007 Congress Report, supra note 17, at 1.  
30 Id. Also see Joann S. Lublin, Conflict Concerns Benefit Independent Pay Advisers (December 10, 2007), 
WSJ.com, available at 
http://www.delvesgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/WSJ-Article-Dec.-10-2007.pdf. (“Activist 
shareholders have long complained that large consulting firms often simultaneously advise directors about 
executives’ compensation and provide benefits consulting or other human-resources advice to management. 
Activists say these consultants have an incentive to please managers, who control those more lucrative 
contracts.”). 
31 The 2007 Congress Report, supra note 17, at 4.  
32 Coffee, supra note 12, at 28. 
33 Prior to 2010 there were existing six leading compensation consultants in the US: Frederick W. Cook & 
Company, Hewitt Associates, Mercer Human Resources Consulting, Pearl Meyer & Partners, Towers Perrin, 
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such a competitive industry, if a compensation consultant makes trouble for a client, it 
will jeopardize not only the compensation consultant fee, but also the potential for 
cross-selling services, which are more profitable than compensation consultancy per 
se.
34
 As a result, “(compensation) consultants who fear being fired, losing repeat 
business, or both are more likely to recommend pay contracts that favor the CEO at 
the expense of shareholders.”35 In short, “(to) lose the client, and your career is 
eclipsed.”36 Surely, there are existing some constraints on the “overtly self-serving” 
compensation consultant. “A compensation consultant who is exposed as colluding 
with management, or recommending lucrative pay deals for poor performance, will 
suffer a loss of valuable market reputation. In addition, the consultant may risk 
termination by the client firm’s board of directors, fail to attract and retain 
assignments at other firms, or even risk litigation.” 37  For its own sake, a 
compensation consultant will find a subtle balance between shareholders and the 
executives, but it is impossible for it to put its full heart and soul to protect the 
interests of shareholders. “To the extent that the gatekeeper is hired by corporate 
managers to reassure its shareholders or investors, a reputation for unbending 
intransigence may alienate corporate managers, even if it pleases investors—thereby 
producing an uncertain trade-off. In short, there is no natural equilibrium.”38 
C. Empirical studies about the influences of conflicts of interest on executives’ 
compensation 
Whether aforementioned two conflicts of interest of compensation consultant will 
lead to grant executives excess or less pay-for-performance compensation, empirical 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and Watson Wyatt. After 2010, Towers Perrin and Watson Wyatt conducted a friendly merge, Towers Watson 
is their new name. See Conyon, supra note 1, at 406. Besides, a few medium-firms can also provide 
compensation consultancy service to companies. In China, investment consultant firms, financial consultant 
firms and securities companies can provide compensation consultancy service. In such a cruel industry, 
“competition could do more harm than good. The credit-rating agencies, which have historically faced little or 
no competition, appear to have remained largely uncaptured by their corporate clients—even if they were slow 
to respond to new information. Thus, the SEC has long feared that new entrants into this market would produce 
a ‘race to the bottom’ that lowered standards. In contrast, securities analysts during the 1990s probably were 
the most ‘captured’ gatekeepers, despite intense competition.” see Coffee, supra note 13, at 82. But Conyon 
held that “the market for executive compensation services is a structural oligopoly”, see Conyon, supra note 1, 
at 410. 
34 Also see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 71, 78–79 (2003) (“Providing advice that hurts the CEO’s pocketbook is hardly a way to enhance the 
consultant’s chances of being hired in the future by this firm or, indeed, by any other firms” ).  
35 Conyon, supra note 1, at 410.  
36 Testimony of Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., The Role and Impact of Credit Rating Agencies on the Subprime 
Credit Markets, at 4 (Before the Senate Banking Committee On September 26, 2007), available at 
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=d1c0419e-d84a-4b43-
b02d-4e246e2dbec7. 
37 Conyon, supra note 1, at 410-411. 
38 Coffee, supra note 3, at 333. 
Chapter Four  Enhancing Supervision by Compensation Consultants 
 
89 
studies offer different findings.
39
 The reason maybe “the retention of the consultant is 
endogenous, and missing explanatory variables may plague model estimation.”40 But, 
at least, the different findings of these studies show the potential harms that the 
conflicts of interest faced by a compensation consultant may bring to shareholders.  
What a pity thing is that there is no empirical studies on the conflicts of interest 
problem of compensation consultant in China. But, in my opinion, the findings made 
by foreign scholars may also apply in China. Facing the same conflicts of interest, 
from my point of view, a compensation consultant (including its employees) will react 
in similar way. Besides, the Chinese compensation consultants are under more cruel 
competition and less possibilities of shame sanctions and litigation than their foreign 
counterparts, so it may be more difficult for them not to favor executives. 
1. The influence of cross-selling problem 
Using a unique data set of compensation consultant service fee in US S&P 500 
firms in 2009, Wei Cen and Na Qiong Tong found that “CEO salary, bonus and total 
compensation are higher in firms where the consultants provide other service and that 
pay is higher when the fees paid to consultants for other services are larger.”41 
Besides, according to Murphy and Sandino, “in both the US and Canada that CEO 
pay is higher in companies where the consultant provides other services, and that pay 
is higher in Canadian firms when the fees paid to consultants for other services are 
large relative to the fees for executive-compensation services.”42 
2. The influence of repeat-business problem 
The influence of repeat-business problem can be observed by the following method: 
if a compensation consultant is changed, whether the level or structure of executives’ 
compensation will become more favorable to them. If so, repeat-business will cripple 
the independence of a compensation consultant. The reason is that a compensation 
consultant can anticipate that if it recommends less favorable compensation, it may 
lose the chance of being hired again. In order to maintain its relationship with the 
                                                          
39 Bender analyzed 11 research studies and concluded different findings, see Bender, supra note 4, at 20-22. 
40 Conyon, supra note 1, at 424. 
41 Wei Cen & Na Qiong Tong, Compensation Consultant Independence and CEO Pay (January 5, 2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1735506. 
42 Kevin J. Murphy & Tatiana Sandino, Executive Pay and “Independent” Compensation Consultants, 49 Journal 
of Accounting and Economics 247, 248 (2010). Surely, there are existing different findings of the influence of 
crossing-selling problem. For example, according to Conyon, “there is little evidence that consultants with 
potential conflicts of interest, such as supplying other business to client firms, leads to greater CEO pay or the 
adverse design of pay contracts.” see Martin J. Conyon, Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: 
Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom, (May 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1106729. But, in his paper, “Executive Compensation 
Consultants and CEO Pay”, Conyon held the different opinion, Conyon, supra note 1, at 424 (“CEO pay is 
higher  in firms where the consultant supplies other business services, or where management is involved in 
the selection of the compensation consultant.”). 
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company, it is better for it to recommend favorable compensation to executives. Using 
a sample of FTSE 350 firms in UK from 2002 to 2008, Goh and Gupta found that 
“executives of firms that switch their main consultant receive higher salary 
increments in the year of the switch (both absolute and adjusted for median peer 
levels) and a less risky compensation package, through a higher proportion of bonus 
and a lower proportion of equity pay. The results provide some evidence that 
companies successfully engage in opinion-shopping between consultants for more 
favorable compensation packages for executives.”43 But, by examining whether CEO 
pay is related to a proxy for managerial influence over the decision to appoint (or 
reappoint) consultants, i.e. an indicator of whether the consultant worked exclusively 
for the committee or also worked for management, Murphy and Sandino found that 
“CEO pay is actually about 13% higher in US companies where the consultant works 
exclusively for the compensation committee rather than for management. The lack of 
support for the repeat business hypothesis is robust to a variety of specifications, 
including a propensity-score matching approach that mitigated the endogeneity of the 
board’s choice to retain its own consultant.”44 “One interpretation of the data is that 
pay consultants recommend greater pay-at-risk for the CEOs of client firms, reflecting 
greater pay-for-performance. ...Risk-averse CEOs whose contracts contain more risky 
compensation such as stock options will demand greater levels of pay.”45 
III. How Compensation Consultants Are Regulated in the US 
It is clear that only self-discipline and market competition is not enough to address 
the conflicts of interest problem faced by a compensation consultant. So, laws and 
rules can play a critical role in addressing this problem. This part, first, briefly 
introduces how compensation consultants resolve the conflicts of interest problem in 
the way of self-discipline; second, analyzes how the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act) addresses this problem ex ante; third, shortly discusses 
how to reform compensation consultant’s civil liabilities ex post based on Coffee and 
Partnoy’s suggestions.  
                                                          
43  Lisa Goh & Aditi Gupta, Executive Compensation, Compensation Consultants, and Shopping for Opinion: 
Evidence from the United Kingdom, 25 Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 607 (2010) . 
44 Murphy & Sandino, supra note 42, at 248. 
45 See Conyon, supra note 1, at 410. 
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A. How a compensation consultant addresses the conflicts of interest problem 
in the way of self-discipline 
If a compensation consultant cannot provide objective and fair advice or opinions, 
its reputation will be harmed and its future may become dim. So in order to protect its 
own reputation, it will solve this problem in the way of self-discipline: 
1. The first approach is to only provide compensation consultancy service. For 
example, Frederic W. Cook and Pearl Meyer in the US do not offer other service than 
the compensation consultancy service to companies. 
46
 
2. The second approach is to implement Chinese walls. For example, in a letter to 
Chairman Waxman in 2007, then Towers Perrin listed several policies and procedures 
for ensuring the soundness and objectivity of its consulting advice, including: “(1) a 
code of conduct that articulates a commitment to providing impartial and objective 
services; (2) the designation of a senior consultant to review and resolve all potential 
conflicts of interest before an engagement proceeds; (3) review of significant 
executive pay recommendations by a senior consultant not on the consulting team 
performing the work; and (4) a policy precluding an individual who advises a 
company’s board on executive pay from serving as the firm’s relationship manager 
with the company, where the firm provides other services to the same company.”47 
3. The third approach is to spin off compensation consultancy service. For example, 
Hewitt spined off its compensation consultancy business in February, 2012.
48
 
“By spinning off separate practices, implementing Chinese walls, and changing 
their operational practices, they (compensation consultants) are demonstrating an 
understanding of what has alarmed outside constituencies,”49 but “there is evidence to 
suggest that the lines between those providing executive compensation advice and 
those providing other services may not be as bright as the consultants described.”50 
B. How the Dodd-Frank Act regulates compensation consultants ex ante 
1. The compensation committee is granted the exclusive power to hire, compensate, 
supervise and fire its own compensation consultant 
                                                          
46 The 2007 Congress Report, supra note 17, at 3.  
47 Letter from Mark V. Mactas, Towers Perrin, to Chairman Henry A. Waxman (June 26, 2007), quoted in The 
2007 Congress Report, supra note 17, at 8.  
48 Bender, supra note 21, at 372. 
49 Id. at 394. 
50 The 2007 Congress Report, supra note 17, at 8. 
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“The compensation committee should have direct and unrestricted access to 
external advisers who are independent of management. .... The committee should have 
the ability to directly engage its own advisers when it determines such engagement is 
appropriate.”51 Only under this condition will a compensation consultant deem itself 
to work for the compensation committee not the executives and will it not worry 
about pleasing the executives in order to continue business relationships with the 
company.  
Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to adopt rules to prohibit the 
stock exchanges and NASDAQ from listing any issuer that does not has a 
compensation committee, whose member shall be independent directors. The 
considerations of independence of directors shall include: (1) the source of the 
director’s total compensation, including such items as consulting, advisory, or other 
fees; and (2) whether the director is affiliated with the company, any of its subsidiaries, 
or any of its other affiliates. However, the self-regulatory organizations are allowed to 
develop their own definition of independence besides forementioned considerations.
52
 
More importantly, Section 952 of Dodd-Frank Act makes it clear: (1) The 
compensation committee must have authority to retain a independent compensation 
consultant at company expense ; and (2) The committee is to be solely responsible for 
selecting, retaining, and determining the compensation of a compensation consultant, 
which also have been regarded as the best practice for listed companies.
53
 
The relationship between the compensation committee and the compensation 
consultant was unclear before the Dodd-Frank Act. The compensation consultant 
usually regarded itself as to be hired, compensated, supervised and fired by the 
executives. As a result, the compensation consultant would serve the interests of 
executives for its own sake. With the new rules have come into force, the 
compensation consultant , whose master is the compensation committee, can be more 
independent from the executives.  
2. The company shall disclose the conflicts of interest of a compensation consultant 
                                                          
51 The Conference Board, The Conference Board Task Force on Executive Compensation, at 24 (2009) , 
available at http://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/execcompensation2009.pdf. 
52 In practice, almost all the listed companies in New York Exchange and NASDAQ have compensation 
committees, whose member are all independent directors, except in the case of NASDAQ, majority of the 
independent directors can also make compensation decisions. See NYSE Listed Company Manual, 303A.05 
Compensation Committee (a) and NASDAQ listing standard 5605(d). 
53 The Conference Board, supra note 51, at 24 (“If the compensation committee decides that engaging a 
compensation consultant is desirable, the compensation consultant should report directly to the committee. The 
compensation consultant should be independent of management and selected and engaged by the committee. 
The committee should review and approve all key terms of the engagement, including the scope of the 
engagement and the work to be undertaken.”). 
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The Dodd-Frank Act does not require a compensation consultant to be independent, 
only that the company to disclose whether—(1) the compensation committee of the 
issuer retained or obtained the advice of a compensation consultant; and (2) the work 
of the compensation consultant has raised any conflict of interest and, if so, the nature 
of the conflict and how the conflict is being addressed.
54
 Section 952 (b) (2) of the 
Dodd-Frank Act specifies the factors that affect the independence of a compensation 
consultant, including: (1) the provision of other services to the issuer by the person 
that employs the compensation consultant; (2) the amount of fees received from the 
issuer by the person that employs the compensation consultant, as a percentage of the 
total revenue of the person that employs the compensation consultant; (3) the policies 
and procedures of the person that employs the compensation consultant that is 
designed to prevent conflicts of interest; (4) any business or personal relationship of 
the compensation consultant with a member of the compensation committee; and (5) 
any stock of the issuer owned by the compensation consultant. In the final rule, the 
SEC add one factor that affect the independence of a compensation consultant, namely, 
(6) any business or personal relationships between the executive officers of the issuer 
and the compensation consultant or the person employing the consultant.
55
 Because 
the company has to disclose information about the hired compensation consultant, if 
the compensation committee has no justified reasons, it will not retain a compensation 
consultant having conflicts of interest. Otherwise, the compensation committee may 
be criticized and blamed by shareholders or even sued by them because of breaking 
their fiduciary duties.  
C. Reforming compensation consultants’ civil liabilities ex post 
Though preventing conflicts of interest can lay a solid foundation for a 
compensation consultant to provide objective and fair advice ex ante, it may still 
break its duty simply because of fraud, carelessness or even incompetent. For example, 
a compensation consultant recommends a generous stock option plan or in Chinese 
                                                          
54 Section 952 (c) (2) of Dodd-Frank Act. Besides, in 2006, the SEC required companies to identify and describe 
the role of all consultants who provided advice on executive compensation, and to disclose whether the 
consultants are engaged directly by the compensation committee rather than by management. Besides, in 2009, 
the SEC expanded its disclosure rules by requiring firms that purchase more than $120,000 in other services 
from their executive-pay consultants to disclose fees paid for both compensation consulting and other services. 
Under the new regulations, firms could avoid such disclosures if the board retained its own compensation 
consultant and if that consultant provided no other services. See Kevin J. Murphy, The Politics of Pay: A 
Legislative History of Executive Compensation, at 7-8 (Marshall Research Paper Series Working Paper FBE 
01.11, August 24, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1916358. 
55 SEC, Final Rule: Listing Standards For Compensation Committees, at 39, available at  
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2012/33-9330.pdf. 
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context, the compensation consultant issues a professional opinion supporting the plan 
which hurts the interests of shareholders because it has been bribed by the executives 
or it has done the job in a negligent manner. Therefore, it is also necessary to “expose 
gatekeepers to a higher threat of litigation,”56 which will “logically make them more 
attentive to the interests of investors.”57 “If the gatekeeper is subject to effective 
litigation remedies, then, even in the absence of significant reputational capital, the 
gatekeeper will face losses exceeding the expected gains from involvement in fraud. 
Because the gatekeeper is inherently an agent of its principal, its expected fee or 
commission is likely to be far less than the gain that the principal itself expects to 
make from the transaction. As a result, because the gatekeeper/agent expects less 
profit than its principal does, it can be more easily deterred than its principal.”58 
Under Section 11 of 1933 Securities Act in the US, the gatekeeper has a due diligence 
based defenses. It may escape liabilities by showing that, after reasonable 
investigation, it had reasonable grounds to believe that the materially misleading 
statements are in fact true. 
As a matter of practice, “in applying due diligence-related standards, courts and 
regulators inevitably err in specifying the optimal level of gatekeeper monitoring and, 
more importantly, in adjudicating disputes about whether gatekeepers engaged in 
adequate monitoring. These errors are magnified when the gatekeeper activity is 
complex (as it increasingly is, given rapidly evolving financial technologies) and 
when the law is ambiguous (as it increasingly is, given the dearth of reported and 
relevant gatekeeper cases),”59 thus due diligence based defenses creating “incentives 
for them to engage in costly activities they otherwise might avoid.”60 
So both Coffee
61
 and Partnoy
62
 suggest that gatekeepers shall be strictly liable for 
any securities fraud damages paid by the issuer and not have any due diligence based 
defenses for securities fraud. According to Coffee’s point of view, strict liability has 
three advantages: “1. Strict liability gives the gatekeeper greater incentive to take 
precautions and exercise due diligence; 2. Strict liability induces the gatekeeper to limit 
its level of activity, for example, by rejecting overly risky corporations as clients; and 3. 
Strict liability spares both courts and regulators the need to descend into the Serbonian 
                                                          
56 Coffee, supra note 12, at 334.  
57 Id.  
58 Id. at 5. 
59 Partnoy, supra note 15, at 512.  
60 Id. at 492-493.  
61 John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. 
L. Rev. 301, 346-352 (2004). 
62 Partnoy, supra note 15, at 492. 
Chapter Four  Enhancing Supervision by Compensation Consultants 
 
95 
bog of defining precise standards of care, thereby reducing transaction costs and 
increasing predictability.” 63 But the gatekeeper’s liabilities shall be limited to a 
percentage on the scope of its liabilities for the issuer’s damages64 or the amount 
based on the revenues it received from the issuer
65
 in order not to cause too much 
deterrence, for example, the compensation consultant may charge too much fee. But 
one serious problem of the latter method is that it measures “only private costs to 
gatekeepers, not social costs, and therefore would either under-deter or over-deter, 
depending on the relationship between gatekeeper revenues and overall shareholder 
damages.”66 
IV. Law and Rules, Practice, Problems of Compensation 
Consultants in China and Suggestions on How to Improve Them 
A. Law and rules and practice of compensation consultants in China 
According to Article 32 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans, when the 
compensation committee believes it necessary, it may request the company to hire a 
compensation consultant (independent financial consultant) to provide professional 
opinion on the feasibility of the stock option plan, whether it is conducive to the 
sustained development of the listed company, whether it will impair the interests of 
the listed company, and its affect to the shareholders’ interests. Obviously, the 
compensation committee has the discretion to hire a compensation consultant or not. 
By contrast, the company shall retain an attorney to issue legal opinions to its stock 
option plan. In China, the primary role of a compensation consultant is to legitimize 
the board and the compensation committee’s decision. If the stock option plan is 
checked and scrutinized by a compensation consultant, the board and the 
compensation committee can claim that they have already fulfilled their duties, as a 
result, they need not to be worried about being criticized, blamed or even sued by 
shareholders. It is not common for a compensation consultant to help the board and 
the compensation committee to make the stock option plan.  
In practice, the company often hires a investment consulting company or a 
securities company to issue professional opinions on the stock option plan. Generally 
                                                          
63 Coffee, supra note 61, at 346-347. 
64 Partnoy, supra note 15, at 492. 
65 Coffee, supra note 61, at 350 (“The one mandatory element in this proposal would be a minimum floor on the 
gatekeeper’s insurance policy that would have to equal some adequate multiple of the highest annual revenues 
received by the gatekeeper from its client over the last several years.”). 
66 Partnoy, supra note 14, at 371. 
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speaking, the report of a compensation consultant has following parts and contents:  
Part 1. Definitions. Defining and explaining some legal and professional 
terminologies in the stock option plan. 
Part 2. Statements. The compensation consultant discloses the sources of the 
materials and documents that its opinions based on, how it performs its duty, and the 
conditions exempting its legal liabilities.
67
 
Part 3. Basic assumptions. Such as the laws and regulations will not be greatly 
changed, the materials and documents provided by the company are accurate and 
complete and so on. 
Part 4. The excerpts of the draft of the stock option plan. 
Part 5. Professional opinions concerning the ten items of Article 32 of the Measures 
for Equity Incentive Plans. 
Part 6. Contact information. 
B. The problems of compensation consultants in law and rules and practice in 
China 
1. The power of the compensation committee is quite limited 
According to Article 32 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans, when the 
compensation committee believes it necessary, it may ask the company to retain a 
compensation consultant. There are existing two problems in this requirement: (1) 
Generally, executives or those who under the control of executives act for the 
company to hire a compensation consultant. As a result, the compensation consultant 
will consider itself to be hired by executives not the company or the compensation 
committee. Therefore, it will not be against the executives’ will,68 even though from 
its professional perspective, the stock option plan is not reasonable, thus not good for 
shareholders. (2) Whether the compensation committee can supervise and fire the 
compensation consultant is unclear. If the power of supervising and firing the 
compensation consultant it at the hands of executives, it is highly possible that the 
compensation consultant will surrender itself to executives in order to keep its job.  
2. The standard of independence or no-independence of a compensation consultant 
is not established 
Though the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans requires the company to hire a 
                                                          
67 The compensation consultant declaims that its professional opinion cannot be seen as a recommendation for 
the investors. It will not take any responsibility for the losses the investors incur.  
68 Tong Lie Chun & Zhang Na, Concerning the Listed Company Executive Pay Legal Regulation, 11 Public 
Administration & Law 97, 98 (2011). 
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independent compensation consultant. But the standard of independence or 
no-independence of a compensation consultant is not established. Besides, the 
company does not need to disclose information about the compensation consultant, so 
even the compensation consultant is not independent, the outsiders cannot know. By 
contrast, other regulations have made some requirements of the independence of other 
gatekeepers.
69
 
3. The civil liabilities mechanism on compensation consultants is not workable   
According to Article 5 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans, when a 
compensation consultant performs its duty, it shall be honest and in good faith, 
diligent, and ensure that the documents it issues are truthful, accurate, and complete.  
But, suppose that the documents it issues are not truthful, accurate, and complete, the 
means to impose civil liabilities on it is not very efficient. According to the Securities 
Law, a gatekeeper in China also has due diligence based defenses for securities 
fraud.
70
 As for the scope of liability, if a gatekeeper who knows or ought to know the 
issuer’s or listed company’s false statement, but does not correct it or issue reserved 
opinions, its behavior shall constitute a joint tort, and it shall bear joint liabilities for 
                                                          
69 Article 11 of the Measures for the Administration of the Provision of Securities Legal Services by Law Firms 
(promulgated by the CSRC and Ministry of Justice, effective May 1, 2005) provides, “a same law firm shall 
not simultaneously issue legal opinions for both the issuer and the recommender or the securities underwriting 
company for a same securities issuance, and shall not simultaneously issue legal opinions for the acquirer and 
the listed company being acquired in a same acquisition initiative, nor may it simultaneously issue legal 
opinions for different clients that have a conflict of interests in a same securities business. In case a lawyer acts 
as the director, supervisor or senior manager of a company or a related party thereof, or is under the 
circumstance that will affect her independence, her law firm shall not accept the entrustment of the said 
company or provide securities legal services for it.”Article 17 of the Administrative Measures for the Financial 
Consultancy Business in the Merger, Acquisition and Reorganization of Listed Companies (promulgated by the 
CSRC, effective Aug. 4, 2008) provides, “where a securities company, securities investment consulting agency 
or any other FCA (“financial consultancy agencies”) is hired to act as an independent financial consultant of a 
listed company, it shall keep its independence, and shall not be an interested party to the listed company. In any 
of the following circumstances, it shall not act as an independent FCA: 1. It holds alone, or holds jointly with 
others through an agreement or any other arrangement, 5% or more of the shares of the listed company, or 
appoints a delegate to act as a director of the listed company; 2. The listed company holds alone, or holds 
jointly with others through an agreement or any other arrangement, 5% or more of the shares of the FCA, or 
appoints a delegate to act as a director of the FCA; 3.The FCA has had a relationship of authorized asset 
management or provided any mutual guaranty with the listed company during the recent 2 years, or has offered 
financing services to the listed company during the recent 1 year; 4. Any director, supervisor, senior manager, 
signatory or his lineal relative of the FCA assumes a post in the listed company, etc., which may affect the 
impartiality of his performance of duties; 5. It provides financial consultancy service to the opposite party of 
the listed company during the merger, acquisition or reorganization; and 6. Other circumstances in which it is 
an interested party to the listed company, which may affect the independence of the FCA and its signatories. ”  
70 Article 173 of the Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China (2005) (promulgated by the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress, effective Jan. 1, 2006) provides, “where a securities trading 
service institution (including: investment consulting institution, financial advising institution, credit rating 
institution, asset appraisal institution, or accounting firm) formulates and issues any auditing report, asset 
appraisal report, financial advising report, credit rating report or legal opinions for the issuance, listing and 
trading of securities, it shall be assiduous and dutiful by carrying out examination and verification for the 
authenticity, accuracy and integrity of the contents of the documents applied as the base. In the case of any 
false record, misleading statement or major omission in the documents it has formulated or issued, which 
incurs any loss to any other person, the relevant securities trading service institution shall bear several and joint 
liabilities together with the relevant issuer and listed company, unless a securities trading service institution has 
the ability to prove its faultlessness.”  
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the losses caused to the investors.
71
 Otherwise, it shall only bear the liabilities for 
compensation for the part that it is liable.
72
 Here the “false statement”, according the 
explanation of the supreme court, refer to “any of the behaviors of the obligor for 
information disclosure in violation of the securities laws, such as making false records 
on major events by violating the true facts, making misleading statement, having 
major omissions when disclosing the information or disclosing information 
inappropriately during the issuance or transaction of securities.”73 Concerning the 
civil liabilities on compensation consultants, there are existing two problems: (1) The 
due diligence based defenses may consume much time and energy for the courts, 
plaintiffs and defendants to determine whether compensation consultants have already 
fulfilled their duties or not; (2) Several and joint liability may put too much deterrence 
on compensation consultants. 
C. Some suggestions on improving compensation consultants in China 
1.Granting the compensation committee the exclusive power to hire, compensation, 
supervise and fire its own compensation consultant 
In chapter one, I have already pointed out that the compensation committee having 
limited power is the very reason that it cannot successfully play its role. So, granting 
the compensation committee the exclusive power to hire, compensation, supervise and 
fire its own compensation consultant can expand the role of the compensation 
committee and make it serve the interests of shareholders better. The reasons are: (1) 
                                                          
71 Article 27 of the Some Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Trying Cases of Civil Compensation 
Arising from False Statement in Securities Market (promulgated by Supreme People’s Court, effective Feb. 1, 
2003, hereinafter “Some Provisions on Trying Cases of Civil Compensation Arising from False Statement”). 
Also see Article 5 of the Several Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Trial of Compensation Cases 
for Civil Tort Involving Accounting Firms Engaging in the Audit Business (promulgated by Supreme People’s 
Court, effective June 15, 2007, hereinafter “Several Provisions on the Trial of Compensation Cases for Civil 
Tort Involving Accounting Firms Engaging in the Audit Business” ) (“Where a certified public accountant 
engaging in audit business is under any of the circumstances, if she issues a false report which results in losses 
to the interested party, it shall be determined that the accounting firm and audited entity shall bear several and 
joint liabilities for the compensation. (1) It maliciously colludes with the audited entity; (2) Although knowing 
that the accounting treatment made by the audited entity regarding any important matter is contrary to the 
relevant provisions of the state, it fails to give a clear indication as such; (3) Although knowing that the 
accounting treatment made by the audited entity will directly impair the interests of the interested party, it 
conceals it or makes a false report; (4) Although knowing that accounting treatment made by the audited entity 
will lead to misunderstanding by the interested party, it fails to give a clear indication as such; (5) Although 
knowing that the important items of any financial statement of the audited entity contain any false content, it 
fails to give a clear indication as such; (6) It does not refuse the audited entity’s hint of making a false report. If 
the audited entity commits any of the acts as described in Items (2) through (5) of the preceding Paragraph, if 
the certified public account should know it under the practicing guidelines and rules, the people’s court shall 
regard him as in the knowledge.”). 
72 Article 24 of the “Some Provisions on Trying Cases of Civil Compensation Arising from False Statement”. 
Also see article 6 of the “Several Provisions on the Trial of Compensation Cases for Civil Tort Involving 
Accounting Firms Engaging in the Audit Business”.  
73 Article 17 of the “Some Provisions on Trying Cases of Civil Compensation Arising from False Statement”. 
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This strategy can efficiently reduce the executives’ influence on the compensation 
consultant, because its livelihood is at the hand of the compensation committee now. 
So, the compensation consultant will consider the interests of shareholders at the first 
place. As a result, the repeat-business problem will also be resolved at the same time; 
(2) This strategy can reduce the executives’ influence on the board and the 
independent directors in the compensation committee. Since the compensation 
consultant will give objective and fair opinions on the stock option plan, suppose that 
the plan favors executives too much, thus hurting the interest of shareholders, it will 
surely be objected or suggested to be amended by the compensation consultant. 
Considering this point, the board and compensation committee will reconsider their 
compensation decision, which, in my point of view, will reduce the influence of the 
executives on the board and the independent directors compensation committee. 
Surely, a listed company may simply not hire a compensation consultant to issue  
professional opinions, but how it justifies its compensation decision will be a difficult 
task.  
2. Establishing the non-independence standard of a compensation consultant and 
prohibiting the non-independent compensation consultant from providing opinions on 
the stock option plan 
If a compensation consultant cannot keep its real independence, it is impossible for 
it to issue objective and fair opinions. So, the compensation consultant who face 
conflicts of interest shall be prohibited from issuing opinions on the stock option plan. 
Based on the new provisions of Dodd-Frank Act and Article17 of the Administrative 
Measures for the Financial Consultancy Business in the Merger, Acquisition and 
Reorganization of Listed Companies, this chapter suggests that in any of the 
following circumstances, a compensation consultant shall not regard as independent, 
as a result, it cannot issue professional opinions on the stock option plan: (1) It has 
helped the board and the compensation committee make the stock option plan; (2) It 
has provided other services to the company, such as M&A consultancy service, 
employee pension plan consultancy service, financial consultancy service, securities 
sale service (“sale by proxy” or “exclusive sale”) and so on;74 (3) Any director, 
supervisor, senior manager, undertaker or her lineal relative of it is also the eligible 
participant
75
 in the stock option plan; (4) Any director, supervisor, senior manager or 
                                                          
74 Under circumstance (1) and (2), it is highly possible that cross-selling problem can cripple the independence of 
a compensation consultant.  
75 Here, “the eligible participant” refers to anyone who is granted stock options according to the stock option plan, 
such as executive or employee. 
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undertaker of it has close business relationship with the executives, for example, both 
of them are general partners in the same LP partnership;
76
 (5) It holds alone, or holds 
jointly with others through an agreement or any other arrangement, 5% or more of the 
shares of the listed company, or appoints a delegate to act as a director of the listed 
company;
77
 (6) The listed company holds alone, or holds jointly with others through 
an agreement or any other arrangement, 5% or more of the shares of it, or appoints a 
delegate to act as a director of it;
78
 (7) Other circumstances which may affect the 
independence of it and its undertakers.  
In my opinion, since the Chinese compensation consultants face more cruel 
competition and less possibilities of shame sanctions and litigation than their foreign 
counterparts, so it is better to ban the compensation consultants who are not 
independent from issuing professional opinions on the stock option plans at present 
time. This requirement will not bring much costs to the company due to less choices 
for it, because many compensation consultants are still available in the market. Even 
if the company does incur some costs, it is still good for it. Because “the costs of 
ensuring real independence are a tiny fraction of the aggregate compensation being 
paid out. This seemingly obvious approach can help guard against situations in which 
too much money is paid for nonperformance.”79 Besides, the company shall disclose 
the identity of the compensation consultant and assures that the compensation 
consultant is really independent and without aforementioned circumstances. 
3. Imposing more efficient civil liabilities on compensation consultants ex post 
Imposing more efficient civil liabilities on compensation consultants ex post will 
make them more attentive to the interests of shareholders. But, in China, shareholders 
have never sued the compensation consultants for issuing false opinions to date. One 
reason maybe that the compensation consultants have successfully fulfilled their 
duties. So there is no need for shareholders to impose civil liabilities on them. But, if 
the reason is that it is difficult for the shareholders to sue the compensation 
consultants because it costs too much time and energy on arguing the standards of 
care for them, thus something shall be done to change this situation. So I suggest that 
we may follow Coffee and Partnoy’s advice to impose strict liabilities on the 
                                                          
76 Under circumstance (3) and (4), it is also highly possible that the independence of a compensation consultant 
may be crippled. 
77 Under such circumstance, because a compensation consultant has a major stake in the company, its 
independence will be affected. Besides, it may collude with the executives to hurt the interests of other 
shareholders.  
78 Under such circumstance, the executives of the listed company may have a huge influence on the 
compensation consultant, which may also cripple the latter’s independence.  
79 Symposium, Current Issues in Executive Compensation, 3 NYU J. L. & BUS. 519, 528 (2007). 
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compensation consultants; meanwhile, their liabilities shall be limited to some 
percentage of the amount that the company has to compensate the victims. Frankly 
speaking, comparing to aforementioned suggestions, this suggestion is not so urgent 
that needs to be adopted now and maybe controversial and objected by others. Here, 
my purpose is only to offer another choice for the rule-makers and shareholders when 
they are not satisfied with the current civil liabilities mechanism on the compensation 
consultants. 
V. Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the roles that a compensation consultant can play in 
addressing some agency problems of executive stock option compensation. In the US 
and UK, a compensation consultant can: provide professional advice and assistance to 
independent directors in the compensation committee; legitimize the compensation 
committee’s decisions; and, serve as a intermediary between shareholders and the 
company. In China, the primary role of a compensation consultant is to legitimize the 
board and the compensation committee’s decision. When facing conflicts of interest, 
such as providing other services to the company or continuing business relationship 
with the company, a compensation consultant may surrender itself to executives. It is 
also confirmed by foreign empirical studies.  
The conflicts of interest problems also cripple the Chinese compensation 
consultants, so this chapter suggests that: first, the compensation committee shall have 
the exclusive power to hire, compensation, supervise and fire its own compensation 
consultant; second, the non-independence standard of a compensation consultant shall 
be established and the non-independent compensation consultant shall be prohibited 
from providing professional opinions on the stock option plan; and third, strict 
liabilities shall be imposed on the compensation consultants; meanwhile, their 
liabilities shall be limited to some percentage of the amount that the company has to 
compensate the victims. 
Chapter Five  Ex Ante Strategy of Enhancing Supervision by Public Authorities 
 
102 
Chapter Five  Ex Ante Strategy of Enhancing 
Supervision by Public Authorities: The CSRC Shall Make 
“Comply or Explain” Rules 
I. Introduction 
This chapter discusses how the vital role of the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), which is akin to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in the US,
1
 can play in addressing some specific agency problems of executive 
stock option compensation. In the chapter of introduction, I have pointed out three 
agency problems of executive stock option compensation: 1. Stock option 
compensation may induce executives to time information disclosure to maximize their 
personal profits; 2. Stock option compensation may wrongly encourage executives to 
pursue short-term profits at the costs of shareholders’ long-term interests; and 3. 
Stock option compensation may bring windfalls to executives. The deep root of these 
agency problems lies in the “enormous discretion managers have over most aspects of 
corporate business, coupled with traditional deference from boards,”2 or according to 
Bebchuk and Fried’s famous remark, the “managers’ power”.3 Because executives 
can actually decide when and what to disclose, especially they can disclose 
voluntarily earlier than they are required by securities law and rules; executives also 
have huge influence on whether to invest in risky ventures or reduce R&D 
investments, which has fatal relevance to the company’s long-term development; or 
executives can influence the board and the compensation committee not to filter out 
windfalls in their stock option compensation. So the task faced by shareholders, 
rule-makers, and scholars is how to grant enough power to executives to encourage 
them to maximize shareholders’ interests, at the same time, to prohibit them from 
abusing their power and influence. This “trade-off” job needs intelligence, knowledge, 
experience and some luck and is difficult to finish . 
                                                          
1 In China, banking and trust industries are regulated by the China Banking Regulatory Commission ( CBRC); 
while insurance industry is regulated by the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC). 
2  Charles M. Yablon & Jennifer Hill, Timing Corporate Disclosures to Maximize Performance-Based 
Remuneration, a Case of Misaligned Incentives? 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 83, 117 (2000). 
3 Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
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I have already made some suggestions on how to address the managers’ power 
problem in other chapters, such as expanding the role of compensation committee and 
its independent directors, improving the disclosure of executive stock option 
compensation, enhancing supervision by compensation consultants and so on. Besides, 
the CSRC can also play a very critical role in resolving the managers’ power problem 
by means of regulating the substantial terms of stock option plans, which may take 
way or, at least, restrict the executives’ influence. In fact, the CSRC has already done 
so.
4
 
But, the approach which the CSRC adopts to address the managers’ power problem 
is to make totally mandatory rules (too powerful) or totally default rules (too weak), 
there are no other alternatives lying between the two extremes. However, under some 
circumstances, this approach has its own weak points. 
The problem of mandatory rules is over-inclusiveness
5
 or under-inclusiveness. For 
example, Article 12 (1) of the Measure for Equity Incentive Plans provides that the 
aggregate target stocks
6
 involved in all the effective equity incentive plans shall not 
exceed 10% of the total equity of the company accumulatively. But under some 
circumstance, the company may have to grant more than 10% of the total equity to 
realize its goal to retain or attract needed talents. So, as a result, the 10% limit is 
over-inclusiveness.
7
 With regard to the under-inclusiveness problem, Article 27 of the 
Measure for Equity Incentive Plans provides that the eligible participants
8
 shall 
exercise their rights at the second trading day after the announcement of the regular 
report of a listed company, and within 10 trading days before the announcement of the 
next regular report, but shall not exercise power during the following periods: 1. 2 
                                                          
4 The Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentive Plans of Listed Companies (For Trial Implementation) 
(promulgated by the SCRC, effective Jan. 1, 2006, hereinafter Measures for Equity Incentive Plans), Memo No. 
1, No.2 and No. 3 on the matters of Equity Incentive (promulgated by the SCRC, effective respectively Mar. 17, 
Mar. 17 and Sept. 16, 2008, hereinafter respectively the Memo No.1, Memo No.2 and Memo No.3) and other 
regulations promulgated by the CSRC aim at assuring that the stock option plan is “conducive to the sustained 
development of the listed company and shall not impair the interests of the listed company.” 
5 David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 435, 470 
(2010) (“One-size-fits-all regulation inevitably involves some over-inclusiveness, and firms have little choice 
but to comply with compulsory regulation.”). 
6 Here , “target stocks” means the stocks of a listed company, granted to or purchased by the eligible participants 
pursuant to the equity incentive plan (article 51 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans). 
7 Mark A. Clawson and Thomas C. Klein, Indexed Stock Options: A Proposal for Compensation Commensurate 
with Performance, 3 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 31, 39 (1997) (“The number of shares of stock subject to the 
options-and the percentage of the company these options represent for key executives-depends upon a number 
of factors. These factors include the maturity of the company, … the stage of development of the company’s 
products, the cohesiveness of the company’s management team, the nature and extent of the competition for the 
company’s products, and the competition for the prospective executive and the resulting negotiations that take 
place over his compensation package.”). 
8 Here, the “eligible participants” means those who are granted stock options according to the stock option plan, 
such as executives and employees. 
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trading days during the determination of a major transaction or a great event until 
after the matter is announced; and 2. 2 trading days from the day when any other great 
event that may affect the stock price occurs until after it is announced. But executives 
can still increase their wealth through disclosing the news that can boost stock price 
shortly before they exercise their rights even though they can only exercise their 
rights 2 days after the disclosure. Because comparing with disclosing the news after 
they exercise their rights, disclosing such news shortly before they exercise their 
rights can surely raise the stock price, thus increasing the difference between the stock 
price and the strike price. Counter to the objectives of the rule-makers, the 
“one-size-fits-all” approach may not protect but hurt the interests of shareholders. 
Because a company cannot tailor the terms in stock option plan based on its own 
conditions and needs.  
The problem of totally default rules is that such rules cannot realize the objectives 
of the rule-makers, in other words, they are too weak. For example, Article 5 of the 
Memo No.2 provides that companies are encouraged to use market index, component 
stocks index or an index of related companies when they design the conditions for 
executives to exercise their rights, which aims at filtering out windfalls in executive 
stock option compensation. But, in practice, few companies use such indexed stock 
option compensation.  
In short, “it is highly unlikely that the same design option design will be efficient in 
all cases. The incentives created by options depend on a variety of grantee-specific 
factors, including the executive’s portfolio and risk preference. At the same time, a 
variety of firm-specific factors, such as growth opportunities and debt load, determine 
which incentives will be desirable. Besides differing from firm to firm, these factors 
may vary within a single firm over time.”9 So, the CSRC is highly suggested in this 
chapter to make “comply or explain” rules to regulate some substantial terms of stock 
option plans. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Part II introduces some key characteristics and 
functions of “comply and explain” approach and suggests that the CSRC regulate the 
substantial terms of stock option plans through this approach. Part III discusses how 
to address the timing problem of executive stock option compensation through 
“comply and explain” approach. Part IV discusses how to address the short-termism 
problem of executive stock option compensation through “comply and explain” 
                                                          
9 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 3, at 160. 
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approach. Part V discusses how to address the windfalls problem of executive stock 
option compensation through “comply and explain” approach. Part VI offers a short 
conclusion.  
II. The CSRC Shall Make “Comply or Explain” Rules 
As aforementioned, the “one-size-fits-all” approach may not protect but hurt the 
interests of shareholders, meanwhile, totally default rules are too weak. So this 
chapter suggests that the CSRC
10
 shall adopt a “comply or explain” approach to 
regulate some substantial terms of stock option plans aiming at reducing the 
executives’ power and influence. At least, the CSRC shall make “comply or explain” 
rules (as suggested by this chapter) to resolve the timing, short-termism, and windfalls 
problems of executive stock option compensation.
11
 In China, this approach has been 
                                                          
10 The reasons why I suggest the CSRC to make the “comply or explain” rules rather than others (e.g. the 
people’s congress or a stock exchange. It is not a tradition in China that other market agencies except the stock 
exchange provide the best practice or recommendations etc. on corporate governance for listed companies) are: 
1. The rules regulating stock option plans are made by the CSRC, so it is appropriate for the CSRC to make 
“comply or explain” rules on the matters of stock option plans, and if it is necessary, the CSRC is able to act 
quickly to amend or cancel the rules too. Besides, the Code of Corporate Governance of Listed Companies in 
China was promulgated by the CSRC (effective Jan. 7, 2002), since stock option compensation is a matter of 
corporate governance, logically, the CSRC shall be granted the power to make “comply or explain” rules on 
executive stock option compensation. Even if the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2005 
Revision) (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, effective Jan. 1, 2006, 
hereinafter Company Law) adopted the “comply or explain” approach, it is highly possible that the CSRC 
would be granted the power to make the specifical rules, so from a practical standpoint, why not directly 
granting it this power at the beginning. 2. In China, it will take long time for the national people’s congress to 
amend the Company Law if it wants to adopt the “comply or explain” approach; let alone it is not sure whether 
the people’s congress would like to adopt this approach or not in the Company Law. For instance, no Articles 
of the Company Law have been amended, canceled or added since the law was amended in 2005 though some 
Articles have generated hot controversies in practice and some new problems are needed to be addressed in the 
Company Law. And, if we adopted the “comply or explain” approach in the Company Law and found it was 
not useful in China, it will be difficult to change. Besides, there are lots of laws needed to be made or amended 
on people’s congress’s schedule, obviously, the Company Law is not one of them (at least in the next 5 years). 
So it is not workable to adopt “comply or explain” approach in the Company Law currently. 3. In theory, a 
stock exchange is a good substitute for the CSRC to make “comply or explain” rules in its listing standard or 
guidelines, but the difficulty faced by a stock exchange is that it lacks of the power to regulate the substantial 
matters of a listed company. According to Article 102 (1) of the Securities Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (2005) (promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, effective Jan. 1, 
2006, hereinafter Securities Law), a stock exchange “refers to a legal person that provides the relevant place 
and facilities for concentrated securities trading, organizes and supervises the securities trading....” Specifically, 
it shall announce up-to-the-minute quotations of securities trading (Article 113 of the Securities Law), may 
take the measures of a technical suspension of trading or decide a temporary speed bump (Article 114 of the 
Securities Law) or it shall supervise and urge listed companies to disclose information in a timely and accurate 
manner according to law (Article 115 of the Securities Law) and so on. In all, the function of a stock exchange 
is to organize and supervise the securities trading not to regulate the substantial matters of a listed company. So, 
if a stock exchange makes the “comply or explain” rules, its authority and the legitimacy of these rules may be 
challenged by listed companies. But, arguably, stock exchanges in China did make some guidelines on the 
substantial matters of a listed company. For example, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) made the 
Guidelines for Behavior of Directors of Companies Listed on the Small and Medium Enterprise Board of the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2005 to regulate the behaviors of directors (including independent directors). But, 
from the perspective of legitimacy, requiring the CSRC to make the “comply or explain” rules will definitely 
bring no objections.  
11 As for the information disclosure rules, the format and content of information disclosure is mandatory 
according to securities law and regulations. Maybe, it is efficient to do so. Because it saves the costs for the 
players in the capital market to compare the different disclosed content in different format. As for the 
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never adopted in laws or regulations; therefore, it has not been paid enough attention 
by Chinese law scholars.
12
 Thus, whether this approach can offer the rule-makers 
another good choice and be successfully adopted in China or not is uncertain. But, 
from the successful experience of the UK and other countries that adopt this approach, 
the “comply or explain” approach can “do improve corporate governance.”13 This 
approach is “strongly supported by both companies and shareholders and has been 
widely admired and imitated internationally”14 So, it is a beneficial attempt for China 
to adopt this approach based on the same needs of the listed companies and the goals 
of corporate governance.
15
 And the stock option plan maybe a appropriate 
touchstone. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
procedure of shareholders meeting, it is also mandatory in China (See The Rules for the Shareholders’ Meeting 
of Listed Companies (promulgated by the CSRC, effective Mar. 16, in 2006). It may not be so necessary for 
companies to design their own procedures of shareholders meeting. I cannot dig this problem deeply in this 
chapter. But the interesting problem is what kind of rules shall be designed as totally mandatory rules, some 
shall be designed as totally default rules, while other shall be designed as rules between the two extremes, for 
example “comply or explain” rules or rules that “automatically applied if not opted out by shareholders”. The 
basic logic maybe whether these rules involve a third party and whether the private parties can negotiate these 
rules in less costs. 
12 I only found one article written by Prof. Wu Jian, who seriously discussed this approach in China, see Wu Jian, 
Principle of “Comply or Explain” in the Enforcement of Corporate Governance Code, Vol. 10, No.1, Journal 
of Beijing University of Technology (Social Science Edition) 46 (2010). 
13 Jan Andersson, Evolution of Company Law, Corporate Governance Codes and the Principle of Comply or 
Explain – A Critical Review, at 100 (Nordic & European Company Law Working Paper No. 10-19, June 22, 
2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1869916.  
14 Financial Reporting Council (FRC), The UK Corporate Governance Code (September 2012) (UK CGC), at 4. 
15 I believe it is possible that the “comply or explain” approach will be successful in China. The reasons are: 1. 
Most Chinese scholars believe that the capital market in China is a weak-form efficiency market, which means 
the market can evaluate the information disclosed by companies (though not fast), see Zhang Bing & Li Xiao 
Ming, An Evolving Market Efficiency Test On Chinese Stock Market , No.1 Economic Research Journal 54, 61 
(2003). So, in theory, the market can evaluate the unjustified explanations disclosed by companies and react to 
these unjustified explanations. Besides, the media can play a very important role in monitoring corporate 
governance violation and protecting minority shareholders (which I have argued in chapter two), thus 
supervising companies to disclose detailed and justified explanations. Even stock exchanges could publicly 
censure those companies which do not disclose detailed explanations. 2. By the end of 2010, the institutional 
shareholders owned about 51.535% of all shares listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. So 
they can and have the incentives to involve in corporate governance of the companies which they invest in. 
Quite a few empirical studies have already confirmed the positive value that the institutional shareholders can 
bring to the companies by the means of involving in the corporate governance, such as supporting or objecting 
the reorganization of companies or M&As. See Li Wei An & Li Bin, An Empirical Study on the Effect of 
Institutional Investors Participating in Corporate Governance: Based on the Data of 2004-2006 
CCGINK,Vol.11 No. 1 Nankai Business Review 4, 12-13 (2008) (They found that “institutional investors have 
played an important role in promoting the level of listed companies corporate governance, and then reduces the 
agency cost with the improving of corporate governance quality in China. Meanwhile, there is a significantly 
positive correlation relation between institutional investor’s shareholding ratio of listed companies and 
corporate performance or market value.”). So, the institutional shareholders can and have incentives to evaluate 
the explanations disclosed by companies. However, if the matters are not important, the institutional 
shareholders may not involve in from a cost-and-benefit perspective. In the case of executive stock option 
compensation, I am not sure whether the matter of stock option compensation will be as important as the 
reorganization of companies or M&As that the institutional shareholders would like to evaluate the stock 
option plan and the explanations on it. 3. With regard to the substantial matters of companies, as a rule of 
thumb, it is better to let companies make their own decisions. From the perspective of comparative law, the 
“comply or explain” approach, in general, is successful in European countries, where concentrated ownership 
is also prevailing. 4. Companies do not provide sufficient reasons why they do not comply with the rules is a 
crucial factor that hurts the efficiency of “comply or explain” approach, so I suggest that if we adopt such 
approach, companies shall provide detailed reasons to explain why they do not comply with the rules. What 
can be regarded as “detailed reasons” is difficult to define now. But, after we have enough experience, the 
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The “comply or explain” approach is “the trademark of corporate governance in the 
UK”16 and has been transplanted to the EU countries as well as the EEA-countries.17 
Under this approach, the company shall comply with the code and the rules therein, or 
explain why the company depart from them, specifically, the company shall: 
“illustrate how its actual practices are consistent with the principle to which the 
particular provision relates, contribute to good governance and promote delivery of 
business objectives. It should set out the background, provide a clear rationale for the 
action it is taking, and describe any mitigating actions taken to address any additional 
risk and maintain conformity with the relevant principle.”18 The main premise of this 
approach is that “it is not appropriate to impose a strict and rigid regulation common 
to all, companies should choose the structure that best suits them.”19 In general, the 
companies will comply with the rules, because “the code (at least in the United 
Kingdom) represents the view of institutional investors as to best practice.”20 If  
companies do not comply and do not provide justified reasons either, shareholders 
and the capital market will lower their valuation of them. “Bad 
explanations-explanations assessed by investors as having a negative effect on the 
expected return on their investment-will be penalized by a reduction in the stock 
price.”21 In short, for the sake of simplification, the “comply and explain” approach 
could realize the objectives of the rule-makers, at the same time, it also can provide 
                                                                                                                                                                      
CSRC may make some formats to guide companies to make their explanations so as to make it easy for the 
market to evaluate the explanations. In short, I think it is worthwhile for us to adopt this approach, though I 
cannot be sure that it will be successful in China. Anyway, if we do not adopt this approach, how can we know 
whether this approach can be successful or not in China? 
16 FRC, supra note 14, at 4.  
17 Andersson, supra note 13, at 92 (“Today the principle of comply or explain is – more or less – mandatory in 
the Member States of EU as well as in the EEA-countries.”) Some US scholar also supports this approach. See 
Janice Kay McClendon, Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive Compensation to Realign 
Management and Shareholders’ Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, Wake Forest L. 
Rev. 971, 1013 (2004) (“To accommodate various corporate structures, however, listed companies should 
generally be given the option of either complying with the additional standards or sufficiently explaining non- 
compliance.”). 
18 FRC, supra note 14, at 4. But see Andersson, supra note 13, at 92. (The company shall: (1) report every 
deviation; (2) describe the alternative solution; and (3) explain the reasons why the alternative solution chosen 
by the company is superior to the solution preferred in the code.”). 
19 Siddhartha Arcot et al., Corporate Governance in the UK: Is the Comply-or-Explain Approach Working? 30 
International Review of Law and Economics 193, 194 (2010); Wu, supra note 12, at 47 (“Under this approach, 
the company itself can opt out some rules according to its unique conditions. Since only the company itself 
knows its needs and preference best, the governance rules made by it are usually more efficient than the 
mandatory rules.”); and Dr. Marc T. Moore, The End of “Comply or Explain” in UK Corporate Governance?, 
60 N. Ir. Legal Q. 85 (2009) (“In theory, this novel regulatory technique permits a company to opt out, in effect, 
from any one or more requirements of the Code that its board considers to be cost-ineffective or otherwise 
inappropriate for that company’s specific circumstances.”). 
20 Iain MacNeil & Xiao Li, “Comply or Explain”: Market Discipline and Non-Compliance with the Combined 
Code, Vol.14 Corporate Governance 486, 487(2006). 
21 Annaleen Steeno, Note: Corporate Governance: Economic Analysis of a “Comply or Explain” Approach , 11 
Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 387, 397 (2006). 
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flexibility to companies, as a result, they need not adopt a “one-size-fits-all” model, at 
the same time, they cannot directly avoid applying the default rules. 
With regard to China, my suggestion is: based on the successful experience of other 
developed countries, the CSRC shall make rules that can protect the interests of 
shareholders (at least, from its own perspective) and require the listed companies to 
comply with those rules. At the same time, companies are allowed not to comply with 
those rules under some circumstances, but they shall explain and disclose the reasons 
why they do so in detail based on their own conditions. Only with detailed 
explanations can shareholders know whether their interests are protected and whether 
to support companies’ explanations or not.22 Besides, the media and stock exchanges 
can also supervise whether the company provide justified explanations or not. 
III. How to Address the Timing Problem 
A. Executives have motivation to time information disclosures to increase their 
profits from stock option compensation (the timing problem) 
The profits that executives can make from their stock option compensation equal to 
the difference between the stock price when they exercise their rights and the strike 
price times the amount of options exercised. Thus, the lower the strike price and 
higher the stock price is, the more profits executives can make.
23
 Naturally, if 
executives can cause their company’s stock price to drop shortly before the date of 
issuance (or delay the stock price from rising until after the date of issuance) or boost 
the stock price shortly before the date of exercise (or delay the stock price from 
dropping until after the date of exercise),
24
 they can earn more money from their 
                                                          
22 See Arcot et al., supra note 19, at 199. (“If there is full compliance, or if no meaningful explanations are 
observed (in cases of non-compliance), the ‘explain’ part of the Code is ineffective. The relative benefit of 
flexibility, relative to a statutory regime, must be therefore commensurate to the number of good 
explanations.”). 
23 Generally see Jeffery J. Haas, Corporate Finance (St. Paul, MN: West, 2003), at 162-164. 
24 Wen Xiu, The Controversial Chinese Equity Incentive Compensation, No. 3 Financial Practices (2008), 
available at http://magazine.caijing.com.cn/2008-03-03/110070938.html. And Yablon & Hill, supra note 2, at 
87 (“CEOs who know when their options will be issued and become exercisable have incentives to disclose 
negative corporate news shortly before the issuance of such options and to disclose positive news shortly 
before their exercise date while delaying disclosure of negative news.”). Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 
Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1915, 1940 (2010) (“executives may have an interest 
in accelerating the release of negative information before the equity award and delaying disclosures about 
positive developments until after the award. Artificially lowering the stock price in this manner can benefit 
executives, whether their grant consists of options or restricted stock.”). Empirical study see David Aboody & 
Ron Kasznik, CEO Stock Option Awards and the Timing of Corporate Voluntary Disclosures, 29 Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 73 (2000) (“Our findings suggest that CEOs make opportunistic voluntary 
disclosure decisions that maximize their stock option compensation.”) No such empirical study has been made 
in China, but newspapers have reported the same suspicious behaviors, see infra note 26, 27, 29 and 30. 
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stock option compensation. Thus, “(stock option compensation) creates a new 
potential conflict between the interests of the corporation and its shareholders in 
credible, timely, and accurate disclosure and the CEO’s newly created interest in 
disclosure timed to maximize the value of his pay package.”25 
In China, such behaviors have also arisen recently and been reported by 
newspapers. For example, “at the beginning of 2007, one CEO in some listed 
company called a manager of some investment fund to depress the stock price before 
the company disclosing its excerpts of the draft of the stock option plan so as to obtain 
a lower strike price.”26 Yu Kai also pointed out that, “because granting stock option 
(to executives) needs time, the company may make full use of this period to depress 
stock price. There are lots of means to do so. For example, the company can disclose 
poor financial results in newspapers.”27 With regard to executives may boost the 
company’s stock price shortly before the date of exercise in the way of disclosing 
good news in advance,
28
 it is reported that the ShiJi Information Inc. disclosed on Feb. 
25, 2011 that its net profits in 2010 was 62.46% more than that of 2009 because its 
hotel management system developed very quickly. One anonymous expert believed 
that the reason why the company disclosed such information at this moment was to 
boost its stock price aiming at helping its executives exercise their rights successfully. 
The fact was that the date of exercise (Mar. 9, 2011) was approaching, but the stock 
price was only slightly higher than the strike price (RMB 48.9 v. RMB 44.7).
29
 It is 
                                                          
25 Yablon & Hill, supra note 2, at 89. 
26 Wen, supra note 24. Article 24 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans provides, “a listed company shall, 
when granting stock options to the eligible participants, determine the exercise price or the method for 
determining the exercise price. The exercise price shall be no less than the following prices, whichever is 
higher:1. The closing sales price of the target stock of the company at one trading day before the promulgation 
of the excerpts of the draft of the equity incentive plan; and 2. The average closing sales price of the target 
stock of the company within 30 trading days before the promulgation of the excerpts of the draft of the equity 
incentive plan.” So, if executives can depress the stock price low for one month, or even only a few days 
before the disclosure of the excerpts of draft of the plan, they will increase the value of their stock options.  
27 Yu Kai: Jilin Forest Industry Group: Equity Incentives Boost Stock Price, Oriental Morning Post, Nov. 16, 
2006. Delaying disclosing good news until after executives are granted with stock options may violate 
securities law and regulations, so it is not common in practice in China, see infra III A. 2. Here the “bad news” 
and the “good news” mean any news about the major event that may considerably affect the trading price of a 
listed company’s stock. According to article 30 (2) of the Administrative Measures for the Disclosure of 
Information of Listed Companies (promulgated by the CSRC, effective Jan. 30, 2007, hereinafter Measures for 
the Disclosure of Information), such major event includes: a decision of the company on any major investment 
or major purchase of asset; an important contract as concluded by the company, which may produce an 
important effect on the assets, liabilities, rights and interests or business achievements of the company; a major 
change in the external conditions for the business operation of the company and so on. In all, article 30 (2) lists 
20 circumstances maybe considered as major events. 
28 Delaying disclosing bad news until after executives have already exercised their rights may violate securities 
law and regulations, so it is not common in practice in China either, see infra III A. 4.  
29 Song Yuan Dong, ShiJi Information Inc.: The Date of Exercise Is Approaching, National Business Daily, Feb. 
27, 2011. Article 27 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans provides, “the eligible participants shall 
exercise power at the second trading day after the announcement of the regular report of a listed company, and 
within 10 trading days before the announcement of the next regular report, but shall not exercise power during 
the following periods: 1. 2 trading days during the determination of a major transaction or a great event until 
Chapter Five  Ex Ante Strategy of Enhancing Supervision by Public Authorities 
 
110 
also reported that “some private funds recommended Grandland Decoration Inc. to 
investors recently because its date of exercise was approaching but its stock price was 
lower than the strike price. It was highly possible that the company would boost its 
stock price before the date of exercise, which meant investment opportunity for 
investors.”30 Obviously, it is well-accepted by the players in the capital market that 
executives may boost the company’s stock price shortly before the date of exercise. 
In theory, executives can also make more profits from stock option compensation 
by means of timing the date of granting stock options. For example, executives can 
request the company to grant stock options shortly after its stock price drops; or 
executives can request the company to grant stock options before its stock price 
rises.
31
 But granting stock options takes long time, executives cannot assure that the 
company will grant stock options in time as they want. By contrast, when and what to 
disclose is largely under the control of executives.
32
 Besides, Article 26 of the 
Measures for Equity Incentive Plans
33
 and Article 2 (2) and (3) of the Memo No.2
34
 
strictly regulate the date when the listed company can grant stock option 
compensation. Consequently, in practice, the cases that executives increase their 
profits from stock option compensations through timing the date of granting stock 
                                                                                                                                                                      
after the matter is announced; and 2. 2 trading days from the day when any other great event that may affect the 
stock price occurs until after it is announced.” But executives can still increase their wealth through disclosing 
good news shortly before they exercise their rights even they only can exercise their rights 2 days after the 
disclosure. Because comparing with disclosing the good news after they exercise their rights, disclosing good 
news shortly before they exercise their rights surely can raise the stock price. 
30 Wang Dan, It is Uncertain That the Executives in Grandland Decoration Inc. Will Exercise Their Rights, 
Beijing Business Today, Oct. 12, 2012. 
31 This kind of stock option is called “spring loaded option”, which means “a company waits for announcements 
of good news that it knows will bump up market price and then grants options to executives on the day before 
the announcement. The value of the options is ‘spring loaded’ because a day or two after they are granted there 
is a high likelihood that the options will be ‘in the money’ -- the exercise price will be below market price, 
affected by the new announcement of good news.” see J. Robert Brown, Desimone, Spring Loaded Options 
and Insider Trading, available at 
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/preemption-of-delaware-law/desimone-spring-loaded-options-and-insider-t
rading.html. 
32 Article 40 of the Measures for the Disclosure of Information provides, “when the directors, supervisors and 
senior managers have the knowledge of a major event, they shall, according to the provisions of the company, 
immediately perform their reporting obligation. When the chairman of the board of directors receives a report, 
she shall immediately report it to the board of directors and urge the secretary of the board of directors to 
organize the work of disclosure of temporary reports.” Article 44 of the Measures for the Disclosure of 
Information provides, “the senior managers shall timely report to the board of directors the major events 
arising in the business operations or financial aspect of the company, the progress and changes of the events 
already disclosed, and other relevant information.” 
33 It provides, “ a listed company shall not grant stock options to the eligible participants within the following 
periods: 1. 30 days before the promulgation of the regular report; 2. 2 trading days during the determination of 
a major transaction or a great event until after the matter is announced; and 3. 2 trading days from the day 
when any other great event that may affect the stock price occurs until after the matter is announced.” 
34 Article 2 (2) provides, “the listed company shall not grant stock options during it intending to issue new stocks, 
inject assets, or issue convertible debts until 30 days after such great events completed.” Article 2 (3) provides, 
“the company shall not issue new stocks, inject assets, or issue convertible debts during it disclosing the 
excerpts of draft of the stock option plan until 30 days after the shareholders meeting ratifying the plan.” 
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option have been never heard of since 2008. So, this chapter only focuses on the 
problem of timing information disclosure to increase executives’ profits. 
B. Whether executives time information disclosure violates the securities law 
and regulations 
Article 6 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans provides that “no one may 
make insider trading, manipulate the securities transaction prices, or carry out 
fraudulent securities activities by making use of the equity incentive plan.” So, Do 
executives time information disclosure to increase the value of their stock option 
compensation violates this Article or other laws and regulations? “The answer to that 
question depends very much on the precise nature of the manipulation involved.”35 I 
will analyze whether under the following four circumstances, executives violate the 
securities law and regulations respectively: 
1. Executives disclose a piece of bad news in order to depress the stock price 
shortly before the date of issuance. 
(1) Does it constitute insider trading? The answer is no. Because executives are 
granted stock options after they disclose information. The “abstain or disclose” rule 
applies in such circumstance.
36
 
(2) Does it constitute manipulating the securities transaction prices? Maybe. If 
executives disclose a piece of bad news shortly before the date of issuance aiming at 
depressing stock price, thus, they can be granted stock options at lower strike price, it 
will constitute manipulating the securities transaction prices.
37
 But, if the goal of 
executives to disclose the bad news is to clarify some rumors about the company, 
which is required by securities regulations,
38
 thus it will not constitute manipulating 
                                                          
35 Yablon & Hill, supra note 2, at 91. 
36 Article 76 (1) of the Securities Law provides, “any insider who has access to insider information or has 
unlawfully obtained any insider information on securities trading may not purchase or sell the securities of the 
relevant company, or divulge such information, or advise any other person to purchase or sell such securities.”  
But, because such information is disclosed, it is not insider information anymore. So executives can sell or buy 
stocks except restricted by other rules. Also see Yablon & Hill, supra note 2, at 99 (“It is important to 
recognize that, because the CEO has made disclosure prior to receiving the options, the suit against him would 
not be for insider trading... ”).  
37 Article 77 of the Securities Law provides, “anyone is prohibited from manipulating the securities market by 
any of the following means: (1) Whether anyone, independently or in collusion with others, manipulates the 
trading price of securities or trading quantity of securities by centralizing their advantages in funds, their 
shareholding advantages or taking their information advantage to trade jointly or continuously; (2) Where 
anyone collaborates with any other person to trade securities pursuant to the time, price and method as agreed 
upon in advance, thereby affecting the price or quantity of the securities traded; (3) Where anyone trades 
securities between the accounts under his own control, thereby affecting the price or quantity of the securities 
traded; or (4) Where anyone manipulates the securities market by any other means.” This behavior is another 
means of manipulating the securities market. 
38 Article 31 of the Measures for the Disclosure of Information provides, “the listed company shall timely 
disclose the present situation and the risk factors which may affect the progress of the major event, when this 
major event has been divulged or there is already any hearsay in the market.” 
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the securities transaction prices, even though clarifying such rumors depresses the 
stock price in effect. So the key question is what is the executives’ intent? If 
shareholders want to sue executives based on manipulating the securities transaction 
prices, they shall prove the intent of executives is to depress the stock price so as to be 
granted stock options at lower price. It is very difficult even not impossible for them 
to prove it.
39
 This is because there many explanations are available for executives to 
decide when and what to disclose. 
(3) Does it constitute carrying out fraudulent securities activities? According to 
securities law and regulations,
40
 executives shall disclose truthful, accurate and 
complete information in time, so except the information disclosed by executives 
contains any false records, misleading statements or serious omissions, executives 
disclose a piece of bad new shortly before the date of issuance does not constitute 
carrying out fraudulent securities activities. Because executives do not break the 
“timely” requirement in securities law and regulations, on the contrary, they even do 
better than they are required. 
2. Executives delay disclosing a piece of good news until the excerpt of the draft of 
the stock option plan is disclosed in order not to raise the stock price, thus, obtaining a 
lower strike price. 
(1) Does it constitute insider trading? Very likely. Generally speaking, executives 
occupy one-third seats in the board in Chinese listed companies, so it is highly 
possible that they know when they will be granted stock option compensation. 
Therefore, it is very likely that the reason why they delay disclosing a piece of good 
news is to be granted stock option at a lower strike price.  
(2) Does it constitute manipulating the securities transaction prices? Maybe. If the 
intent of executives to delay disclosing a piece of good news is not to cause the stock 
price to risen before they are granted stock option compensation, as a result, they will 
gain a lower strike price, it will constitute manipulating the securities transaction 
prices. But, in practice, it is difficult for shareholders to prove the intent of executives.  
(3) Does it constitute carrying out fraudulent securities activities? The answer is yes. 
Because executives violate the requirement of disclosing information in time, except 
the information disclosed by executives contain any false records, misleading 
                                                          
39 Peng Bing, Chinese Securities Law (Second Edition) (Beijing: Higher Education Press, 2007), at 393-394.  
40 Article 63 of the Securities Law provides, “the information as disclosed by issuers and listed companies 
according to law shall be authentic, accurate and complete and shall not have any false record, misleading 
statement or major omission.” Article 2 of the Measures for the Disclosure of Information provides, “an 
information disclosure obligor shall disclose its information truthfully, accurately, completely and in time. The 
information disclosed shall not contain any false record or misleading statement or serious omission.” 
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statements or serious omissions. Article 30 (1) of the Measures for the Disclosure of 
Information provides that “in the case of a major event that may considerably affect 
the trading price of a listed company’s shares and that is not yet known to the 
investors, the listed company shall disclose it to them in time, stating the cause, the 
present situation, and the possible legal consequence of the event.” 41  So, if  
executives delay disclosing a piece of good news, they violate the securities law and 
regulations, even they do not intend to make profit from it.  
3. Executives disclose a piece of good news to boost the stock price shortly before 
the date of exercise. The results of this situation are similar to the first circumstance, it 
does not constitute insider trading, it may constitute manipulating the securities 
transaction prices and it does not constitute carrying out fraudulent securities 
activities. 
4. Executives delay disclosing a piece of bad news until they finish exercising their 
rights in order not to depress the stock price. The results of this situation are similar to 
the second circumstance, it constitutes insider trading, it may constitute manipulating 
the securities transaction prices and it constitutes carrying out fraudulent securities 
activities. 
So, it is highly possible for executives to violate the law and regulations if they 
delay disclosing a piece of good news until the excerpt of the draft of the stock option 
plan is disclosed in order not to raise the stock price or delay disclosing a piece of bad 
news until they finish exercising their rights in order not to depress the stock price. 
Therefore, in practice, the safe methods for executives to increase their profits from 
stock option compensation are to disclose a piece of bad news to depress the stock 
price shortly before the date of issuance or disclose a piece of good news to boost the 
stock price shortly before the date of exercise. Under such circumstances, only 
shareholders can prove that the intent of executives to disclose the bad or good news 
is to manipulate the securities transaction prices will executives are regarded as 
violating the securities law and regulations. It is a very hard task for shareholders. 
Ultimately, the nature of the timing problem is how much discretion executives have 
in disclosing information according to securities law and regulations. The answer is 
very much because “the law assumes the existence of such discretion and further 
                                                          
41 At the same time, article 31 (1) of the Measures for the Disclosure of Information also provides, “a listed 
company shall timely perform the obligation to disclose the information about a major event when any of the 
following circumstances is the first to occur: (1) The board of directors or board of supervisors makes a 
resolution about the major event; (2) The parties concerned enter into a letter of intent or agreement on the 
major event; or (3) The directors, supervisors or senior managers know the major event and report it...”. 
Chapter Five  Ex Ante Strategy of Enhancing Supervision by Public Authorities 
 
114 
assumes that it will be applied by management in the best interests of the corporation 
and the shareholders as a whole.”42 
C. Suggestions on how to address the timing problem 
The profits that executives can make from disclosure timing are exactly the losses 
incurred by the company, in other words, its shareholders. It is a “zero-sum” game. So, 
in order to protect the interests of shareholders, the CSRC shall make some rules to 
prohibit or constrain executives from making profits by the means of disclosure 
timing. But, frankly speaking, “managerial discretion over disclosure timing is not an 
oversight or an accidental effect of the system that can be easily changed.” 43 
Considering the complexity of stock option compensation, for example, the strike 
price alone is determined by many factors, such as “the degree of managerial risk 
aversion (which in turn might be affected by the manager’s age and wealth), the 
project choices available to the company, the volatility of the company’s stock, the 
expected rate of inflation and the length of the manager’s contract”,44 hence, “there is 
no reason to expect that ‘one size fits all’—that the same exercise price is optimal for 
all executives at all firms, in all industries and at all times.”45 So, this chapter 
suggests that the CSRC shall make the “comply or explain” rules to require listed 
companies to comply with the following suggestions, but the companies are allowed 
to change or just disobey these rules as long as they provide and disclose their choices 
and detailed reasons (whether these choices are appropriate and reasons are justified 
are up to shareholders). 
1. In order to address the problem that executives may disclose a piece of bad news 
to depress the stock price shortly before the date of issuance so as to gain a lower 
strike price,
46
 the CSRC may amend Article 24 of the Measures for Equity Incentive 
Plans to require companies to extend the period determining the strike price from 30 
trading days to one year,
47
 and cancel another method to determine the strike price, 
                                                          
42 Yablon & Hill, supra note 2, at 104. 
43 Id. at 103. 
44 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 71, 84 (2003). 
45 Id. 
46 Such behavior is called “one big payday”, see Yablon & Hill, supra note 2, at 104 (“where the CEO has a 
much greater interest in having the company’s stock achieve a certain price on one particular day (the issuance 
date, the exercise date) than he has in the stock price the rest of the time. The bigger the potential payday, the 
greater the incentives to manipulate stock prices around that date.”). 
47 This suggestion is based on Bebchuk and Fried’s proposal. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 24, at 1942. 
According to their suggestion, “to reduce the potential for gaming, the terms and amount of equity awards 
should not be based on the grant-date stock price.” Specifically, their suggest is “consider an executive who is 
promised that, over each of X years, Y options will be granted each year. Instead of setting the exercise price to 
the stock price on the grant date each year—a price that could be manipulated—the exercise price could be set 
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namely, “the closing sales price of the target stock of the company at one trading day 
before the promulgation of the excerpts of the draft of the equity incentive plan.” So 
the new strike price shall be no less than “the average closing sales price of the target 
stock of the company within one year trading days before the promulgation of the 
excerpts of the draft of the equity incentive plan”. Because it is hard to image that 
executives are willing and able to maintain the stock price low for whole one year. If 
they do so, two bad outcomes will arisen: (1) The financial performance of the 
company maybe disappointing, so executives cannot satisfy the conditions to exercise 
their rights; (2) Suppose that executives have some unexercised stock options or 
stocks, their benefits will be hurt by such behavior. So this approach can address the 
one big payday problem, at least, to some extent.  
2. As to the problem that executives may disclose a piece of good news to boost the 
stock price shortly before the date of exercise, frankly speaking, there is no good 
method to address this problem. According to Bebchuk and Fried’s proposal,48 the 
CSRC may require executives to disclose their intended exercising in advance, for  
example, if executives want to exercise their rights on May 1, they have to disclose 
their intent before Apr. 1. So, before the date of exercise, their behaviors will be 
closely scrutinized by the board, shareholders, the media and the CSRC. Suppose that 
one executive discloses that she will exercise her rights on May 1. On April 28, she 
requires the company to disclose a piece of good news. Usually the board will directly 
follow her requirement. But now, considering that the date of exercise is approaching 
and the executive’s motivation to disclose the good news maybe to increase her 
personal wealth, the board will carefully scrutinize her requirement. Even, the board 
may postpone disclosing the good news if it will not violate the securities law and 
regulations until she finishes exercising her stock options . Because the board is afraid 
of being accused of helping executives manipulate securities transaction prices. This 
approach may partly reduce the executive’s motivation to time information 
disclosure.
49
 But considering the executive’s influence on the board, whether the 
board is willing to be against the executive’s requirement is unclear. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
to the stock price at the time of hiring.” This suggestion is not suitable in China for two reasons: (1) It is 
uncommon for Chinese listed companies to grant stock option compensation to executives, let alone grant 
stock options every year, thus, they do not know whether they will grant stock options or not in the future. 
Therefore, it is not necessary and efficient to write the strike price in the employment contract when executives 
are hired by the company in the first place; (2) If the companies intend to grant stock options in the middle 
term of executives, how to determine the stock price is unclear. It is not reasonable to still apply the stock price 
when the companies hired the executives, especially, when the executives have been hired for several years. 
48 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 24, at 1948-1950. 
49 A similar way to address this problem is suggested by Prof. Fried, which is called “hands-off” options, which 
refers to “options that are cashed out according to a fixed, gradual, and pre-announced schedule. By removing 
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IV. How to Address the Short-termism Problem 
A. Stock option compensation may wrongly induce executives to pursue 
short-term profits at the costs of shareholders’ long-term interests 
(short-termism problem) 
It has been widely accepted by many scholars for long time that stock option 
compensation may wrongly induce executives to pursue short-term profits, which will 
hurt the sustainable development of the company and the long-term interests of 
shareholders.
50
 Because, “the value of a stock option depends entirely on the market 
price of the company’s stock on the date the option is exercised. As a result, managers 
were incentivized to focus their efforts not on planning for the long term, but instead 
on making sure that share price was as high as possible on their option exercise date 
(usually only a year or two in the future), through whatever means possible.” 51 The 
possible means include: “adopting massive stock-buyback programs that drained 
much-needed capital out of firms; jumping into risky ‘proprietary trading’ strategies 
with credit default swaps and other derivatives; cutting payroll and 
research-and-development budgets; and even resorting to outright accounting fraud, 
as Enron’s options-fueled and stock-price obsessed executives did.”52 Furthermore, 
the nature of stock option also encourages executives to “undertake risks that are 
suicidal for the company as a whole.”53 The reason is “an option holder does not 
share in downside risk on the underlying stock. If the stock loses value, the option 
                                                                                                                                                                      
executives’ control over the timing of unwinding, such options would make it impossible for executives to sell 
on inside information. ” See Jesse M. Fried, Hands-Off Options, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 453, 455 (2008). 
50 Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling Executive Pay, 68 Ind. 
L. J. 59, 68 (1992) (“Since her compensation depends on the company’s performance, and the company’s 
performance is measured primarily by earnings-per-share or market price, the executive has incentive to do 
whatever is necessary to prop up this quarter’s earnings or increase the market price of shares. Instead of 
positioning the company for the future, which is an important objective of shareholders, the executive’s 
attention is diverted to positioning the company to meet his own short-term goals.”). Clawson & Klein, supra 
note 7, at 44 (“Options ...create incentives to inflate share price in the short run, at the expense and risk of other 
objectives such as long-term corporate viability or a steady, less volatile, upward drift in the stock price.”) 
Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation and a Modest Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 
S.M.U. L. Rev. 201, 221 (1996) (“If a CEO’s compensation is largely dependent on share price, the CEO may 
pursue strategies that raise short-term profits and, thus, share prices, at the expense of long-term returns.”). 
Arthur Levitt, Jr., Corporate Culture and the Problem of Executive Compensation, 30 J. Corp. Law. 749,750 
(2005) (“Too often they are managing the numbers for short-term gain and personal payout, and not managing 
the business for long-term growth and shareholder value.”). This short-termism is also generated by so called 
“impatient capital”, which is driven “by pressures from investors and the stock analyst community to generate 
short-term profits.” See Justice Jack B. Jacobs, “Patient Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive 
It? 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1649 (2011). 
51 Judith F. Samuelson & Lynn A. Stout, Are Executives Paid Too Much? available at  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123561746955678771.html.  
52 Id. 
53 Calvin H. Johnson, Stock and Stock Option Compensation: A Bad Idea, Vol. 51, No.3 Canadian Tax Journal 
1259, 1269 (2003). 
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holder will simply fail to exercise the option and will thus avoid the loss. Risks that 
would properly scare the flesh off a shareholder are a matter of indifference to the 
option holder.”54 The excessive risk-taking activity among financial companies is 
said to be the very reason that caused the 2008 financial crisis.
55
 
In theory, the ideal compensation incentives should be designed to “produce 
long-term value for shareholders without encouraging excessive risk-taking,” which is 
highly recommended by institutional shareholders and academic institutions.
56
 But, 
“until very recently, firms have taken surprisingly few steps to prevent or to regulate 
the unwinding of the incentives created by option and restricted-stock grants. 
Managers thus have been enjoying broad freedom to unload their options and shares. 
Such unloading either weakens mangers’ incentives or force the firm to provide 
additional options or shares to restore incentives.”57 
In China, the CSRC also strongly emphasizes that stock option compensation shall 
encourage executives to create long-term value for shareholders.
58
 But, in practice, 
                                                          
54 Id. Also see Brian William Hughes, Stock Option “Springloading”: An Examination of Loaded Justifications 
and New SEC Disclosure Rules, 33 J. Corp. L. 777, 779 (2008) (“Linking pay to short-term gains through 
options appears to magnify the risk that executives are willing to take, since they are compensated for stock 
price increases, but-unlike shareholders they are not punished for decreases in stock price.”).  
55 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 Geo. LJ, 247, 249 (2009). And 
Samuelson & Stout, supra note 51 (“There have been nearly as many reasons proposed for the current crisis as 
there are experts to propose them. But if we had to pick one overarching cause, it would be business leaders 
taking on excessive risk in the quest to increase next quarter’s profits. This short-term thinking, in turn, was 
driven by two trends in the business world: shareholders' increasingly clamorous demands for higher earnings, 
and compensation plans that paid managers handsomely for taking on risks today that would only be realized 
later.”). But see David Yermack, Keeping the Pay Police at Bay (October 10, 2009), WSJ.com, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703746604574461462598126406.html (“In most companies 
executive pay works rationally and effectively. No evidence whatsoever indicates that errant executive 
compensation ‘caused’ the financial crisis of 2008, or that its reduction would prevent similar events in the 
future. The recent scrutiny of executive pay seems to stem from an odd mix of envy and vengeance, 
unsupported by facts or theories.”). 
56 Business Roundtable, Principles Of Corporate Governance, at 25 (2010),  available at  
http://businessroundtable.org/uploads/studies-reports/downloads/2010_Principles_of_ 
   Corporate_Governance_1.pdf. California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CALSTRS), Principles for 
Executive Compensation, at 1, available at  
http://www.calstrs.com/corporategovernance/PrinciplesExecutiveCompensation.pdf. (“The company’s 
compensation philosophy should intend to create long-term value while not incentivizing excessive risk 
taking”); and The Conference Board, The Conference Board Task Force on Executive Compensation, at 13 
(2009), available at http://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/execcompensation2009.pdf. (“Too much focus 
on the short term in the wrong business model can lead to reward for current performance, but fail to promote 
the company’s business strategy over the long term.”). 
57 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 3, at 174.  
58 Article 2 (1) of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans provides, “the equity incentive as mentioned in the  
Measures for Equity Incentive Plans refers to the long-term incentive provided by a listed company for its 
directors, supervisors, senior executives, and other employees by granting stock of its own company to them.” 
Article 22 (1) of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans provides, “the interval between the date of grant of 
the stock options and the exercisable date of the granted stock options for the first time shall be less than one 
year.” And article 23 (1) of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans provides “ a listed company shall prescribe 
that the eligible participants exercise power by installment within the effective duration of the stock options.” 
Besides, article 142 (2) of the Company Law also provides, “the directors, supervisors and senior managers of 
the company shall declare to the company the shares held by them and the changes thereof. During the term of 
office, the shares transferred by any of them each year shall not exceed 25% of the total shares of the company 
he holds. The shares of the company held by the aforesaid persons shall not be transferred within 1 year from 
the day when the stocks of the company get listed and are traded in a stock exchange. After any of the 
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almost all the stock option plans issued by listed companies last for quite short time. 
According to Qu Hai Xiang and Cao Yan Dong, “concerning the effective duration of 
stock option, the average duration period is 5.64 years. Comparing to average 10 
years’ duration in western countries, stock option compensation in China actually 
encourages short-termism, which means it is highly possible that executives will take 
some illegal behaviors to benefit themselves.”59 Zhu Rui Min and Li Chang Qiang 
believe that “the vesting time in Chinese executives’ stock option compensation is 
relatively short, only one year. How long executives shall wait before they can 
exercise rights and how can they exercise their rights are two key issues in stock 
option compensation and they are shall be designed to provide long-term 
incentives.”60 Recently, in order to totally avoid the limitation and restriction on them 
and make “quick bucks”, many executives in Chinese listed companies resign from 
their companies, which enhances their already existed short-termism.
61
 
B. How to address the short-termism problem 
One of the feasible approaches to address the short-termism problem is to require 
executives to hold the stock options for longer time than current practice.
62
 “In order 
to overcome managerial myopia, managerial wealth should be tied to firm 
performance over the longer term, which, in the view of finance theorists, helps 
explain vesting requirements on stock and options, and long-term incentive plans with 
multi-year horizons.”63 Surely, this approach has its disadvantages, for example, it 
requires executives to “bear more risk (from a lack of diversification) .”64 
1. Two influential proposals made by US scholars 
                                                                                                                                                                      
aforesaid persons is removed from his post, he shall not transfer the shares of the company he holds. The bylaw 
may have other restrictions on the transfer of shares held by the directors, supervisors and senior managers.”  
59 Qu Hai Xiang & Cao Yan Dong, On the Harms that Executive Stock Option Compensation May Bring to 
Minority Shareholders and How to Do with It, No. 9 Accounting Study 47, 47 (2011). 
60 Zhu Rui Min & Li Chang Qiang, Stock Option Incentive Mechanism and Its Usage in Chinese Listed 
Companies, No.11 Shanghai Finance 57, 59 (2007).  
61 Gao Ming Hua, Equity Incentives Should Be Postponed, No.6 Broad and Directors 109, 109 (2011). For 
example, subject to Article 43 (2) of the 2011 Vanke Stock Option Plan, if a executive resigns from the 
company or after her tenure, she and the company do not renew the contract, her stock options that have 
already been granted but cannot be exercised shall be canceled and her stock options that can be exercised shall 
be exercised in 12 months. 
62 Brian J. Hall, Six Challenges in Designing Equity-Based Pay, Vol.15 No.3 Journal of Corporate Finance 21, 25 
(2003) (“Solving, or at least limiting, the problem of short-termism requires lengthening vesting periods and 
strengthening executive ‘ownership requirements’.”). 
63 Walker, supra note 5, at 441. 
64 Steven N. Kaplan, Response, Weak Solutions to an Illusory Problem, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 43, 
44 (2010). Also see Walker, supra note 5, at 442 (“managers resist having too much of their wealth tied to 
long-term performance because of the negative effects on the diversification of their portfolios and 
liquidity. ”). 
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Specifically, there are two influential alternatives: one is made by Sanjai Bhagat 
and Roberta Romano; another is made by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried. 
(1) According to Sanjai Bhagat and Roberta Romano’s proposal, “(80-90%) 
incentive compensation plans should consist only of restricted stock and restricted 
stock options, restricted in the sense that the shares cannot be sold (or the option 
cannot be exercised) for a period of at least two to four years after the executive’s 
resignation or last day in office.”65 The reasons why they choose two and four years 
are “two years should be the short end of the waiting period because managers’ 
discretionary authority, under current accounting conventions in the United States, to 
manage earnings unravels within a one-to two-year period. On the other side, four 
years is a reasonable time for at least the intermediate-term results of the executives’ 
decisions to come to realization.” 66  Under this proposal, executives will have 
“diminished incentives to make public statements, manage earnings, or accept undue 
levels of risk, for the sake of short-term price appreciation,”67 hence, “the proposal 
will diminish the perverse incentives (to manipulate or emphasize short-term stock 
prices over long-term value), yet retain the benefits of equity-based incentive 
compensation plans.”68 There are three important concerns about their proposal: (a) It 
will lower the risk-adjusted expected return for the executives. Their solution to this 
concern is to grant additional (restricted) shares and options to them and prohibit them 
from buying financial derivatives to hedge risks.
69
 (2) It will cause executives to lack 
of liquidity. Their solution to this concern is to raise cash compensation deduction 
ceiling, for example, to $2 million (comparing to $1 million according to current tax 
law ) and allow 10-15% incentive compensation in a given year not covered by their 
proposal.
70
 (3) It will lead to early management departures. They admitted this 
scenario would happen, but it was not so serious. Because, “managers who develop a 
reputation for early departures from firm to firm are likely to negatively impact their 
future career opportunities.”71 
2. According to Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried’s proposal, “after allowing 
                                                          
65 Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the 
Long-Term, 26 Yale J. on Reg. 359, 363 (2009). Such proposal has also been made by other scholars, see 
Lloyd Blankfein, Do Not Destroy the Essential Catalyst of Risk, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 2009 (“Senior executive 
officers should be required to retain most of the equity they receive at least until they retire, while equity 
delivery schedules should continue to apply after the individual has left the firm.”). 
66 Bhagat &Romano, supra note 65, at 363. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 367-368. 
70 Id. at 368-369. 
71 Id, at 371. 
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for any cashing out necessary to pay any taxes arising from vesting, equity-based 
awards should be subject to grant-based limitations on unwinding that allow them to 
be unwound only gradually, beginning some time after vesting.”72 Even executives 
retire from the company, this requirement is still applied to them, thus (1) removing 
any incentive for the CEO to accelerate her retirement; and (2) making it less likely 
that she will focus on short-term results while making decisions for the firm just prior 
to retirement.”73 Because “each equity grant is made at a different point of time and 
must be unwound gradually, the executive does not face a situation in which she can 
cash out almost all of her unliquidated equity at once. Thus, even when the executive  
is in her last year or two in office, she will still have an incentive to consider the effect 
of her decisions on long-term share value,”74 hence, executives will be encouraged to 
pursue long-term interests for shareholders.  
2. How to address the short-termism problem in China  
This chapter agrees that “the optimal term (of executives’ compensation contracts) 
would vary considerably by industry, firm, and executive. ... ‘one-size-fits-all’ targets 
for executive pay term that have real bite will inevitably exceed the optimal mark for 
some firms and executives.”75 So, this chapter suggests that the CSRC shall make 
rules to require the listed companies to comply with my following suggestions in 
order to address the short-termism problem of executive stock option compensation, 
however, the companies could disobey or change these rules and provide their own 
solutions as long as they disclose detailed explanations to shareholders. For the focus 
of this chapter, my suggestion is:  
(1) Prolonging the vesting time from 1 year to at least 3 years. It is also suggested 
by other scholar that “if the effective duration of stock option plan is 10 years, the 
vesting time shall be 3-5 years; if the effective duration of stock option plan is five 
years, the vesting time shall be 2-3 years.”76 
(2) In China, listed companies do not grant stock options to executives every year. 
Considering this reality, the CSRC may require that executives shall only exercise no 
                                                          
72 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 24, at 1928-1931. Similar approach has also been suggested by David Yermack, 
see Yermack, supra note 55 (“Companies might benefit by imposing more restrictions on how and when 
managers can sell their holdings, perhaps by considering limits on the amount that can be liquidated each year 
or requiring advance notification to the market before a sale takes place (current law requires 48-hour 
retroactive disclosure).”). 
73 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 24, at 1931. 
74 Id. at 1929. 
75 Walker, supra note 5, at 461-462. Also see Zhu & Li, supra note 60, at 58-59 (“For each listed company, how 
long the vesting time shall be and when executives can exercise their rights are determined by the company’s 
unique conditions.”). 
76 Zhu Yong Guo, Studies on the Executives’ Equity Incentives in Chinese Listed Companies(Beijing: Capital 
University of Economics and Trade Press, 2012), at 80. 
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more than 20% options that they are granted for the first time every year after 3 years’ 
vesting time.
77
 For example, if one executive is granted 1 million stock options at a 
given year, after waiting for 3 years, in the fourth year, she can exercise no more than 
200,000 stock options, in the fifth year, she can also exercise no more than 200,000 
stock options, and so on. Then, at least after 8 years, she can exercise all her 1 million 
stock options. Besides, the CSRC may also require that even executives resign from 
the companies, they shall still be subject to this requirement, which can prevent the 
executives from avoiding this requirement through resigning. This approach may 
deter some executives from taking stock option compensation because they will bear 
more firm-specific risks and illiquidity, which is not good for shareholders. In order to 
resolve this concern, I also suggest that if executives are subject to this requirement, 
the stocks which they gain from exercising their rights are exempting from the 
restrictions of Article 142 (2) of the Company Law (restriction on selling stocks) and 
Article 47 (1) of the Securities Law (restriction on short-swing trading),
78
 which 
means they can freely sell the stocks and keep the profits. This is a proper balance 
between long-time holding (from the perspective of shareholders) and risk aversion 
and needs for liquidity (from the perspective of executives). As Bebchuk and Fried 
believed, “an efficient contract can be expected to strike a balance between 
maintaining these incentives and satisfying managers’ legitimate liquidity and 
diversification.”79 
V. How to Address the Windfalls Problem 
A. Windfalls of executive stock option compensation 
When executives exercise their rights, the higher the stock price is, the more profits 
they can make. But in practice, the stock price when executives exercise their rights is 
determined by many factors, such as: 1. the general market situation, for example, 
stock price is boosted by low interest rate; 2. the industry development, for example, 
government subsidies may help the company to make more profits; and 3. the specific 
                                                          
77 Currently, the typical practice is: after waiting for one year, executives can exercise 30-40% options, at the 
third year, they can exercise another 30-40% options, and at the fourth year, they can exercise the remaining 
options. If they cannot exercise all their options in four years, their stock options shall be canceled.  
78 It provides, “where any director, supervisor and senior manager of a listed company or any shareholder who 
holds more than 5% of the shares of a listed company, sells the stocks of the company as held within 6 months 
after purchase, or purchases any stock as sold within 6 months thereafter, the proceeds as generated there from 
shall be incorporated into the profits of the relevant company. The board of directors of the company shall take 
back the proceeds. ...” 
79 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 3, at 174-175. 
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situation of a company itself, for example, the competence of its executives and the 
skillfulness of its employees.
80
 According to Johnson, 80 percent of the volatility in 
respect of a share of stock is out of executives’ control.81 So, “the performance of a 
company changes not only because of the executives’ diligence, but also other factors. 
As a result, even executives do not manage the company well, its performance can 
still be promising; on the contrary, even executives try their best to run the company, 
its performance may still be disappointing.”82 
Ideally, “executives and managers should be rewarded for the actions and decisions 
within their control, not general market movements.”83 But, in reality, when the stock 
price goes up quickly due to good market or industry development, the company will 
not filter out this factor through raising the strike price. “One widespread and 
persistent feature of stock option plans is that they fail to filter out stock price rises 
that are due to industry and general market trends and thus completely unrelated to 
managers’ own performance.”84 Hence, “fixed price stock options are like the lottery 
tickets referred to above in that the appreciation in their value may be wholly 
unrelated to the executive’s performance.” 85  By contrast, when the stock price 
declines below the strike price (out-of-money stock option), the company usually 
cancels the old stock options and grant new stock options to replace them with lower 
strike price.
86
 The main reason why the company does so is that “if the company is 
severely troubled, and all the options are deeply underwater, then directors say our 
first priority in compensation is to retain these people and to assure continuity, so we 
                                                          
80 Clawson and Klein, supra note 7, at 43 (“The stock price could appreciate due to a favorable economy, 
favorable industry trends, or other exogenous events, and the executive with fixed price options would receive 
the benefit of such appreciation.”). Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and If So, What If 
Anything Should Be Done About It?, 58 Duke L.J. 1013, 1026 (2009) (“Many things move a company’s stock 
besides the decisions of its CEO. To tie his income to the value of his company’s stock is a bit like tying the 
salary of the president of the United States to GNP. The analogy is particularly close in an industry like oil, in 
which the profits of an oil company are largely a function of the price of oil, over which the companies have little 
control.”). 
81 Johnson, supra note 53, at 1276 (“It appears that about 80 percent of the volatility in respect of a share of stock 
arises from industry wide or stock-market wide factors over which management has no control.”). 
82 Seiichi Ochiai, The Elements of Corporate Law (Beijing: Law Press, Chinese Translation Edition, translated by 
Wu Ting et al., 2011), at 134. 
83 Samuelson & Stout, supra note 51.  
84 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 44, at 83. Also see Matthew A. Melone, Are Compensatory Stock Options Worth 
Reforming? 38 Gonz. L. Rev. 535, 567 (2003) (“traditional stock options fail to filter out general market 
effects thereby increasing the possibility that the firm overcompensates or under compensates the managerial 
effort for which it bargained.”). 
85 Clawson & Klein, supra note 7, at 46. 
86 Melone, supra note 84, at 557 (“Corporations, under the theory that deeply out-of-the-money options offered 
no incentives to employees, often reduced the strike price of options or canceled existing options and reissued 
replacement options with a lower stock price. ”). Actually, repricing stock option is uncommon in the US now. 
According to the requirements’ of NYSE listing standard, only ratified by the shareholders’ meeting could the 
company reprice stock option since 2003, so almost “no new plans have repricing provisions” in practice. See 
Andrew C.W. Lund, What Was the Question? The NYSE and Nasdaq’s Curious Listing Standards Requiring 
Shareholder Approval of Equity-Compensation Plans, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 119,136 (2006). 
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can’t pay them below the norm.”87 Otherwise, these executives will quit and find jobs 
in other companies, which means a disaster to the company. But “the alignment of 
shareholder and management incentives only exists if executives are unrewarded 
when stock prices fail to rise, or fall.”88 
In short, “the challenge in designing multi-year option plans is to create sufficient 
upside potential for incentive alignment purposes while at the same time preserving 
the company’s ability to retain and motivate executives if the stock price falls 
sharply.”89 
In China, we are facing the same problem. Article 5 of the Memo No.2 provides 
that companies are encouraged to use market index, component stocks index or an 
index of related companies when they design the conditions for the executives to 
exercise their rights. But, in practice, few companies use this kind of stock option 
compensation. As a result, when the stock price goes up quickly due to good economy 
or industry development, the company will not raise the strike price; meanwhile when 
the stock price declines below the strike price, the company will routinely cancel the 
old stock option plan. Usually, the company makes following explanation: “since 
major changes have taken place in the capital market, if our company still continues 
the stock option plan, it is difficult to realize the objectives of the plan. So, the board 
decided to cancel the stock option plan. We will wait for the opportune moment to 
issue new stock option plan again.”90 Canceling the stock option plan has three 
disadvantages: 1. The company incurs lots of costs in making the stock option plan, 
such as holding board and compensation committee meetings, hiring lawyers and 
compensation consultants or other professional agencies. So, if the stock option plan 
is canceled, company’s wealth will be wasted; 2.The reasons why the stock price 
declines below the strike price maybe out of executives’ control, for example, because 
of 2008 Financial Crisis. Thus, if the stock option plan is canceled, executives will be 
discouraged to maximize shareholders’ interests. Because, even they do their best, it 
is impossible for them to gain profits from their stock option compensation; and 3. 
                                                          
87 Orin Kramer, Pay without Performance: The Institutional Shareholder Perspective, 30 J. Corp. L. 773,774 
(2005). 
88 Randall S. Thomas and Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option Plans, 35 
Wake Forest L. Rev. 31, 51 (2000). 
89 Hall, supra note 62, at 28. 
90 Zeng Fu Bing, Ningbo GQY Canceled Its Stock Option Plan, Oriental Morning Post, June 18, 2011 (GQY, 
listed in Shenzhen ChiNext market, describes itself as the world’s leading expert of visual-info system 
solutions). “Statistics suggested that the stock price of 30 listed companies that issued stock option  plans since 
2011 was below the strike price. According to a market analyst, under such circumstance, the stock option 
plans may be canceled by those companies.” see Wang Dan, Equity Incentive in Grandland Decoration May be 
Canceled, Beijing Business Today, Oct. 12, 2012. 
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Subject to Article 1 (2) of the Memo No.3, if the board decides to cancel the stock 
option plan, the company shall not issue any stock option plan again within 6 months. 
So, if the stock option plan is canceled, the company cannot issue new stock option 
plan again within 6 months, even though it is necessary for it to retain and attract 
needed talents by the means of issuing new stock option plan. 
B. How to address the windfalls problem 
It is suggested by a few scholars that using indexed stock option can address this 
windfalls problem.
91
 Under this approach, “the exercise price of the option is 
adjusted to the price movements of a designated index such as the Standard & Poor’s 
500 or to an index more narrowly tailored to the company’s industry group.” 92 
Indexed stock option can ensure that “the increase in value of the company’s stock 
that relates to favorable economic or industry conditions (which presumably the 
executive had no influence in bringing about) is reserved for the shareholders, and 
only the incremental increase in the company’s stock price (which is presumably 
attributable to good management by the executive team and good rank-and-file 
performance), if any, increases the value of the executive stock options.”93 At the 
same time, when market or industry declines, indexed stock option will also ensure 
that executives’ options “remain valuable, and that managers continue to have 
incentives to perform.”94 Because, “the executives who perform adequately relative 
to their peers will always be rewarded.”95 
In spite of these obvious advantages, indexed stock option is virtually nonexistent 
in the US
96
 or in China either. The reasons maybe: 
1. Choosing a proper index, especially a industry index, is difficult. “Picking the 
comparison group (all companies? all companies of the same size? All companies of 
the same profitability, capital structures, markets?) involves considerable 
                                                          
91 Hall, supra note 62, at 24 (“With indexed options, executives are rewarded (or punished) according to their 
success in outperforming their competitors or the broad market.”); Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive 
Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 847, 862 
(2002) (“to the extent that company stock returns are affected by common market-wide shocks, paying based 
on relative performance can reduce the ‘noise’ in the performance measure without affecting incentives.”). 
92 Steven A. Bank, Devaluing Reform: The Derivatives Market and Executive Compensation, 7 DePaul Bus. L.J. 
301, 312 (1995). 
93 Clawson & Klein, supra note 7, at 47. 
94 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 3, at 166 (“Using indexed options that automatically correct for market-wide and 
sector-wide shocks in both directions will generally ensure that options remain valuable, and that managers 
continue to have incentives to perform, when marker decline.”). 
95 Id. at 167. 
96 Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, Vol. 17, No. 3 The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 49, 59 (2003). 
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uncertainty.”97 This concern is not serious. Because in the US, a listed company shall 
disclose a performance graph, which compares the company’s cumulative total 
shareholder return, including dividends, on its common stock with (1) a broad equity 
index such as the S&P 500 or equivalent; and (2) a published industry or 
line-of-business index comprised of peer companies
98
 selected in good faith on an 
industry or line-of-business basis. If the company cannot reasonably identify a peer 
group and it does not use an industry or line-of-business index, then an index must be 
comprised of companies with similar market capitalizations.
99
 So, it is easy for the 
company to choose a market index or industry index. In China, lots of market or 
industry indices are available both in Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE)
100
 and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE),
101
 so it is also not difficult for a listed company to 
choose a proper index in China.
102
 
2. Indexed stock option will cause executives to pursue more risky investments, 
because only when the executives beat their competitors instead of only assuring the  
stock price is higher than the strike price can they make profits from their stock 
options compensation. “Indexed options pose a special danger because they encourage 
or tempt option-holding managers to push the firm to riskier (but lower expected-value) 
activities,”103 which is called by Saul Levmore as “super-risk alteration”.104 This 
problem can be addressed by long-holding requirement, which I have already 
discussed in detail in part IV. 
3.The companies have no ideas what will happen if they use indexed stock option 
first. Because, when a company use indexed stock option first, its stock option 
compensation will become less attractive to executives (there are less windfalls in 
indexed stock option). Thus, executives may refuse to accept this kind of stock option 
compensation or even resign from the company.  
4. The huge influence that executives have over the board and the compensation 
committee may bring windfalls to them. “Given that using conventional options will 
                                                          
97 Posner, supra note 80, at 1026. 
98 When a company refers to a peer group used for benchmarking purposes, the SEC will ask for the names of the 
peer group companies and how the company selected them, and where actual awards fell relative to the 
benchmark. See Shelley Parratt, Executive Compensation Disclosure: Observations on the 2009 Proxy Season 
and Expectations for 2010, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch110909sp.htm. 
99 Clawson & Klein, supra note 7, at 48.  
100 See List of SSE Indices (English), available at  
http://biz.sse.com.cn/sseportal/index/en/common/index_list.shtml;  
101 See List of SZSE Indices (English), available athttp://www.szse.cn/main/en/marketdata/Indiceslist/. 
102 Wang Yu & Zhang Lu, The Risk of Stock Option: Foreign Experience and Its Inspiration, Vol. 1 Securities 
Market Herald 14, 18 (2001).  
103 Saul Levmore, Puzzling Stock Options And Compensation Norms, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1901, 1922 (2001). 
104 Id. 
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be legitimate and acceptable (after all, most firms use them) and that moving to 
indexing or any other form of reduced-windfall options is likely to be costly or 
inconvenient for managers, the lack of any real movement toward such options is 
consistent with the managerial power approach.”105 
Considering the reason 3 and 4, it is unlikely that listed companies will willingly 
use the indexed stock option compensation in China (or in the US either). So this 
chapter suggests that the CSRC shall require all the listed companies to adopt indexed 
stock option compensation. The companies can choose either market-indexed stock 
option compensation or industry-indexed stock option compensation. For example, 
Vanke, a real estate company listed in Shenzhen Stock Exchange, can choose a 
market index, such as SZSE Component Index or SZSE 100 Index or a industry index, 
such as Real Estate Index or SZSE Financials.
106
 But, at the same time, the 
companies are allowed not to comply with this requirement, but they shall explain 
why they do not adopt marker or industry indexed stock option in detail based on their 
unique circumstances. For example, Vanke can choose its own index, which is 
composed of other real estate companies listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange or/and 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange as long as it explain why it do so and how it choose the 
index. 
VI. Conclusion 
This chapter discusses how to address three agency problems (timing problem, 
short-termism problem and windfalls problem) of executive stock option 
compensation by the means of “comply or explain” approach. I suggest that the CSRC 
shall make rules that can address (at least partly address) the aforementioned three 
problems so as to protect the interests of shareholders and require the listed 
companies to comply with those rules. At the same time, companies are allowed not to 
comply with these rules under some circumstances as long as they disclose the 
reasons why they do not comply in detail. Since this “comply or explain” approach 
has never been adopted in China before, I am not sure that this approach can also be 
successful in China. But, this approach can offer another good choice for the 
rule-makers and it is also a beneficial attempt to address the three agency problems of 
executive stock option compensation with this approach. Specifically: 
                                                          
105 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 44, at 84 . 
106 Vanke is one of the companies that constitute the two indices. 
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First, with regard to how to address the timing problem, this chapter suggests that 
the CSRC shall amend Article 24 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans to 
require the companies to extend the period determining the strike price from 30 
trading days to one year and request executives to disclose their intended exercising in 
advance. 
Second, with regard to how to address the short-termism problem, this chapter 
suggests that the CSRC shall require the listed companies to prolong the vesting time 
from 1 year to 3 years. And, executives can only exercise no more than 20% options 
that they are granted at the first time every year after 3 years’ vesting time. If the   
executives are subject to this requirement, the stocks that they gain from exercising 
options are exempting from the restrictions of Article 142 (2) of the Company Law 
(restriction on selling stocks) and Article 47 (1) of the Securities Law (restriction on 
short-swing trading).  
Third, with regard to how to address the windfalls problem, this chapter suggests 
that the CSRC shall require the listed companies to adopt market or industry indexed 
stock option compensation.  
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Chapter Six  Ex Post Strategy of Enhancing Supervision 
by Public Authorities: Shareholders’ Derivative Suits Shall 
Be Made Easier for Minority Shareholders to Bring and 
Courts Shall Clarify the Standard of Judicial Review 
I. Introduction 
This chapter mainly discusses how to enhance the threat of civil liabilities to 
address one problem that the independent directors
1
 in the compensation committee 
(the independent directors) facing little chance of being held liable for violating their 
duty of care
2
 may lead them to fail to supervise executives and grant them excessive 
stock option compensation. 
In theory, if the independent directors are found to break their duty of care when 
they make executive stock option compensation, they shall be held liable for their 
behaviors and compensate the company for the losses, thus protecting the interests of 
shareholders, especially the minority shareholders. Furthermore, being defendants 
alone may impose severe shame sanctions on the independent directors.
3
 
  In practice, however, the threat of civil liabilities is very weak in China. Lacking of 
shareholders’ derivative suits4 and the uncertain standard of judicial review5, in my 
opinion, are two major reasons for the weak threat of civil liabilities.
6
 This chapter 
                                                          
1 This chapter only focuses on the independent directors’ duty of care and civil abilities. Actually, in law and 
practice, independent directors and non-independent directors are not treated differently. See Fu Qiong & Cao 
Li, On the Boundary of Independent Directors’ Duty of Care and Liability Relief Approach, No.12 Social 
Science111, 113 (2011).  
2 For example, “nearly 70 independents directors have been publicly condemned by the Shen Zhen Stock 
Exchange by the end of 2007, but among these directors who failed to perform their fiduciary duties, only one 
director was penalized for RMB 100,000 by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). None of 
them are held civil liable for violating their fiduciary duties in the courts” see Peng Wen Ge & Qiu Yong Hong, 
On Improving the Institution of Independent Directors from the Perspective of Stock Exchange, No.2 Securities 
Market Herald 36, 41 (2007). Since the independent directors have no conflicts of interest in making  
executive stock option compensation, this chapter only discusses the duty of care. 
3 Ning Xiang Dong et al., On Reputation and Behavior of Independent Directors, No.1 Journal of Tsinghua 
University (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 129, 130 (2012) (“In China, reputation mechanism is a crucial 
factor motivating and restricting the behavior of independent directors.”). 
4 Shareholders in listed companies have only brought one derivative suit since the shareholders’ derivative suits 
mechanism has been transplanted into China since 2005, see infra part III. 
5 The standard that the Chinese courts may apply to determine whether the independent directors break their duty 
of care when they make executive stock option compensation (or other decisions) is uncertain, see infra part IV. 
6 Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reputational Sanctions In China’s Securities Market, 108 Colum. L. 
Rev. 929, 943 (2008) (“Doctrinal obstacles and uncertainties, the lack of a class action mechanism to aggregate 
claims, local favoritism in the courts, uncertain enforcement prospects, political pressure, and a lack of assets 
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argues that the threat of civil liabilities could be enhanced by two methods: 
shareholders’ derivative suites shall be made easier for minority shareholders to bring 
and the courts shall clarify the standard of judicial review when they have to 
determine whether the independent directors break their duty of care as they make 
executive stock option compensation. 
What needed to be emphasized is making executive stock option compensation is 
the internal matter of a listed company. It is drafted by the compensation committee, 
discussed by the board and approved by the shareholders’ meeting. Hence, only under 
limited and exceptional circumstances, shall the courts involve in this matter and 
determine whether the independent directors break their duty of care. Otherwise, “the 
normal business operation activities of a company may be affected by the supervision 
and inspection of courts; meanwhile, courts’ enormous power will increase their 
rent-seeking activities and lead to judicial corruptions in the end.”7 Therefore, how to 
balance the needs of a company to manage its own business and the minority 
shareholders’ needs to protect their legitimate rights and interests is a tough job faced 
by the Chinese courts (or the courts in other countries).  
This chapter proceeds as follows. Part II briefly discusses the standard of 
independent directors’ conduct when they make executive stock option compensation. 
Part III points out the reasons why shareholders’ derivative suits are rare in China and 
makes some suggestions on how to make it easier for minority shareholders to bring 
derivative suits into the courts. Part IV discusses the standard of judicial review the 
courts shall apply when they have to determine whether the independent directors 
break their duty of care or not. Part IV offers a short conclusion. 
II. The Standard of Independent Directors’ Conduct When They 
Make Executive Stock Option Compensation 
Subject to Article 3 of the Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentive 
Plans of Listed Companies (For Trial Implementation) (promulgated by the CSRC, 
effective Jan. 1, 2006, hereinafter Measures for Equity Incentive Plans), when the 
independent directors make executive stock option compensation, they shall behave 
honestly, diligently, in good faith and maintain the interests of the company and all its 
                                                                                                                                                                      
against which to collect a judgment from an erstwhile defendant corporation all work to diminish the viability 
of the legal system as a means of protecting investors.”). 
7 Rong Yin, On Business Judgment Rule in US Company Law, No. 2 Journal of Comparative Law 46, 47 (2008). 
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shareholders.
8
 With regard to this requirement, I want to emphasize two points: 
First, When the independent directors perform their duty of care, they shall exercise 
the care that other ordinary independent directors would use in the similar 
circumstance.
9
 The reasons are:  
1. According to Article 2 (4) of the Guidance Opinion on the Establishment of an 
Independent Director System in Listed Companies (promulgated by CSRC, effective 
in 2001, hereinafter Independent Director Opinion), the independent directors must  
have more than five years’ working experience in law or economics etc. They shall 
have the ordinary skill, experience and knowledge that required by their jobs, in other 
words, they shall have “business common sense” as the independent directors.10 
Obviously, the requirement for the independent directors when they perform they 
duties is higher than ordinary persons.  
2. According to Article 7 (1), (2) of the Independent Director Opinion, listed 
companies shall provide the independent directors with sufficient materials and 
information to help them to fulfill their duties. Besides, if the independent directors 
believe it is necessary, they can require the companies to hire gatekeepers to provide 
professional opinions to them, and the costs shall be borne by the companies.
11
 So, 
the independent directors can inform themselves by different kinds of means. 
Second, though there are no universal rules or procedures that the independent 
directors can follow when they make executive stock option compensation, basically, 
they are expected to do following things: 1. They shall evaluate executives’ pay 
structure and the necessity of granting stock option compensation to them; 2. They 
shall evaluate executives’ potential contributions to the company; 3. They shall collect 
important information on executive stock option compensation in other companies 
                                                          
8 Article 148 (1) of Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2005 Revision) (promulgated by the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, effective Jan. 1, 2006, hereinafter Company Law) also 
provides, “the directors, supervisors and senior managers shall comply with the laws, administrative regulations, 
and bylaw. They shall bear the obligations of loyalty and diligence to the company.”  
9 Fu & Li, supra note 1, at 113. Articles 4 (2) of Guidelines on Directors’ Conduct in the Listed Companies on the 
SME Board in Shenzhen Stock Exchange (promulgated by Shenzhen Stock Exchange, effective Oct.1, 2011) 
also provides, “directors shall act diligently and perform their duty with the knowledge, skill and experience 
that a director shall have...” Also see Article 330 of the Japanese Company Law and Article 644 of the Japanese 
Civil Law. But see Liu Jing Wei, A Comparative Study on the Criteria of Directors’ Duty of Diligence, No.5 
Contemporary Law Review 148, 152 (2007) (The author suggests that we shall use ordinary person standard, 
which is applied in the US). According to the American Law Institute, 4.01 (a) of Principles of Corporate 
Governance: Analysis and Recommendations, “a director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the 
director’s or officer’s functions... with the care that an ordinary prudent person would reasonably be expected to 
exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances.”  
10 Seiichi Ochiai, The Elements of Corporate Law (Beijing: Law Press, Chinese translation edition, translated by 
Wu Ting et al., 2011), at 99. Surely, the independent directors shall not be required to act as business experts, 
see Id.  
11 Article 7 (4) of the Independent Director Opinion and Article 32 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans. 
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within its own industry; 4.They shall hire a professional agency or a compensation 
consultant to provide professional advice to them or check the reasonableness of the 
stock option compensation if they believe it is necessary; 5. They shall really discuss 
the matters of executive stock option compensation with other directors in the 
compensation committee and the board; 6. They shall keep the minutes of the meeting 
of board and the meeting of compensation committee;
12
 and, most importantly, 7. 
They shall truly believe that the executive stock option compensation they have made 
is the best decision for the company and its shareholders.
13
 
But, if the independent directors break their duty of care and grant excessive stock 
option compensation to executives,
14
 thus hurting the interests of shareholders, 
especially the minority shareholders, who are the real masters that the independent 
directors shall serve,
15
 could the minority shareholders successfully pursue the 
independent directors’ civil liabilities? Next part, I will discuss some problems of 
shareholders’ derivative suits in China and provide some suggestions. 
III. Shareholders’ Derivative Suits Shall Made be Easier for 
Minority Shareholders to Bring 
A. The current situation of shareholders’ derivate suites in China 
Subject to Article 152 of the Company Law, if the independent directors break their 
duty of care, the shareholders, who solely or aggregately hold 1% or more of the total 
shares of a listed company for 180 consecutive days or more, can request in writing 
the board of supervisors to initiate a lawsuit against these independent directors in the 
                                                          
12 Jennifer S. Martin, The House of Mouse And Beyond: Assessing the SEC’s Efforts to Regulate Executive 
Compensation, 32 DJCL 481, 518-519 (2007) (“To comply with the best practice, the compensation committee 
members should first receive (preferably in advance of the meeting) a spreadsheet or document prepared by a 
compensation expert disclosing the amounts the executive might receive under various alternatives. Second, 
the compensation expert, or a committee member, should explain the spreadsheet or document to the 
committee, with the document itself attached to committee minutes. Finally, the committee members should 
then have deliberations and discussion.”). 
13 According to Article 29 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans, “an independent director shall present his 
independent opinions on whether the stock option plan is conducive to the sustained development of a listed 
company, and whether it obviously impairs the interests of the listed company and all of its shareholders.” So, 
the independent directors in the compensation committee shall also issue their opinions on executive stock 
option compensation. 
14 For example, the compensation committee may just recommend the stock option plan, which is drafted by the 
professional agency who collude with executives, to the board without any checking, discussing and amending 
on the plan. In other words, it becomes a rubber stamp. Also see Eric L. Johnson, Waste Not, Want Not: An 
Analysis of Stock Option Plans, Executive Compensation, and the Proper Standard of Waste, 26 J. Corp. L. 
145, 153 (2000) (“if a director approving the plan without taking any time whatsoever to read the plan, failing 
to seek help in understanding the plan, or taking any action that would better inform him of the plan’s effects 
and possible consequences. In other words, if the director’s approval is merely a ‘rubber stamp’ on the plan, 
then that director has violated his duty of care.”). 
15 Article 1 (2) of the Independent Director Opinion. 
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courts. If the board of supervisors refuses to initiate a lawsuit after receiving a written 
request, or if they fail to initiate a lawsuit within 30 days after receiving the request, 
or if, in an emergency, the failure to initiate an action immediately will cause 
unrecoverable damages to the interests of the company, the shareholders can, on their 
own behalf, directly initiate a lawsuit in the courts.  
Though the objective of this article is to protect the interests of minority 
shareholders
16
 when the company (represented by the board of supervisors) does not 
sue against the independent directors who break their duty of care,
17
 in practice, this 
objective has never been achieved. Minority shareholders in listed companies have 
only brought one derivative suit since the shareholders’ derivative suits mechanism 
was transplanted into China in 2005.
18
 In that case, the minority shareholders of ST 
SanLian sued its controlling shareholder (SanLian Group) for violating ST SanLian’s 
trademark rights.
19
 The case that minority shareholders sue the independent directors 
for breaking their duty of care when they make executive stock option compensation 
has been never heard of to date.  
B. The possibles reasons why minority shareholders are not willing to 
bring derivative suits in China20  
In my opinion, there maybe two reasons that discourage minority shareholders to 
bring derivative suits, one is the high shareholding requirement and another is the 
benefit-and-cost consideration.  
1. The high shareholding requirement 
According to Article 152 of the Company Law, only the shareholders, who solely 
or aggregately hold 1% or more of the total shares of a listed company can bring 
derivative suits. This high shareholding requirement makes it difficult for minority 
shareholders to bring derivative suits. Only institutional shareholders may satisfy this 
                                                          
16 Liu Kai Xiang, Judicial Application and Legislative Perfection of Shareholders’ Derivative Suits, No. 4 China 
Legal Science 157,157 (2008). 
17 Hitoshi Maeda, Understanding Company Law (Beijing: Beijing University Press, Chinese translation edition, 
translated by Wang Zuo Quan, 2012), at 334. Also see Zhong Zhang, Making Shareholder Derivative Actions 
Happen in China: How Should Lawsuits Be Funded? 38 Hong Kong L.J. 523, 524 (2008) (“Allowing 
individual shareholders to take legal action on behalf of a company where the company is unable to do so 
because of wrongdoer control, the shareholder derivative action has been regarded as a useful tool to check the 
dominant powers of controlling shareholders and to curb opportunistic behavior of management.” ). 
18 Geng Li Hang, On the Suit Expense of Shareholders’ Derivative Suits and the Permit of Litigation by Courts, 
No. 1 Science of Law 170, 171 (2013). 
19 See Wen Yu, Investors Protection Develops Steadily After 10 Years’ Waiting, Securities Times, Dec. 24, 2011. 
20 There are several other hot debates about Article 152 of the Company Law, such as how to calculate the 180 
consecutive days or more, the role of a company and other shareholders in the suit, what the meaning of 
emergency is, whether the plaintiffs shall provide securities and so on. See Liu, supra note 16, at 158-166. For 
the purpose of this dissertation, I only discuss the possible reasons why minority shareholders are not willing to 
bring derivative suits and provide some suggestions. 
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requirement, but institutional shareholders will not protect their rights through 
bringing derivative suits. They are more willing to involve in corporate governance 
through having meeting with controlling shareholders and executives or voting at the 
shareholders’ meetings.21 For other minority shareholders, obviously, it is not easy for 
them to aggregate more than 1% of the total shares.
22
 Besides, under some 
circumstances, this requirement may generate unfairness among shareholders. For 
example, suppose that the stock price of A company is RMB 100 and it has 100 
million outstanding shares, meanwhile, the stock price of B company is only RMB 5 
and it also has 100 million outstanding shares, for the minority shareholders in A 
company, only they solely or aggregately hold shares worth more than RMB 100 
millions can they bring derivative suit in the courts, while the minority shareholders in 
B company who only hold RMB 5 million can bring derivative suit. It is clear that it is 
easier for the minority shareholders in B company to bring derivative suit. Even 
though the shareholding requirement is not an obstacle for minority shareholders to 
bring a derivative suit, considering the benefits and costs of a derivative suit, they 
would not positively bring it.  
2. Benefit-and-cost consideration 
Shareholders’ derivative suits are designed for the interests of the company or its 
whole shareholders, the plaintiffs cannot benefit directly from the suits if they win the 
cases; meanwhile, the plaintiffs shall bear the costs directly if they lose the cases. 
Thus the plaintiffs of derivative suits have nothing to gain, but much to lose. The 
benefits and costs of a derivative suit are not balanced. As a result, it is impossible 
that minority shareholders will positively use this weapon to protect their rights.
23
 
Specifically: 
(1) If plaintiffs win the derivative suits, the benefits gained from the suits may 
include: a. The compensation paid by the independent directors to the company, thus 
shared by all the shareholders according to their share holdings; b. The price of their 
                                                          
21 Geng, supra note 18, at 176. 
22 Zhong, supra note 17, at 525 (“the 1 per cent minimum shareholding requirement in respect of companies 
limited by shares rules out the possibility that public shareholders other than institutional investors actively bring 
up derivative actions to pursue wrongs done to listed companies which are the focal concern of corporate 
governance.”). 
23 Id. at 526 (“It is thus clear that the potential benefits and costs from a derivative action for litigating minority 
shareholders are so incommensurate that they would have little incentive to bring up a lawsuit.”) It is the result 
of so-called “collective action problem”, see Edward M. Iacobucci, The Effects of Disclosure on Executive 
Compensation, 48 U. Toronto L.J. 489, 496 (1998) (“The benefits of disciplinary activity, either through 
monitoring or influencing the board, are shared equally by all shareholders, yet each would individually bear 
the cost of such activity. Consequently, each shareholder faces an incentive to take a free ride on the 
disciplinary actions of others. Since each shareholder relies on others to take action, no action is taken, and 
disciplinary activity is underprovided.”). 
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stocks will rise due to improved corporate governance. Actually, each shareholder can 
receive few benefits from wining the suits. In practice, however, it is difficult for 
minority shareholders to win the suits, meanwhile, it is high possible for them to lose 
suits. 
(2) If plaintiffs lose the derivative suits, the costs they shall bear may include: a. 
The litigation costs. According to Article 29 of the Measures for the Payment of 
Litigation Costs (promulgated by the State Council, effective Apr. 1, 2007, hereinafter 
Measures for Payment of Litigation Costs), “the litigation costs shall be borne by the 
party that loses the lawsuit, unless the party that wins the lawsuit bears the costs at his 
free will. Where the party concerned partially wins the lawsuit and partially loses it, 
the people’s court may, at its discretion, decide on the amounts of litigation costs to be 
borne by the parties respectively;”24 b. Lawyer’s fees. In general, each party in a suit 
shall pay their own lawyer’s fees, regardless of whether they win or lose. Only under 
very limited circumstances, if the plaintiff win the suit, the lawyer’s fees paid by the 
plaintiff can be compensated by the defendant;
25
 and c. Other costs (e.g. traffic 
expenses and accommodation expenses for plaintiffs to attend the suits).  
C. Some suggestions on making it easier for minority shareholders to bring 
derivative suits 
1. One alternative to 1% shareholding requirement 
I suggest that if shareholders solely or aggregately have shares worth RMB 50,000  
(or more) in a listed company, they shall be allowed to bring derivative suits. The 
reason why I choose RMB 50,000 is that the average salary of Chinese employee in 
2012 is about RMB 43,000,
26
 thus if shareholders invest RMB 50,000 (or more) in a 
company, it may indicate that she/it has a stake in the company (because she invests 
more than one year’s salary into the company). Hence, she/it has some incentives to 
                                                          
24 According to Article 6 of the Measures for Payment of Litigation Costs, the litigation costs include: (1) filing 
fees, which are payable when the plaintiff minority shareholders bring up a suit to the courts; and expenses 
incurred during the suit, such as the traffic expenses, accommodation expenses, living expenses, and subsidies 
for missed work, which incurred by witnesses, authenticators, interpreters and adjustment makers for their 
appearing in the courts at designated dates. Among them, filing fees in a property case are charged at a 
percentage of the value of claim. The applicable percentage is scaled down when the amounts of value go up. For 
fees of filing a claim, the maximum percentage is 2.5% for value below RMB 10,000 and the minimum 0.5 per 
cent for value above RMB 20 million (Article 13 of the Measures for Payment of Litigation Costs). 
25 Only in antitrust suits, the intellectual property suits or torts suits, the lawyer’s fees can be compensated by the 
losing party. Besides, the lawyer’s fees should be reasonable. See The Supreme Court, Suggestions and 
Opinions Issued by the Supreme Court to the Netizens, available at  
http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/200912/1223_17_1485438.shtml. 
26 National Bureau of Statistics, The Employee’s Average Salary in 2012, available at  
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2013-05-18/093227158918.shtml. 
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improve the corporate governance of the company.
27
 
2. Reducing the costs for minority shareholders to bring derivative suits
28
 
(1) Reducing the filing fees 
“The filing fees present a substantial obstacle to the pursuance of derivative actions. 
For derivative actions to actually happen and play a role in corporate governance in 
China, the rule on filing fees has to be changed.”29 So, I suggest that we learn from the 
experience of Japan, thus treating the shareholders’ derivative suits as non-property 
suits.
30
 Hence, according to Article 13 (2) of the Measures for Payment of Litigation 
Costs, the plaintiffs only have to pay RMB 50-100 to the courts. Reducing the filing 
fees has an important impact on whether minority shareholders will bring derivative 
suites or not. Since Japan changed the filing fees to a small fixed amount 8, 200 YEN 
in 1993,
31
 “there was immediately an explosion of derivative suits.”32 
(2) Compensating plaintiffs for the lawyers’ fees if they win the suits 
If plaintiffs win the suits, the compensation shall be returned to the companies. So I 
suggest that the companies shall compensate the plaintiffs for reasonable lawyer’s 
fees.
33
 Two points shall be emphasized here: 
a. The lawyer’s fees shall be reasonable. Since the lawyer’s fees are negotiated by 
                                                          
27 Another suggestion is to delete the shareholding requirement like Japan (Article 847 (1) of the Japanese 
Company Law) and US (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1), thus any shareholder can bring derivative suit 
if she/it holds one or more shares for 180 consecutive days or more. From the experience of the two countries, 
it will not cause “a flood of derivative suits” to the courts. For example, during 1999 and 2000 there were only 
134 filings of derivative suits in Delaware, among them, eighty percent of the derivative complaints (108) were 
brought against public companies with the remaining 20 percent (26) against closely held companies. See Robert 
B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 
1747, 1762 (2004). 
28 Minority shareholders are on the behave of companies to bring derivative suits, if they win the suits, the 
compensation shall be returned to companies. Not matter in law or in practice, minority shareholders cannot 
directly gain the compensation from the defendants. So, this part only focuses on reducing the costs for 
minority shareholders to bring derivative suits. 
29 Zhong, supra note 17, at 545. 
30 Article 847 (6) of the Japanese Company Law. Meng Xiang Gang, Judicial Review of Shareholders’ 
Derivative Suits, No.4 The Application of Law 19, 23 (2007); Liu, supra note 16, at 62; Zhong, supra note 17, 
561.  
31 Now the filing fees are 13,000 YEN, which is equal to about RMB1,000. 
32 Maeda, supra note 17, at 336. Ochiai, supra note 10, at 147; and Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The 
Evidence from Japan 30 J. Legal Stud. 351 (2001). 
33 Article 852 (1) of the Japanese Company Law. If plaintiffs lose the suits, they shall not “be obligated to 
compensate the relevant Stock Company for the damages arising as a result thereof, except when the 
shareholder was in bad faith.” ( Article 852 (2) of the Japanese Company Law). But they still have to bear the 
lawyer’s fees, one way to address this problem is the plaintiffs can assign a contingent fees contract with the 
lawyer. Under such contract, “if a case is successful, the lawyer is paid by the company out of the recoveries 
from the action; If a case is lost, the lawyer is not entitled to payments, which is called ‘no win, no fees’.” see 
Zhong, supra note 17, at 534. It is legitimate in China. According to Article 13 of the Measures for the 
Administration of Lawyers’ Fees (promulgated by the National Development and Reform Commission and the 
Ministry of Justice, effective Dec. 1, 2006, hereinafter Measures for Lawyers’ Fees), “to charge fees on the 
basis of risk agency, a law firm shall conclude a risk agency charging contract with the client and stipulate the 
risks and liabilities both parties should assume, the methods of payment, and the charging amount or 
proportion. To charge fees on the basis of risk agency, the maximum charging amount shall not be higher than 
30% of the amount stipulated in the charging contract.” 
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the plaintiffs and the lawyer, it is likely that the plaintiffs and the lawyer may collude 
to hurt the interests of company. Besides, since the lawyer and the plaintiffs could 
sign a contingent fees contract, the plaintiffs may not care about how much the 
company pays the lawyer. So the courts shall review whether the lawyer’s fees are 
reasonable based on the following considerations: (i) the time spent on the work; (ii) 
the complexity of the legal affair; (iii) the affordability of the clients; (iv) the risks and 
responsibilities the lawyer might assume; and (v) the social reputation and working 
level, etc. of the lawyer.
34
 
b. Wining the suits shall be explained in a broad meaning, besides the independent 
directors compensate the company, other circumstances can also be regarded as 
wining or partial wining if the companies can get some non-financial benefits from 
the derivative suits.
35
 For example, because of the shareholders’ derivative suit, the 
company promises to improve its disclosure of executive stock option compensation, 
thus the court may require the company compensate the plaintiff (or partly) at its 
discretion. 
Frankly speaking, my suggestions may lead to some nuisance suits or strike suits. 
One solution to this problem is if defendants can prove that the plaintiffs who bring 
derivative suits are in bad faith
36
 (e.g. defaming the defendants. For the independent 
directors, they are very sensitive to the media reports and shame sanctions.), the 
courts may refuse to accept the suits. The first and most important concern of 
shareholders’ derivative suits mechanism in China is to make it easier for minority 
shareholders to bring derivative suits into the courts. The side-effects of easier 
shareholders’ derivative suits are the second concern. Only after accumulating enough 
experience can we make the shareholders’ derivative suits better.  
When more shareholders’ derivative suits can be brought into the Chinese courts, 
what standard shall the courts apply to determine whether the independent directors 
break their duty of care so as to protect the interests of minority shareholders, at the 
same time, respect the self-governance of the company? Next part will answer this 
question. 
                                                          
34 Article 9 of the Measures for Lawyers’ Fees. 
35 This is called “substantial benefit” test, under this test, a non-pecuniary relief may constitute a ‘substantial’ 
benefit when “it corrects or prevents an abuse which would be prejudicial to the rights and interests of the 
corporation or affects the enjoyment or protection of an essential right to the stockholders’ interest”. See Zhong, 
supra note 17, at 535.  
36 Article 847 (8) of the Japanese Company Law. 
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IV. The Courts Shall Clarify the Standard of Judicial Review 
Suppose that based on my suggestions, more shareholders’ derivative suites against 
the independent directors are brought into the courts, how shall the courts review 
those suits? Or, in other words, what standard of judicial review shall the courts apply 
to protect the interests of minority shareholders meanwhile respect the 
self-governance of the company? It is not clear in law and practice. Most Chinese 
scholars suggest that we shall also apply the US business judgment rule (BJR), but 
one critical point neglected by them is under the BJR, the courts will use gross 
negligence standard to determine whether the independent directors break their duty 
of care or not,
37
 but shall the Chinese courts also apply this so lenient standard?  
First, this part briefly introduces the BJR in the US; then introduces Chinese 
scholars’ suggestions on how to transplant the BJR into China and one critical 
problem neglected by them; last, offers my suggestions. 
A. The BJR in the US 
The BJR is widely applied in US corporate law, such as M&As, paying out of 
dividends, charitable donations, executive compensation and so on.
38
 But, the BJR is 
still full of controversies even till now. “Countless cases invoke it and countless 
scholars have analyzed it. Yet, despite all of the attention lavished on it, the business 
judgment rule remains poorly understood. We lack a coherent and unified theory that 
explains why the rule exists and where its limits should be placed.”39 Put simply, the 
BJR is a presumption that favors the directors. It is presumed that “in making a 
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good 
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the courts. 
The burden is on the party challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the 
presumption.”40 
According to such presumption, the BJR is not a rule, since it does not tell directors 
what to do or what not to do. On the contrary, it is just a standard of judicial review, 
                                                          
37 William T. Allen et al., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: 
A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 Nw. U.L. Rev. 449, 463 (2002) 
(“Any claim that the duty was breached would be reviewed under the lenient gross negligence standard, and if a 
breach of duty and resulting harm were found, then liability would be imposed.”). 
38 D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, and Executive Compensation, 81 Tul. L. Rev. 
829, 831 (2007).  
39 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 83, 83-84 
(2004). 
40 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
Chapter Six  Ex Post Strategy of Enhancing Supervision by Public Authorities 
 
138 
or a standard of judicial “no-review”.41 But, the BJR can be also understood in the 
following way: when the directors make business decisions, if they 1. reasonably 
inform themselves; 2. act in good faith and 3. have no financial interest in the 
decisions, their decisions will be respected by the courts. Hence, the BJR becomes a 
case law rule (similar to other case law rules in contract law, torts law or property law) 
because it does tell the directors what they shall do when they make business 
decisions by the means of judicial judgments. Ultimately, the BJR represents a 
passive attitude of the courts to intervene in internal matters of companies. So, the 
BJR is called as an “abstention doctrine”.42 In practice, it is unusual that directors are 
found to be held liable for breaking their duty of care in the US.  
The BJR has two very important functions:
43
 first, it encourages directors to invest 
in “potentially valuable corporate opportunities that have some risks of failure”44 and 
preventing courts’ “hindsight bias”.45 A reasonable business decision ex ante may 
generate bad results because of some factors out of the directors’ control, so if the 
directors are held liable for the bad results, they will not pursue risky but valuable 
ventures.
46
 Besides, because of “hindsight” effects, the courts may make mistakes in 
determining whether the directors have fulfilled their duty of care ex post. The second 
one is “judges are trained as lawyers, not compensation experts. Most have little if 
any experience in compensation matters”, 47  so the “policy matters involved in 
compensation decisions are “totally outside the expertise of the courts.”48 
                                                          
41 Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn’t a Rule - The Business Judgment Rule, 36 Val. U.L. Rev. 631 , 635 
(2002) (“The much misunderstood business judgment rule is not a ‘rule’ at all. It has no mandatory content. It 
involves no substantive ‘do’s’ or ‘don’ts’ for corporate directors or officers. ... Alternatively, it could be called a 
standard of non-review, entailing no review of the merits of a business decision corporate officials have 
made.”). 
42 Bainbridge, supra note 39, at 95. 
43 Generally see Franklin A. Gevurtz, Corporation Law (Second Edition) (St. Paul, MN: West, 2010), at 298-310; 
Allen et al. supra note 37, at 454-457; Telman, supra note 38, at 839-861; and Bainbridge, supra note39, at 
110-219. 
44 Allen et al. supra note 37, at 449. 
45 see Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. The Business Judgment Rule: Differences in 
Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587 (1994) (“Hindsight bias is the tendency for people with knowledge of an 
outcome to exaggerate the extent to which they believe that outcome could have been predicted.”).  
46 Allen et al. supra note 37, at 452 (“If the risk of liability is disproportionate to the directors’ incentives for 
service, directors may avoid making economically valuable decisions that might subject them to litigation risk”). 
47 Symposium, Current Issues in Executive Compensation, 3 NYU J. L. & BUS. 519, 538 (2007). 
48  Id. Also see Heller v. Boylan 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941) (“Courts are ill-equipped to solve or even 
to grapple with these entangled economic problems. Indeed, their solution is not within the juridical 
province.”). Another function of the BJR is to respect corporate self-governance. Since directors are elected 
and powered by the shareholders to manage the company, if shareholders are dissatisfied with their decisions, 
they can remove them. So, “where stockholders are able to change the board because of inadequate performance, 
there is less reason for courts to intervene and police whether the directors are behaving reasonably.” see Allen et 
al., supra note37, at 456.  
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B. Chinese scholars’ suggestions and one problem neglected by them 
Though the independent directors own the duty of care to the company, the specific 
component of this duty is not clearly prescribed by the law and the courts lack of 
unified and clear standard to determine whether the independent directors break their 
duty of care. In practice, in the cases of shareholders of closed companies suing 
managers or chairmen of the board for breaking their duty of care, the local Chinese 
courts usually use torts law principles (behaviors that bring damages to the plaintiffs, 
subjective faults of the defendants, losses that incurred by the plaintiffs and the 
causation between the behaviors and the losses) to determine whether the defendants 
break their duty of care.
49
 So, it is necessary, as most Chinese scholars suggest, that 
the Supreme Court shall make unified judicial interpretations on this matter. 
Considering the important functions of the BJR, they suggest that we shall also apply 
the BJR in the US.
50
 Specifically, the Supreme Court shall make it clear that: 
1. When the independent directors make business decisions, they are presumed to: 
(1) have no conflicts of interests in the decisions; (2) inform themselves with respect 
to the decisions; and (3) act in good faith.”51 
2. Only the plaintiff minority shareholders can provide sufficient evidence to rebut 
one of the three presumptions will the courts accept the suits, otherwise the courts will 
“issue a ruling within seven days to refuse to accept the suit which fails to meet the 
conditions for instituting an suit.” 52  As a result, “with such presumption, the 
shareholders will think carefully before they intend to sue the directors. Hence, the 
authority of directors is protected; meanwhile shareholders’ undue intervention is 
deterred.”53 
3. The focus of the judicial review shall be the process of making business 
decisions not the substance of the business decisions,
54
 especially whether the 
                                                          
49 See Luo Pei Xin et al., Empirical Studies on the Judicial Review of Executives’ Duty of Care, No.3 Securities 
Law Review 372, 403 (2010). 
50 Id. at 405-407. Also see Zhu Yi Kun, Directors’ Accountability: Institutional Structure and Efficiency (Beijing: 
Law Press, 2012), at 107; Liu Yin Shuang, Business Judgment Rule in the Shareholders’ Derivative Suit , No.5 
Law Science 142, 147 (2009). The BJR is also accepted by the Japanese courts and the Taiwan’s courts, two 
East Asian jurisdictions that are deeply affected by the US law. See Liu Lian Yu, Directors’ Liabilities and the 
Application of Business Judgment Rule, 17 Cross-Strait Law Review 186, 186 (2007). 
51 Generally see Shi Tian Tao, On Company Law (Beijing: Law Press, 2006), at 404-407; Zhu Ci Yun: Company 
Law (Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2012), at 331-332.  
52 Article 123 of the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (2012 Revision) (promulgated by the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, effective Aug. 31, 2012, hereinafter Civil Procedure 
Law). Article 121 of the Civil Procedure Law provides, “A written complaint shall state:... (3) claims and 
supporting facts and reasons;...”. 
53 Zhu, supra note 50, at 107. 
54 Ren Zi Li, Studies on the Standard of Directors’ Duty of Care, No.6 China Legal Science 83, 90 (2008); Liu 
Yin Shuang, supra note 50, at 145.  
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independent directors have informed themselves or not. As for the executives’ 
compensation, it is very difficult for the courts to determine whether executives’ 
compensation is reasonable or not, because “(1) We cannot measure exactly how big 
roles the executives play in the company; (2) We cannot reliably distinguish good 
CEOs from bad, let alone make fine gradations among them on a spectrum; (3) Even if 
we could truly estimate ex post how much impact the executives had on the company’s 
performance, we cannot do so ex ante; (4) We do not know how many people have the 
skills to be competent executives of large companies; and (5) We lack any basis for 
determining the ‘fair’ allocation of profits between the executives who have worked to 
create the wealth and the shareholders who have financed it.”55 Thus, “procedural 
justice is critical to the legitimacy of executive remuneration. It is of pressing 
necessity to create the firm value maximization and orient executive remuneration 
procedures with independence, fairness and transparency so as to curb the super 
remuneration and regain public confidence.”56 
But one serious problem that neglected by those scholars is when the US courts 
apply the BJR, they will use gross negligence standard to determine whether the 
independent directors break their duty of care. But shall the Chinese courts also apply 
the gross negligence standard? 
C. The Chinese courts shall apply ordinary negligence standard 
I suggest that the Chinese courts shall apply the ordinary negligence standard 
instead of the gross negligence standard to determine whether the independent 
directors break their duty of care when they make executive stock option 
compensation. The reasons are: 
1. The social background of China is different from that of the US 
(1) The M&A (including hostile M&A and friendly M&A) market is well 
developed in the US, the directors will be punished by the market for their reckless 
decisions. By contrast, the M&A market is at its primary stage in China, the 
independent directors cannot feel the stresses from the M&A market.
57
 
(2) The different competence and reputation of judges. “The success of BJR lies in 
                                                          
55 See Franklin G. Snyder, More Pieces Of The CEO Compensation Puzzle, 28 Del. J. Corp. L. 129, 144-149 
(2003). 
56 Zhu Yi Kun, Executive Remuneration: Legitimacy Crisis and Procedural Control, No. 6 Legal Forum 5, 7 
(2004). 
57 Surely, the independent director maybe supervised by controlling shareholders in China, thus making them 
more prudent when they make decisions. But one flaw of this “supervision model” is the independent directors 
are not willing and able to supervise controlling shareholders when the latter do something that hurt the 
interests of minority shareholders.  
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its high qualified judges,”58 for example, the five judges in the Delaware Chancery 
Court are specialized in company law matters and enjoy very good reputation, their 
judgments are highly respected by lawyers and executives and have huge influence on 
them and the courts in other state (even in other countries). In China, we lack of 
highly qualified judges specialized in company law matters, at least currently. Also, 
judicial corruption is a serious problem in China, judges may abuse the gross 
negligence standard to protect the rich and powerful independent directors. One 
solution to this problem is the courts shall be stopped from intervening in the internal 
matters of a company, thus the realities of Chinese judges (not so competent and easy 
to be corrupted) will not become a problem. But, considering the needs to protect 
minority shareholders and improve corporate governance, this solution maybe not 
good for China now. So another solution to this problem is limiting the courts’ 
discretion by using stricter ordinary negligence standard. Thus, the judges have no 
much room to make their own decisions. 
2. If the courts use gross negligence standard to review the independent directors’ 
behaviors ex post, suppose other things are the same, it is highly possible that the 
independent directors will not behave with due care as they are expected ex ante. So, 
in my opinion, it is not realistic that the standard of conduct can diverge from the 
standard of judicial review in practice. 
3. Policy consideration 
The reality in China is that there are few cases that the independent directors are 
held liable for breaking their fiduciary duties in the courts.
59
 If we still apply so 
lenient gross negligence standard, the civil liabilities shall be totally ignored by the 
independent directors. Besides, if plaintiffs know that the courts will use so lenient 
standard to review the independent directors’ decisions, they may not be willing to sue 
against them, thus further reducing the threat of the civil liabilities on the independent 
directors. So the standard of judicial review shall be raised. It is a little bit like the 
idea of punitive damages: for the independent directors, the possibility of being sued 
is low, if we still use the gross negligence standard, the independent directors can 
escape liabilities easily, thus the threat of civil liabilities cannot be realized. So we 
must raise the standard of judicial review to offset the low possibility of the 
independent directors’ being sued to maintain the threat of civil liabilities. 
I admit that the ordinary negligence standard may deter some independent directors 
                                                          
58 Rong, supra note 7, at 56. 
59 See Peng & Qiu, supra note 2, at 41. 
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from accepting the jobs. There are several methods to relieve this concern: 
1. Granting the independent directors more stock compensation to offset the risks 
generated by the stricter standard of judicial review. Shareholders can also benefit 
from granting the independent directors more stock compensation, because this kind 
of compensation may align the interests of the independent directors with those of 
shareholders.  
2. Buying liabilities insurance for the independent directors.
60
 According to Article 
7 (6) of the Independent Director Opinion, “listed companies may establish liabilities 
insurance system for the independent directors to reduce the risks that they could face 
when performing their duties.” I suggest that listed companies shall buy liabilities 
insurance for all the independent directors to offset the stricter standard of judicial 
review. Hence, if the independent directors break their duty of care due to ordinary 
negligence, their liabilities can be covered by insurance policies. 
3. Besides, special circumstances shall also be considered, for example, if a 
decision has to be made in a very short time, there is no enough time for the 
independent directors to collect and analyze related information and discuss it 
completely with other independent directors or directors, the standard of conduct and 
judicial review shall be relieved.  
In short, in my opinion, considering the current realities in China, it is necessary to 
put the independent directors under stricter standard of judicial review so as to 
enhance the threat of civil liabilities.  
V. Conclusion 
I believe that the enhanced threat of civil liabilities will urge the independent 
directors to “take shareholders’ interests more seriously” and perform their duties 
more diligently. For the independent directors, being defendants alone will generate 
severe reputation losses. When the independent directors perform their duties, they 
shall exercise the care that other ordinary independent directors would use in the 
similar circumstance. 
In China, the threat of civil liabilities is weak. This chapter mainly discusses two 
reasons for this phenomenon: we lacking of shareholders’ derivative suits and the 
uncertain standard of judicial review.  
                                                          
60 Generally see Ren Zi Li & Cao Wen Ze, On the Limitation of Directors’ Liability, No. 5 The Jurist 84 (2007). 
Thus, to some extent, the independent directors will also be supervised by insurance companies, which may 
bring a new supervision mechanism to Chinese corporate governance.  
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Hence, this chapter suggests that shareholders’ derivative suits shall be made easier 
for minority shareholders to bring by the means of changing the shareholding 
requirement, reducing filling fees and compensating plaintiffs for lawyers’ fees if they 
win the suits. Furthermore, the Chinese courts shall make it clear that: 1. When 
making executive stock option compensation, the independent directors are presumed 
to: (1) have no conflicts of interests in the decisions; (2) inform themselves with 
respect to the decisions; and (3) act in good faith; 2. Only the plaintiffs can provide 
sufficient evidence to rebut one of the three presumptions will the courts accept the 
suits; 3. The focus of the judicial review is the process of making stock option 
compensation not the substance of the decision; 4. The courts shall apply ordinary 
negligence standard to determine whether the independent directors break their duty 
of care when they make executive stock option compensation.  
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Conclusion 
I. The Short Conclusion of This Dissertation 
Executive stock option compensation grant executives the rights but not the 
obligations to purchase certain amounts of the company’s stocks at a pre-determined 
price (strike price) and conditions within a designated period of time in the future.
1
 
Given the strike price is fixed, the higher the stock price is when executives exercise 
their rights, the more profits executives will make from their stock option 
compensation. Thus when executives are reaping the highest yields from their stock 
option compensation, shareholders can also receive the highest benefits. As a result, 
when granted stock option compensation, executives will be motivated to maximize 
shareholders’ value, hence, the interests of shareholders will align with those of 
executives. To a great extent, executive stock option compensation can reduce the 
agency problems resulting from the separation of ownership and management in listed 
companies.  
To those risk-averse executives, who invest most of their human capitals in the 
company, stock option compensation can encourage them to undertake more risky but 
positive net present value projects. Otherwise, they will not do so because they cannot 
make profits from those projects. Considering shareholders’ limited liability and 
diversification-oriented investment strategies, risky decisions by executives are worth 
making.  
For a start-up company, which lacks of cash but has a bright future, granting stock 
option compensation to executives makes it possible for it to attract and retain highly 
motivated and entrepreneurial executives without directly expending cash. The best 
example of this function of stock option compensation is the high-tech companies in 
the US Silicon Valley grant millions of stock options to their executives and ordinary 
employees.  
                                                          
1 Article 19 of the Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentive Plans of Listed Companies (For Trial 
Implementation) (promulgated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), effective Jan. 1, 2006, 
hereinafter Measures for Equity Incentive Plans) provides, “the stock options as mentioned in the “Measures of 
Equity Incentive Plans” shall refer to the right of the eligible participants granted by a listed company to 
purchase a certain number of shares of the company within a certain period in the future at the pre-determined 
price and conditions. The eligible participants may purchase a certain number of shares of a listed company 
through the stock options granted to it at the pre-determined price and conditions within a prescribed time limit, 
or may waive such right.” Here, the “eligible participants” refers to those who are granted stock options 
according to the stock option plan, such as executives and employees. 
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In a concentrated-ownership company, which is prevailing in China, executive 
stock option compensation can also bring some positive value to both controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders. From the perspective of controlling 
shareholders, stock option compensation can stimulate executives to work harder and 
make better decisions; meanwhile, from the perspective of minority shareholders, 
stock option compensation can encourage executives to resist some “tunneling” 
behaviors of controlling shareholders. Because such behaviors will depress the stock 
price, thus reducing the profits that executives can make from their options. These 
positive functions of executive stock option compensation and its value to 
shareholders have been confirmed by empirical studies in China as well as in other 
developed countries.  
But executive stock option compensation cannot be regarded as a panacea to 
address all the agency problems in listed companies. It also has its own shortcomings 
or agency problems.
2
 The deep root of these agency problems lies in the “enormous 
discretion managers have over most aspects of corporate business, coupled with 
traditional deference from boards,”3 or according to Bebchuk and Fried’s famous 
remark, the “managers’ power”.4 Executives have huge influence over the board and 
the independent directors in the compensation committee; they can help controlling 
shareholders to tunnel the companies for personal profits, thus hurting the interests of 
minority shareholders; they can decide when and what to disclose; they can also 
determine whether to invest in risky ventures or reduce R&D investments and so on. 
The executives’ huge influence (either power or discretion) will definitely hurt the 
interests of shareholders, especially the minority shareholders in the Chinese context,  
where the ownership of publicly traded companies is highly concentrated. So, the 
main focus of this dissertation is to reduce the influence of executives to protect the 
interests of shareholders through different kinds of legal approaches and strategies.  
Specifically, this dissertation intends to discuss and address the following five 
common agency problems of executive stock option compensation in Chinese listed 
companies: 
                                                          
2 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17Journal of 
Economic Perspective 71, 72 (2003) (“Executive compensation is viewed not only as a potential instrument for 
addressing the agency problem but also as part of the agency problem itself.”).  
3  Charles M. Yablon & Jennifer Hill, Timing Corporate Disclosures to Maximize Performance-Based 
Remuneration, a Case of Misaligned Incentives? 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 83, 117 (2000).  
4 Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
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A. Executives may be granted excessive stock option compensation because the 
compensation committee and its independent directors fail to perform their duties 
efficiently. Under the influence of executives, it is difficult for them to make objective, 
independent and fair compensation decisions. 
B. Stock option compensation may induce executives to violate securities law and 
regulations to satisfy the conditions for gaining their stock options, for exercising 
their rights, or for artificially raising the stock price when they exercise their rights so 
as to make excessive and unjust profits from their options. 
C. Stock option compensation may provide executives with the unethical incentives 
to time information disclosures by the means of causing their company’s stock price 
to drop shortly before the date of issuance or boosting the stock price shortly before 
the date of exercise so as to maximize the value of their options, which I call timing 
problem in this dissertation. 
D. Stock option compensation may wrongly encourage executives to purse 
short-term profits through making excessive risk-taking investments, cutting R&D 
budgets or laying off masses of workers at the costs of the long-term interests of 
shareholders, which I call short-termism problem in this dissertation. 
E. Due to executives’ huge influence, they may be awarded with windfalls (e.g. the 
strike price will not be raised even if the good performance of the company is due to 
the good market development), which cannot coexist with the objective of this kind of 
compensation from the perspective of shareholders, namely, “profiting together, 
losing together”, which I call windfalls problem in this dissertation.  
This dissertation intends to make some suggestions to address the aforementioned 
five agency problems of executive stock option compensation through three different 
legal approaches: first, enhancing supervision inside the company; second, enhancing 
supervision by compensation consultants; and third, enhancing supervision by public 
authorities. Furthermore, each approach is divided into two strategies: ex ante strategy 
and ex post strategy. Frankly speaking, I have no expectation that my suggestions will 
completely address these agency problems. I only hope that my suggestions can do 
better than current laws and regulations, thus improving the development of executive 
stock option compensation in China. 
The ex ante strategies of enhancing supervision inside the company are: expanding 
the role of compensation committee and its independent directors and improving the 
disclosure of executive stock option compensation; the ex post strategy of enhancing 
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supervision inside the company are: clarifying the provision of clawing back 
executive stock option compensation and making shareholders’ derivative suits easier 
for minority shareholders to bring. Since the shareholders’ derivative suits have a 
close relationship with the judicial review, I will discuss the issues of shareholders’ 
derivative suits together with the judicial review.  
The ex ante strategies of enhancing supervision by compensation consultants are: 
granting the compensation committee the exclusive power to hire, compensate, 
supervise and fire its own compensation consultant, establishing the 
non-independence standard of a compensation consultant and preventing the 
non-independent compensation consultant from issuing professional opinions on the 
stock option plans; the ex post strategy of enhancing supervision by compensation 
consultants is imposing more efficient civil liabilities on them.  
The ex ante strategy of enhancing supervision by public authorities is the CSRC 
shall make “comply or explain” rules to address three specific agency problems (the 
timing problem, short-termism problem and windfalls problem) of executive stock 
option compensation; the ex post strategy of enhancing supervision by public 
authorities is the courts shall clarify the standard of judicial review.  
The core suggestions of this dissertation are: 
A.The role of the compensation committee shall be expanded. 1. It shall be granted 
the sole power to make executive stock option compensation; and 2. It shall be 
granted the exclusive power to hire, compensate, supervise and fire its own 
compensation consultant. 
B. The role of the independent directors in the compensation committee shall be 
expanded. 1. They shall be granted stock compensation to align their interests with 
those of shareholders; 2. More efficient shame sanctions shall be imposed on them 
through well-defined power and the improved disclosure of executive stock option 
compensation; 3. Independent, objective and professional advice shall be provided to 
them; and 4. More efficient threat of civil liabilities shall be imposed on them through 
easier shareholders’ derivative suits and clear and stricter standard of judicial review. 
C. The CSRC shall play a critical role in addressing the aforementioned agency 
problems in China, where the powers of the courts and the capital market are not 
strong. 1. It shall update and improve its disclosure rules to make the disclosure of 
executive stock option compensation more understandable, transparent and 
comprehensive to minority shareholders and the media; 2. It also shall establish the 
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non-independence standard of a compensation consultant and ban the 
non-independent compensation consultant from providing professional opinions on 
the stock option plans; and 3. It shall make “comply or explain” rules to address three 
specific agency problems (timing problem, short-termism problem and windfalls 
problem) of executive stock option compensation. 
The following is the short conclusion of this dissertation. 
A. In the chapter of introduction, first, I briefly analyze the agency problems in 
listed companies and the solutions to address these problems; second, I point out the 
positive functions and five common agency problems of executive stock option 
compensation and the purpose of this dissertation; third, I briefly introduce three legal 
approaches and two strategies to address these problems; forth, I introduce the 
methodology of this dissertation; fifth, I make some notices on what will not be 
discussed in this dissertation; finally, I introduce how this dissertation proceeds. 
B. In chapter one, I point out that executives may be granted excessive stock option 
compensation because of 1. executives’ influence on the board and the independent 
directors in the compensation committee; 2. the compensation committee having 
limited power; and 3. some shortcomings of the institution of independent directors in 
China. Considering the framework of this dissertation, this chapter makes suggestions 
on how to address the problem of the compensation committee having limited power 
and the problem of the independent directors being paid without incentive 
compensation. This chapter suggests that the compensation committee shall be 
granted the exclusive power to make executive stock option compensation. Or if the 
board decides to amend or withdraw the draft of executive stock option compensation 
made by the compensation committee, it has to disclose detailed reasons why it does 
so, as a result, its decision will be supervised by minority shareholders and the media. 
Besides, companies shall grant the independent directors stock compensation to align 
their interests with those of shareholders. 
C. In chapter two, I point out some problems of the disclosure of executive stock 
option compensation in China, such as the disclosure of executive stock option 
compensation is not understandable, the disclosure of the process of making executive 
stock option compensation is not transparent, and the disclosure of the content of 
executive stock option compensation is not comprehensive, which make it difficult for 
minority shareholders and the media to understand and evaluate executive stock 
option compensation, thus reducing the effectiveness of shame sanctions on the 
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independent directors in the compensation committee, which maybe the most efficient 
method to supervise them. So, this chapter suggests: 1. The disclosure of executives’ 
stock option compensation shall be easy for minority shareholders and the media to 
understand; 2.The disclosure of the process of making stock option compensation 
shall be transparent so as to prevent conflicts of interest; and 3. The disclosure of the 
content of stock option compensation shall be comprehensive so as to let minority 
shareholders and the media evaluate the performance of the board and the 
compensation committee, especially the independent directors in the compensation 
committee.  
D. In chapter three, I point out that executives may break securities laws and 
regulations, for example, by manipulating earnings or other accounting figures, to 
satisfy the conditions for gaining their stock options, for exercising their rights, or for 
artificially raising the stock price when they exercise their rights so as to make 
excessive and unjust profits from their options. So the provision of clawing back 
executive stock option compensation is created to deter such behaviors. According to 
Article 46 of the Measures for Equity Incentive Plans, “in case there are any false 
records in the financial and accounting documents of a listed company, the eligible 
participant who is responsible shall return all the interests she has obtained pursuant 
to the equity incentive plan within 12 months from the day when the financial and 
accounting documents are announced.” There some uncertainties in this Article, 
including: 1. What exactly are the financial and accounting documents? 2. Whether 
only in the circumstance of false records in the financial and accounting documents 
shall the eligible participant return all the interests. If not, are there any other 
circumstances? 3. What is the specific range of the executives whose stock option 
compensation should be clawed back? 4. What does the “all the interests” mean? 5. 
Who exactly can claw back executive stock option compensation? This chapter 
clarifies these uncertainties as follows: 1. The financial and accounting documents 
only refers to the accounting statements that shall be disclosed; 2. Misleading 
statements or serious omissions in the accounting statements shall also lead to claw 
back executive stock option compensation; 3. The specific range of who should be 
clawed back includes the current or former non-independent directors and senior 
managers if they are responsible for the illegal behaviors; 4 “All the interests” means 
granted but not exercised stock options and the benefits from exercising options (not 
including the profits from selling stocks which executives gain after exercising their 
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options); 5. The board of the company shall claw back executive stock option 
compensation. 
E. In chapter four, I discuss the roles that a compensation consultant can play in 
addressing agency problems of executive stock option compensation. In China, the 
primary role of a compensation consultant is to legitimize the board and the  
compensation committee’s decision. When facing conflicts of interest, such as 
providing other services to the company or continuing business relationship with the 
company, a compensation consultant may surrender itself to executives, hence, this 
chapter suggests: 1. The compensation committee shall have the exclusive power to 
hire, compensation, supervise and fire its own compensation consultant; 2. 
Non-independence standard of a compensation consultant shall be established and the 
non-independent compensation consultant shall be prohibited from issuing 
professional opinions on the stock option plan; 3. More efficient civil liabilities shall 
be imposed on compensation consultants in the future.  
F. In chapter five, I suggest that the CSRC shall make “comply or explain” rules 
that could address the timing problem, short-termism problem and windfalls problem 
of executive stock option compensation and require companies to comply with those 
rules. But, at the same time, companies are allowed not to comply with those rules 
under some circumstances if they explain and disclose the reasons why they do so in 
detail.  
Specifically, with regard to how to address the timing problem, this chapter 
suggests that the CSRC shall amend Article 24 of the Measures for Equity Incentive 
Plans to require companies to extend the period determining the strike price from 30 
trading days to one year and require executives to disclose their intended exercising in 
advance. With regard to how to address the short-termism problem, this chapter 
suggests that the CSRC shall require companies to prolong the vesting time from 1 
year to 3 years. In addition, executives can only exercise no more than 20% options 
that they are granted at the first time every year after 3 years’ vesting time. If 
executives are subject to this requirement, the stocks that they gain from exercising 
options are exempting from the restrictions of Article 142 (2) of the Company Law
5
 
(restriction on selling stocks) and Article 47 (1) of the Securities Law
6
 (restriction on 
short-swing trading). With regard to how to address the windfalls problem, this 
                                                          
5 Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (2005 Revision) (promulgated by the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress, effective Jan. 1, 2006). 
6 Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China (2005Revision) (promulgated by the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress, effective Jan. 1, 2006). 
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chapter suggests that the CSRC shall require companies to adopt market or industry 
indexed stock option compensation.  
G. In chapter six, I point out that the independent directors in the compensation 
committee face weak threat of civil liabilities may lead them to less care about the 
interests of shareholders, especially the interests of minority shareholders and to grant 
excessive stock option compensation to executives. The main reasons for this 
phenomenon are: shareholders’ derivative suits are lacking and the standard of judicial 
review is uncertain in China. Hence, this chapter suggests that shareholders’ 
derivative suits shall be made easier for minority shareholders to bring by the means 
of changing the shareholding requirement, reducing filling fees and compensating 
plaintiffs for lawyers’ fees if they win the suits. Furthermore, the Chinese courts shall 
make it clear that: 1. When making executive stock option compensation, the 
independent directors are presumed to: (1) have no conflicts of interests in the 
decisions; (2) inform themselves with respect to the decisions; and (3) act in good 
faith; 2. Only the plaintiffs can provide sufficient evidence to rebut one of the three 
presumptions will the courts accept the suits; 3. The focus of the judicial review is the 
process of making stock option compensation not the substance of the decision; 4. 
The courts shall apply ordinary negligence standard to determine whether the 
independent directors break their duty of care when they make executive stock option 
compensation.  
II. The Contributions of This Dissertation 
This dissertation points out five common agency problems of executive stock 
option compensation in Chinese listed companies in detail. Based on the experiences 
of other developed countries, especially the experiences of the US and Japan, and the 
realities in China, this dissertation provides some suggestions on how to address these 
problems. Specifically:  
A. This dissertation comprehensively discusses the issues of clawing back 
executive stock option compensation and the compensation consultant for the first 
time in China. 
B. In China, “the comply or explain” approach and the functions of “shame 
sanctions” are not paid enough attentions by law scholars. As a result, few law articles 
have ever discussed the two topics seriously before. This dissertation studies these 
topics more detailed than former studies. 
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III. The Shortcomings and Limits of This Dissertation 
Frankly speaking, I lack of practical experience with regard to executive stock 
option compensation and have little knowledge of financial and accounting theories, 
so my understanding of stock option compensation is still inadequate. So, some 
shortcomings and limits cannot be avoided in this dissertation. Specifically: 
A. Though this dissertation discusses the practice of executive stock option 
compensation in China by the means of referring to the empirical studies made by 
financial or accounting scholars and news reports, it does not discuss and analyze the  
judicial judgments with regard to executive stock option compensation. The reason is 
that lawsuits on executive stock option compensation (especially lawsuits with 
Chinese characteristics) have never happened in practice to date.  
B. This dissertation does not discuss the success and failure of institutions of 
Chinese independent directors in detail. This dissertation only focuses on the 
compensation, civil liabilities and shame sanctions of independent directors. So, my 
suggestions with regard to independent directors are not comprehensive.  
  C. The role of stock exchanges in addressing the agency problems of executive 
stock option compensation and the different social and legal backgrounds of China, 
the US and Japan are not discussed in detail in this dissertation. 
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